Lukas Milevski | Universiteit Leiden (original) (raw)
Books by Lukas Milevski
Riga: Jumava 2019. Latvian translation of The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strate... more Riga: Jumava 2019. Latvian translation of The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective.
Defense of the Baltic has gained unprecedented prominence in the West in view of a post-2014 resu... more Defense of the Baltic has gained unprecedented prominence in the West in view of a post-2014 resurgent Russia. The West's East follows the principles of strategic analysis for a systematic introduction to defense of the three Baltic states within their own context of broader security vulnerabilities as well as the historical and current contexts of both allies and neighboring powers. This 800-year overview-from indigenous Baltic tribes to the post-Cold War period-provides a historical and strategic perspective on conditions in which independent states existed and flourished among predatory great powers.
More recent historical events and personalities also form the basis for analogies which are often used, rightly or wrongly, by Western observers to understand Russia and its relationship to the West. Today's strategic balance in the Baltic region is characterized through general analysis of the individual actors' geopolitical outlook, strategic culture, military capabilities, and non-military security vulnerabilities. The dynamics of potential strategic interactions between NATO and Russia are anticipated in case of hypothetical conflict in the Baltic, premised upon the general theory of strategy and essential strategic logic. These potential interactions range from deterrence, through various considerations of strategy in war itself, and the thorniness of war termination. Finally, more technical and esoteric aspects of military strategy related to instrumentality, effect, adversary, and control are considered in relation to the ultimate question of how much defense for the Baltic is enough.
Oxford University Press, 2016. This book tracks the historical evolution of grand strategic thou... more Oxford University Press, 2016.
This book tracks the historical evolution of grand strategic thought. A conceptual history of grand strategy, it traces what people meant when they employed the term. The book refutes a number of commonly held beliefs or assumptions, including that Basil Liddell Hart first coined the term and developed the concept, and that grand strategy experienced only a single evolutionary path. Originally a product of nineteenth-century military thought, grand strategy acquired broader conceptual boundaries and wider popularity through adoption by maritime strategy by the early twentieth century.
Between the World Wars, the Britons John Frederick Charles Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart wrote extensively about grand strategy, while in the United States a myriad of opinions concerning grand strategy emerged, including those of Edward Mead Earle. Grand strategy’s popularity waned during the first half of the Cold War as a result of the immediate importance of developing nuclear strategy and limited war theories. However, as a result of changing intellectual and geopolitical contexts by the early 1970s, grand strategy regained and surpassed its previous popularity, which to this day it has yet to lose even though the range of meanings the concept has attained through overuse has become wider and therefore more obscure.
Monographs by Lukas Milevski
Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Advancing Strategic Thought series, 2019
Book Chapters by Lukas Milevski
ategy Matters…Essays in Honor of Colin S. Gray, 2022
in Donovan C. Chau (ed). Strategy Matters…Essays in Honor of Colin S. Gray. (Maxwell: Air Unive... more in Donovan C. Chau (ed). Strategy Matters…Essays in Honor of Colin S. Gray. (Maxwell: Air University Press 2022), 177-198.
The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy, 2021
“Liddell Hart’s Impact on the Study of Grand Strategy” in Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs (ed... more “Liddell Hart’s Impact on the Study of Grand Strategy” in Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy. (Oxford: Oxford UP 2021), 73-88.
The Conduct of War in the 21st Century: Kinetic, Connected and Synthetic, 2021
“The Emotions of Adversarial Interaction” in Robert Johnson, Martijn Kitzen, and Tim Sweys (eds).... more “The Emotions of Adversarial Interaction” in Robert Johnson, Martijn Kitzen, and Tim Sweys (eds). The Conduct of War in the 21st Century: Kinetic, Connected and Synthetic. (London: Routledge 2021), 279-292.
In Jason Warren (ed). Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force after 9/11. (Lexington: UP of... more In Jason Warren (ed). Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force after 9/11. (Lexington: UP of Kentucky 2019), 15-31.
Articles by Lukas Milevski
Joint Force Quarterly, 2024
When Does Gray Zone Confrontation End? A Conceptual Analysis”, Joint Force Quarterly 112 (January... more When Does Gray Zone Confrontation End? A Conceptual Analysis”, Joint Force Quarterly 112 (January 2024), 4-11.
Survival, 2023
Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy militar... more Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy military equipment and manpower at rates for which the West is ill-prepared. Medium and larger militaries in particular may be primitivised during and by future warfare: they may become more socially, organisationally, and technologically primitive versions of themselves. This is a process with historical and contemporary precedent, as experienced by the Wehrmacht during World War II and the Russian army in Ukraine today. The tactical and operational realities of sustained military campaigning against a major adversary may well primitivise Western militaries too, a challenge for which better technology is both only a partial answer and a vulnerability. Primitivisation has implications not only for defence industrial and manpower policies, but also force design and ultimately employment.
Comparative Strategy, 2023
Comparative Strategy 42/5 (September 2023), 718-728. Open access, link provided.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2023
Journal of Strategic Studies 46/4 “Fads and Fashions in Strategic Studies” special issue (2023), ... more Journal of Strategic Studies 46/4 “Fads and Fashions in Strategic Studies” special issue (2023), 787-808. Open access, link provided.
Journal of Strategic Studies
Journal of Strategic Studies 46/1 (2023), 180-206.
Military Review, 2022
Editor's note: This article is a reprint of a Military Review
RUSI Journal, 2022
RUSI Journal 167/2 (2022), 62-70. Open access.
Military Strategy, 2021
Military Strategy 7/3 (Summer 2021), 4-8.
Comparative Strategy, 2021
“Colin S. Gray, Deterrence, and Contingency”, Comparative Strategy 40/2 (2021), 145-149.
Riga: Jumava 2019. Latvian translation of The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strate... more Riga: Jumava 2019. Latvian translation of The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective.
Defense of the Baltic has gained unprecedented prominence in the West in view of a post-2014 resu... more Defense of the Baltic has gained unprecedented prominence in the West in view of a post-2014 resurgent Russia. The West's East follows the principles of strategic analysis for a systematic introduction to defense of the three Baltic states within their own context of broader security vulnerabilities as well as the historical and current contexts of both allies and neighboring powers. This 800-year overview-from indigenous Baltic tribes to the post-Cold War period-provides a historical and strategic perspective on conditions in which independent states existed and flourished among predatory great powers.
More recent historical events and personalities also form the basis for analogies which are often used, rightly or wrongly, by Western observers to understand Russia and its relationship to the West. Today's strategic balance in the Baltic region is characterized through general analysis of the individual actors' geopolitical outlook, strategic culture, military capabilities, and non-military security vulnerabilities. The dynamics of potential strategic interactions between NATO and Russia are anticipated in case of hypothetical conflict in the Baltic, premised upon the general theory of strategy and essential strategic logic. These potential interactions range from deterrence, through various considerations of strategy in war itself, and the thorniness of war termination. Finally, more technical and esoteric aspects of military strategy related to instrumentality, effect, adversary, and control are considered in relation to the ultimate question of how much defense for the Baltic is enough.
Oxford University Press, 2016. This book tracks the historical evolution of grand strategic thou... more Oxford University Press, 2016.
This book tracks the historical evolution of grand strategic thought. A conceptual history of grand strategy, it traces what people meant when they employed the term. The book refutes a number of commonly held beliefs or assumptions, including that Basil Liddell Hart first coined the term and developed the concept, and that grand strategy experienced only a single evolutionary path. Originally a product of nineteenth-century military thought, grand strategy acquired broader conceptual boundaries and wider popularity through adoption by maritime strategy by the early twentieth century.
Between the World Wars, the Britons John Frederick Charles Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart wrote extensively about grand strategy, while in the United States a myriad of opinions concerning grand strategy emerged, including those of Edward Mead Earle. Grand strategy’s popularity waned during the first half of the Cold War as a result of the immediate importance of developing nuclear strategy and limited war theories. However, as a result of changing intellectual and geopolitical contexts by the early 1970s, grand strategy regained and surpassed its previous popularity, which to this day it has yet to lose even though the range of meanings the concept has attained through overuse has become wider and therefore more obscure.
Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Advancing Strategic Thought series, 2019
ategy Matters…Essays in Honor of Colin S. Gray, 2022
in Donovan C. Chau (ed). Strategy Matters…Essays in Honor of Colin S. Gray. (Maxwell: Air Unive... more in Donovan C. Chau (ed). Strategy Matters…Essays in Honor of Colin S. Gray. (Maxwell: Air University Press 2022), 177-198.
The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy, 2021
“Liddell Hart’s Impact on the Study of Grand Strategy” in Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs (ed... more “Liddell Hart’s Impact on the Study of Grand Strategy” in Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy. (Oxford: Oxford UP 2021), 73-88.
The Conduct of War in the 21st Century: Kinetic, Connected and Synthetic, 2021
“The Emotions of Adversarial Interaction” in Robert Johnson, Martijn Kitzen, and Tim Sweys (eds).... more “The Emotions of Adversarial Interaction” in Robert Johnson, Martijn Kitzen, and Tim Sweys (eds). The Conduct of War in the 21st Century: Kinetic, Connected and Synthetic. (London: Routledge 2021), 279-292.
In Jason Warren (ed). Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force after 9/11. (Lexington: UP of... more In Jason Warren (ed). Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force after 9/11. (Lexington: UP of Kentucky 2019), 15-31.
Joint Force Quarterly, 2024
When Does Gray Zone Confrontation End? A Conceptual Analysis”, Joint Force Quarterly 112 (January... more When Does Gray Zone Confrontation End? A Conceptual Analysis”, Joint Force Quarterly 112 (January 2024), 4-11.
Survival, 2023
Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy militar... more Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy military equipment and manpower at rates for which the West is ill-prepared. Medium and larger militaries in particular may be primitivised during and by future warfare: they may become more socially, organisationally, and technologically primitive versions of themselves. This is a process with historical and contemporary precedent, as experienced by the Wehrmacht during World War II and the Russian army in Ukraine today. The tactical and operational realities of sustained military campaigning against a major adversary may well primitivise Western militaries too, a challenge for which better technology is both only a partial answer and a vulnerability. Primitivisation has implications not only for defence industrial and manpower policies, but also force design and ultimately employment.
Comparative Strategy, 2023
Comparative Strategy 42/5 (September 2023), 718-728. Open access, link provided.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2023
Journal of Strategic Studies 46/4 “Fads and Fashions in Strategic Studies” special issue (2023), ... more Journal of Strategic Studies 46/4 “Fads and Fashions in Strategic Studies” special issue (2023), 787-808. Open access, link provided.
Journal of Strategic Studies
Journal of Strategic Studies 46/1 (2023), 180-206.
Military Review, 2022
Editor's note: This article is a reprint of a Military Review
RUSI Journal, 2022
RUSI Journal 167/2 (2022), 62-70. Open access.
Military Strategy, 2021
Military Strategy 7/3 (Summer 2021), 4-8.
Comparative Strategy, 2021
“Colin S. Gray, Deterrence, and Contingency”, Comparative Strategy 40/2 (2021), 145-149.
Comparative Strategy, 2020
“Battle and its Emotional Effect in War Termination”, Comparative Strategy 39/6 (2020), 535-548.
Defense & Security Analysis, 2020
Military Strategy Magazine 7/1 (Spring 2020), 18-25.
Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 2019
This article considers Baltic defence strategically, focusing on three scenarios of Russian aggre... more This article considers Baltic defence strategically, focusing on three scenarios of Russian aggression against the Baltic states: 1) an ambiguous invasion, what the West would call a hybrid war; 2) a hasty invasion by Russian formations already in and around the Baltic region; and 3) a prepared invasion by more substantial Russian forces brought within striking distance of the Baltic states from other parts of Russia. The ultimate question for each is: does this particular scenario present Russia with a viable strategy, a convincing theory of success? Each scenario is explored through the perspectives of military practice or tactics, then politics, and then synthesized through a strategic perspective. The article argues that neither the ambiguous invasion nor the hasty invasion scenarios provide convincing theories of success for Russia, whereas the prepared invasion does provide a compelling theory of victory.
Orbis, 2020
Orbis 64/1 (Winter 2020), 150-160.
Revue Stratégique, 2019
Revue Stratégique 121-122 (2019/1-2), 347-359.
Orbis, 2019
Orbis 63/3 (Summer 2019), 376-390.
Orbis, 2017
Review of JP Clark, "Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917", Harvar... more Review of JP Clark, "Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917", Harvard UP 2017.
Parameters 47/1 (Spring 2017), 144-145.
RUSI Journal 158/5 (October-November 2013), 107-108.