Gualtiero Piccinini | University of Missouri-Columbia (original) (raw)

Books by Gualtiero Piccinini

Oxford University Press, 2024

We argue that mapping accounts of computational implementation can be made adequate by incorporat... more We argue that mapping accounts of computational implementation can be made adequate by incorporating appropriate physical constraints. Specifically, according to the robust mapping account we propose, a mapping from physical to computational states is a legitimate basis for implementation only if it includes only physical states relevant to the computation, the physical states have enough spatiotemporal structure to map onto the structure of the computational states, and the evolving physical states bear neither more nor less information about the evolving computation than do the computational states they map onto. When these conditions are in place, a physical system can be said to implement a computation in a robust sense, which does not trivialize the notion of implementation. We apply this robust mapping account to important questions in the physical foundations of computation and cognitive science.

Cambridge Elements, 2023

The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history ... more The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history going back to the idea that thought is a kind of computation. Its modern incarnation relies on analogies with contemporary computing technology and the use of computational models. It comes in many versions, some more plausible than others. This Element supports the theory primarily by its contribution to solving the mind-body problem, its ability to explain mental phenomena, and the success of computational modelling and artificial intelligence. To be turned into an adequate theory, it needs to be made compatible with the tractability of cognition, the situatedness and dynamical aspects of the mind, the way the brain works, intentionality, and consciousness.

Oxford University Press, 2020

In Neurocognitive Mechanisms Gualtiero Piccinini presents the most systematic, rigorous, and comp... more In Neurocognitive Mechanisms Gualtiero Piccinini presents the most systematic, rigorous, and comprehensive philosophical defence to date of the computational theory of cognition. His view posits that cognition involves neural computation within multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms, and includes novel ideas about ontology, functions, neural representation, neural computation, and consciousness. He begins by defending an ontologically egalitarian account of composition and realization, according to which all levels are equally real. He then explicates multiple realizability and mechanisms within this ontologically egalitarian framework, defends a goal-contribution account of teleological functions, and defends a mechanistic version of functionalism. This provides the foundation for a mechanistic account of computation, which in turn clarifies the ways in which the computational theory of cognition is a multilevel mechanistic theory supported by contemporary cognitive neuroscience.

Piccinini argues that cognition is computational at least in a generic sense. He defends the computational theory of cognition from standard objections, yet also rebuts putative a priori arguments. He contends that the typical vehicles of neural computations are representations, and that, contrary to the received view, the representations posited by the computational theory of cognition are observable and manipulatable in the laboratory. He also contends that neural computations are neither digital nor analog; instead, neural computations are sui generis. He concludes by investigating the relation between computation and consciousness, suggesting that consciousness may be a functional phenomenon without being computational in nature. This book will be of interest to philosophers of cognitive science as well as neuroscientists.

Oxford University Press, 2015

Gualtiero Piccinini articulates and defends a mechanistic account of concrete, or physical, compu... more Gualtiero Piccinini articulates and defends a mechanistic account of concrete, or physical, computation. A physical system is a computing system just in case it is a mechanism one of whose functions is to manipulate vehicles based solely on differences between different portions of the vehicles according to a rule defined over the vehicles. Physical Computation discusses previous accounts of computation and argues that the mechanistic account is better. Many kinds of computation are explicated, such as digital vs. analog, serial vs. parallel, neural network computation, program-controlled computation, and more. Piccinini argues that computation does not entail representation or information processing although information processing entails computation. Pancomputationalism, according to which every physical system is computational, is rejected. A modest version of the physical Church-Turing thesis, according to which any function that is physically computable is computable by Turing machines, is defended.

Section 3.1 of the present work is an adapted version of section 2 of Gualtiero Piccinini, "Alan ... more Section 3.1 of the present work is an adapted version of section 2 of Gualtiero Piccinini, "Alan Turing and the Mathematical Objection," Minds and Machines 13(1), pp. 23-48.

Drafts by Gualtiero Piccinini

We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its par... more We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a portion of reality at different scales in the precise sense employed by measurement theory. The purpose of these scales is the numerical representation of primitive relations between quantities of objects. To show this, we prove representation and uniqueness theorems for composition. Thus, mereologically invariant composition is trans-scalar identity.

This chapter provides an account of realization within a mechanistic framework and introduces the... more This chapter provides an account of realization within a mechanistic framework and introduces the notions of variable realizability, multiple realizability, and medium independence. I argue that realization is the relation between a higher-level property and the lower-level properties of which it is a part. Variable realizability occurs when the same higher-level property can be realized in different lower-level properties—the same property part embedded in different property wholes. Variable realizability is ubiquitous yet insufficient for multiple realizability proper. Multiple realizability occurs when the same higher-level property can be realized in different lower-level properties that constitute different mechanisms for that property at the immediately lower mechanistic level. Medium independence is an even stronger condition than multiple realizability: it occurs when not only is a higher-level property multiply realizable; in addition, the inputs and outputs that define the higher-level property are also multiply realizable. Thus, all that matters to defining a medium-independent higher-level property is the manipulation of certain degrees of freedom. In sum, medium independence entails multiple realizability, which in turn entails variable realizability, but variable realizability does not entail multiple realizability, which in turn does not entail medium independence.

This chapter articulates an egalitarian ontology of levels of objects and properties. Neither who... more This chapter articulates an egalitarian ontology of levels of objects and properties. Neither wholes nor their proper parts are more fundamental. Neither higher-level properties nor lower-level properties are more fundamental. Instead, whole objects are invariants over some part additions, subtractions, and rearrangements; higher-level properties are part of their lower-level realizers. This egalitarian ontology solves the causal exclusion problem and does justice to the special sciences—including cognitive neuroscience.

According to pancomputationalism, all physical systems – atoms, rocks, hurricanes, and toasters –... more According to pancomputationalism, all physical systems – atoms, rocks, hurricanes, and toasters – perform computations. Pancomputationalism seems to be increasingly popular among some philosophers and physicists. In this paper, we interpret pancomputationalism in terms of computational descriptions of varying strength—computational interpretations of physical microstates and dynamics that vary in their restrictiveness. We distinguish several types of pancomputationalism and identify essential features of the computational descriptions required to support them. By tying various pancomputationalist theses directly to notions of what counts as computation in a physical system, we clarify the meaning, strength, and plausibility of pancomputationalist claims. We show that the force of these claims is diminished when weaknesses in their supporting computational descriptions are laid bare. Specifically, once computation is meaningfully distinguished from ordinary dynamics, the most sensational pancomputationalist claims are unwarranted, whereas the more modest claims offer little more than recognition of causal similarities between physical processes and the most primitive computing processes.

Papers by Gualtiero Piccinini

Synthese

We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing how an... more We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing that is a form of knowing how and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that P is knowing how to represent the fact that P, ground such a representation in the fact that P, use such a representation to guide action with respect to P when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how. More precisely, agents acquire Thus, both implicit and explicit knowing that P are forms of knowing how to represent that P, ground such a representation in P, use such a representation to guide action with respect to P when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how.

Computational neuroscience consists of building computational models of neural systems at various... more Computational neuroscience consists of building computational models of neural systems at various levels of organization. Most computational neuroscientists assume that nervous systems compute and process information. We explain how computational modelling in neuroscience works by using a recent model of object recognition as a case study and discuss what computational neuroscientists mean by 'computation' and 'information processing' in nervous systems; whether computation and information processing are matters of objective fact or of conventional, observer-dependent description; and how computational descriptions and explanations are related to other levels of analysis and organization.

Cognitive Neuroscience

I argue that ideas and models about the mechanisms of neural computation and representation-inclu... more I argue that ideas and models about the mechanisms of neural computation and representation-including computational architecture, representational format, encoding schemes, learning methods, computation-representation coordination, and substrate-dependent aspects-must be tested by studying embodied neural systems. Thus, cognitive computational neuroscience-the study of neural computations over neural representations-must be an embodied research program.

Social Science Research Network, 2009

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep 1, 2004

Philosophy of Science, Dec 1, 2010

Computationalism-the view that cognition is computation-has always been controversial. It faces t... more Computationalism-the view that cognition is computation-has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y, and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this article, I explain why computationalism has survived these objections. To adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, I will conclude that we need a better account of computation.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020

McCulloch and Pitts were the first to use and Alan Turing’s notion of computation to understand n... more McCulloch and Pitts were the first to use and Alan Turing’s notion of computation to understand neural, and thus cognitive, activity. McCulloch and Pitts’s contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata, which is an important formalism in computability theory, (ii) a technique that inspired the notion of logic design, which is a fundamental part of modern computer design, (iii) the first use of computation to address the mind–body problem, and (iv) the first modern computational theory of cognition, which posits that neurons are equivalent to logic gates and neural networks are digital circuits.

Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Jun 4, 2013

Philosophy Compass, May 1, 2009

Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic report... more Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020

This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are som... more This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.

Oxford University Press, 2024

Cambridge Elements, 2023

Oxford University Press, 2020

Oxford University Press, 2015

Synthese

Cognitive Neuroscience

Social Science Research Network, 2009

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep 1, 2004

Philosophy of Science, Dec 1, 2010

Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020

Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Jun 4, 2013

Philosophy Compass, May 1, 2009

Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020

Neural representations are models of the organism and environment built by the nervous system. Th... more Neural representations are models of the organism and environment built by the nervous system. This chapter provides an account of representational role and content for both indicative and imperative representations. It also argues that, contrary to a mainstream assumption, representations are not merely theoretical posits. Instead, neural representations are observable and are routinely observed and manipulated by experimental neuroscientists in their laboratories. If a type of entity is observable or manipulable, then it exists. Therefore, neural representations are as real as neurons, action potentials, or any other experimentally established entities in our ontology.

Oxford University Press eBooks, May 1, 2012

The introduction of the concept of computation in cognitive science is discussed in this article.... more The introduction of the concept of computation in cognitive science is discussed in this article. Computationalism is usually introduced as an empirical hypothesis that can be disconfirmed. Processing information is surely an important aspect of cognition so if computation is information processing, then cognition involves computation. Computationalism becomes more significant when it has explanatory power. The most relevant and explanatory notion of computation is that associated with digital computers. Turing analyzed computation in terms of what are now called Turing machines that are the kind of simple processor operating on an unbounded tape. Turing stated that any function that can be computed by an algorithm could be computed by a Turing machine. McCulloch and Pitts's account of cognition contains three important aspects that include an analogy between neural processes and digital computations, the use of mathematically defined neural networks as models, and an appeal to neurophysiological evidence to support their neural network models. Computationalism involves three accounts of computation such as causal, semantic, and mechanistic. There are mappings between any physical system and at least some computational descriptions under the causal account. The semantic account may be formulated as a restricted causal account.

Springer eBooks, Jun 3, 2007

When we explain the specific capacities of computing mechanisms, we appeal to the computations th... more When we explain the specific capacities of computing mechanisms, we appeal to the computations they perform. For example, calculators��unlike, say, air conditioners��have the peculiar capacity of performing multiplications: if we press appropriate buttons on a (well functioning) calculator in the appropriate order, the calculator yields an output that we interpret to be the product of the numbers represented by the input data. Our most immediate explanation for this capacity is that under the relevant conditions, calculators perform an ...

Synthese, 2007

The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) is often employed in arguments for computationalism. I scrutinize ... more The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) is often employed in arguments for computationalism. I scrutinize the most prominent of such arguments in light of recent work on CTT and argue that they are unsound. Although CTT does nothing to support computationalism, it is not irrelevant to it. By eliminating misunderstandings about the relationship between CTT and computationalism, we deepen our appreciation of computationalism as an empirical hypothesis. Computationalism, or the Computational Theory of Mind, is the view that mental capacities are explained by inner computations. In the case of human beings, computationalists typically assume that inner computations are realized by neural processes; I will borrow a term from current neuroscience and refer to them as neural computations. 1 Typically, computationalists also maintain that neural computations are Turing-computable, that is, computable by Turing Machines (TMs). The Church-Turing thesis (CTT) says that a function is computable, in the intuitive sense, if and only if it is Turingcomputable (Church 1936; Turing 1936-7). CTT entails that TMs, and any formalism equivalent to TMs, capture the intuitive notion of computation. In other words, according to CTT, if a function is computable in the intuitive sense, then there is a TM that computes it (or equivalently, it is Turing-computable). 2 This applies to neural computations as well. Suppose that, as computationalism maintains, neural activity is computation, and suppose that the functions computed by neural mechanisms are computable in the intuitive sense. Then, by CTT, for any function computed by a neural mechanism, there is a TM that computes the same function. This is a legitimate argument for a technical version of computationalism, according to which neural computations are Turing-computable, from a generic one, according to which neural processes are computations in the intuitive sense, via CTT.

Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 12, 2020

Psychological and neuroscientific explanations strongly constrain one another, so much so that ps... more Psychological and neuroscientific explanations strongly constrain one another, so much so that psychology has become an integral part of cognitive neuroscience. The functional analyses of classical cognitive psychology can be integrated with neuroscientific explanations to form multilevel mechanistic explanations of cognition. At each level of mechanistic organization, a mechanism explains phenomena by showing that they are produced by suitably organized components. This requires abstraction from irrelevant causes and lower level details, which abstraction is an essential aspect of mechanistic explanation. Therefore, psychological and neuroscientific explanations are not autonomous from one another.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2003

Introspective reports are used as sources of information about other minds, in both everyday life... more Introspective reports are used as sources of information about other minds, in both everyday life and science. Many scientists and philosophers consider this practice unjustified, while others have made the untestable assumption that introspection is a truthful method of private observation. I argue that neither skepticism nor faith concerning introspective reports are warranted. As an alternative, I consider our everyday, commonsensical reliance on each other's introspective reports. When we hear people talk about their minds, we neither refuse to learn from nor blindly accept what they say. Sometimes we accept what we are told, other times we reject it, and still other times we take the report, revise it in light of what we believe, then accept the modified version. Whatever we do, we have (implicit) reasons for it. In developing a sound methodology for the scientific use of introspective reports, we can take our commonsense treatment of introspective reports and make it more explicit and rigorous. We can discover what to infer from introspective reports in a way similar to how we do it every day, but with extra knowledge, methodological care, and precision. Sorting out the use of introspective reports as

Synthese Library, 2016

According to the computational theory of cognition (CTC), cognitive capacities are explained by i... more According to the computational theory of cognition (CTC), cognitive capacities are explained by inner computations, which in biological organisms are realized in the brain. Computational explanation is so popular and entrenched that it’s common for scientists and philosophers to assume CTC without argument. But if we presuppose that neural processes are computations before investigating, we turn CTC into dogma. If, instead, our theory is to be genuinely empirical and explanatory, it needs to be empirically testable. To bring empirical evidence to bear on CTC, we need an appropriate notion of computation. In order to ground an empirical theory of cognition, as CTC was designed to be, a satisfactory notion of computation should satisfy at least two requirements: it should employ a robust notion of computation, such that there is a fact of the matter as to which computations are performed by which systems, and it should not be empirically vacuous, as it would be if CTC could be established a priori. In order to satisfy these requirements, the computational theory of cognition should be grounded in a mechanistic account of computation. Once that is done, I evaluate the computational theory of cognition on empirical grounds in light of our best neuroscience. I reach two main conclusions: cognitive capacities are explained by the processing of spike trains by neuronal populations, and the processing of spike trains is a kind of computation that is interestingly different from both digital computation and analog computation.

Neurocognitive Mechanisms

The Computational Theory of Cognition (CTC) is controversial. It faces two types of objection. Ac... more The Computational Theory of Cognition (CTC) is controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. This chapter explains why CTC survives these objections. Insufficiency objections are at best partial: for all they establish, computation may be sufficient for cognitive phenomena other than X, part of the explanation for X, or both. Objections from neural realization are based on a false contrast between feature Y and computation.