A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming (original) (raw)

Abstract

The morality of virtual representations and the enactment of prohibited activities within single-player gamespace (e.g., murder, rape, paedophilia) continues to be debated and, to date, a consensus is not forthcoming. Various moral arguments have been presented (e.g., virtue theory and utilitarianism) to support the moral prohibition of virtual enactments, but their applicability to gamespace is questioned. In this paper, I adopt a meta-ethical approach to moral utterances about virtual representations, and ask what it means when one declares that a virtual interaction ‘is morally wrong’. In response, I present constructive ecumenical expressivism to (i) explain what moral utterances should be taken to mean, (ii) argue that they mean the same when referring to virtual and non-virtual interactions and (iii), given (ii), explain why consensus with regard to virtual murder, rape and paedophilia is not forthcoming even though such consensus is readily found with regard to their non-virtual equivalents.

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Notes

1. By ‘single-player video games’ I mean games played on personal computers (PCs) or consoles such as X-Box 360/One, PlayStation 1–4, and Wii. Although such games may be available in formats that allow one player or a number of players (connected through the Internet) to play, I restrict discussion to situations in which a single player plays alongside and/or against non-player characters (NPCs).
2. Owing to the need for brevity, the paper does not concern itself will the issue of morality and play. For discussion on this, see Young and Whitty (2012).
3. I thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
4. For the sake of simplicity, I have discounted a morally neutral attitude.
5. For this reason, this approach is sometimes referred to as projectivism.
6. Perhaps in the case of music or art, one would be more inclined to say bad rather than wrong.
7. For the sake of brevity, I am discounting that one’s approval of murder co-occurs with one’s amoralist view.
8. An anaphoric reference occurs when a word in a text refers to a previous idea in the text for its meaning. In the sentence “Fred always looked unkempt but this never seemed to bother him”, the word ‘him’ clearly refers to Fred.
9. Again, I thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point.
10. I am not discounting the possibility that an individual or group may recognize that x realizes each of these things: negative utility, violation of God’s law, vice. Nevertheless, it is likely that one will be held as a more fundamental reason for disapproval than the others.

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1. Division of Psychology, Nottingham Trent University, Burton Street, Nottingham, NG1 4BU, UK
   Garry Young

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Young, G. A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming.Ethics Inf Technol 16, 91–102 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-014-9336-7

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• Published: 11 February 2014
• Issue Date: June 2014
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-014-9336-7

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