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Papers by Peter Menzies
Making a Difference, edited by H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, H. Price, Oxford University Press, 2015
We offer a critical assessment of the "exclusion argument" against free will, which may be summar... more We offer a critical assessment of the "exclusion argument" against free will, which may be summarised by the slogan: "My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn't have been free". While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation ("could my mental states ever cause my actions?"), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience, with its mechanistic picture of how the brain generates thought and behaviour, seriously challenge our belief in free will. We introduce two distinct versions of the argument, discuss several unsuccessful responses to it, and then present our preferred response. This involves showing that a key premise – the "exclusion principle" – is false under what we take to be the most natural account of causation in the context of agency: the difference-making account. We finally revisit the debate about neuroscience and free will.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Jan 1, 1993
Mind, Jan 1, 1996
Probabilistic theories of singular causation claim that singular causal rela-tions can be analyti... more Probabilistic theories of singular causation claim that singular causal rela-tions can be analytically reduced to probabilistic relations.' Though they differ in detail, these theories depend on the guiding idea that a cause makes a difference to its effect by making it more probable than it would ...
Philosophy of Science, Jan 1, 1989
Over the last fifteen years or so, quite a number of probabilistic theories of singular causation... more Over the last fifteen years or so, quite a number of probabilistic theories of singular causation have been proposed (Suppes 1970; Fetzer 1981; Mellor 1986; Lewis 1986b Postscript B). These theories have been mo-tivated by a recognition of the probabilistic turn that science has ...
The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can b... more The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred. While counterfactual analyses have been given of type-causal ...
Analysis, Jan 1, 1994
A person is offered a choice between two envelopes, A and B. She is told that one envelope contai... more A person is offered a choice between two envelopes, A and B. She is told that one envelope contains twice as much money as the other but has no information as to which one that is. She chooses A, say. Before opening A she asks herself whether she ought to have taken B ...
… and mental causation: The metaphysics of mind …, Jan 1, 2003
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 1989
... 67, No. 1; March 1989 A UNIFIED ACCOUNT OF CAUSAL RELATA * Peter Menzies What kinds of entiti... more ... 67, No. 1; March 1989 A UNIFIED ACCOUNT OF CAUSAL RELATA * Peter Menzies What kinds of entities do causal sentences relate? ... (This difference entails the further difference that an Page 3. Peter Menzies 61 event takes time in a way that a state of affairs does not. ...
Causation and Laws of Nature, Kluwer Academic …, Jan 1, 1999
European Review of Philosophy, Jan 1, 1998
Real metaphysics: essays in honour of DH Mellor, Jan 1, 2003
Cognitive neuropsychiatry, Jan 1, 2010
Philosophy of Science, Jan 1, 2004
… , physics, and the constitution of reality: …, Jan 1, 2007
Being reducedNew essays on reduction, explanation …, Jan 1, 2008
Making a Difference, edited by H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, H. Price, Oxford University Press, 2015
We offer a critical assessment of the "exclusion argument" against free will, which may be summar... more We offer a critical assessment of the "exclusion argument" against free will, which may be summarised by the slogan: "My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn't have been free". While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation ("could my mental states ever cause my actions?"), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience, with its mechanistic picture of how the brain generates thought and behaviour, seriously challenge our belief in free will. We introduce two distinct versions of the argument, discuss several unsuccessful responses to it, and then present our preferred response. This involves showing that a key premise – the "exclusion principle" – is false under what we take to be the most natural account of causation in the context of agency: the difference-making account. We finally revisit the debate about neuroscience and free will.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Jan 1, 1993
Mind, Jan 1, 1996
Probabilistic theories of singular causation claim that singular causal rela-tions can be analyti... more Probabilistic theories of singular causation claim that singular causal rela-tions can be analytically reduced to probabilistic relations.' Though they differ in detail, these theories depend on the guiding idea that a cause makes a difference to its effect by making it more probable than it would ...
Philosophy of Science, Jan 1, 1989
Over the last fifteen years or so, quite a number of probabilistic theories of singular causation... more Over the last fifteen years or so, quite a number of probabilistic theories of singular causation have been proposed (Suppes 1970; Fetzer 1981; Mellor 1986; Lewis 1986b Postscript B). These theories have been mo-tivated by a recognition of the probabilistic turn that science has ...
The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can b... more The basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred. While counterfactual analyses have been given of type-causal ...
Analysis, Jan 1, 1994
A person is offered a choice between two envelopes, A and B. She is told that one envelope contai... more A person is offered a choice between two envelopes, A and B. She is told that one envelope contains twice as much money as the other but has no information as to which one that is. She chooses A, say. Before opening A she asks herself whether she ought to have taken B ...
… and mental causation: The metaphysics of mind …, Jan 1, 2003
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Jan 1, 1989
... 67, No. 1; March 1989 A UNIFIED ACCOUNT OF CAUSAL RELATA * Peter Menzies What kinds of entiti... more ... 67, No. 1; March 1989 A UNIFIED ACCOUNT OF CAUSAL RELATA * Peter Menzies What kinds of entities do causal sentences relate? ... (This difference entails the further difference that an Page 3. Peter Menzies 61 event takes time in a way that a state of affairs does not. ...
Causation and Laws of Nature, Kluwer Academic …, Jan 1, 1999
European Review of Philosophy, Jan 1, 1998
Real metaphysics: essays in honour of DH Mellor, Jan 1, 2003
Cognitive neuropsychiatry, Jan 1, 2010
Philosophy of Science, Jan 1, 2004
… , physics, and the constitution of reality: …, Jan 1, 2007
Being reducedNew essays on reduction, explanation …, Jan 1, 2008
![Research paper thumbnail of Abductive inference and delusional belief [Coltheart, Menzies, & Sutton]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/32827198/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2010
Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experience... more Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. First, the abnormalities of cognition that initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term ‘‘experience’’ to consciousness we refer to ‘‘abnormal data’’ rather than ‘‘abnormal experience’’. Second, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider seven) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is
responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairment is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur: a second cognitive impairment, one that affects the
ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Third (and this is the main thrust of our paper), we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.