Causation as a secondary quality (original) (raw)

Causation and the Objectification of Agency (PhD Dissertation)

Christoph Schulz

Causation and the Objectification of Agency, 2015

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Agency, causality and properties

Helen Steward

Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2011

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THE AGENT'S ROLE IN THE CAUSATION OF ACTION: IS MICHAEL SMITH'S CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION IN TROUBLE? 1

Lucas Mateus Dalsotto

2019

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The Agency Theory of Causality, Anthropomorphism, and Simultaneity, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 28:4, 375-395, DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2014.979668

Marco Buzzoni

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The Agent's Role in the Causation of Action: Is Michael Smith's Causal Theory of Action in Trouble?

Lucas Mateus Dalsotto

Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia, 2019

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Causation as transference and responsibility

Max Kistler

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Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Soo Lam Wong

Disputatio, 2021

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The unsolved mysteries of causation and responsibility

Gideon Rosen

2011

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The Agency Theory of Causality, Anthropomorphism, and Simultaneity

Marco Buzzoni

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Causation: An Alternative

Wolfgang Spohn

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2006

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Action as Downward Causation

Helen Steward

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement

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Action, Animacy, and Substance Causation

Janice T . Chik

Routledge, 2018

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Conceptions of Mechanisms And Insensitivity of Causation

Viorel Paslaru

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Retroactive Causation and the Causal Theory of Action

Roman Altshuler

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How Does Agent-Causal Power Work?

Andrei Buckareff

The Modern Schoolman, 2011

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The Counterfactual Reasoning and the Manipulative Account of Causality. The Origin of Causal Thinking from free will

Gaetano Licata

Giornale di Metafisica, 2018

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Causation, from a human point of view

Violetta Manola

Metascience

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2006), Causation: An Alternative

Wolfgang Spohn

2016

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Causation: Metaphysics or Intuition?

Richard W Wright

Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore, 2016

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Intrinsic versus extrinsic conceptions of causation

Peter Menzies

Causation and Laws of Nature, Kluwer Academic …, 1999

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Manipulation Theory of Causation: J. Woodward

Spiros Galatis

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Review of Causation and Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio

Taylor W Cyr

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Agent-causation and control

David Widerker

Faith and Philosophy, 2005

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Getting a grip: On causation, agency, and the meaning of "manipulation"

Erik Van Aken

Theoria , 2022

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Chapter Nine: Forms of Causality

Chad Hansen

TAKING UP MCLUHAN'S CAUSE, 2017

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Causation without influence

Tomasz Bigaj

Erkenntnis, 2012

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Causation and observation

Helen Beebee

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Causation: Objective or Subjective?

Wolfgang Spohn

Probabilistic and Causal Inference, 2022

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Actions, causes, and causal explanation

Jonathan Knowles

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AGENT CAUSALITY AND REASONS FOR ACTING

Justin Harvey

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20 Dynamics and the Perception of Causal Events

Phillip Wolff

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2008

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Economics, Agency, and Causal Explanation

William Child

Virtues and Economics, 2019

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Agent causation and the alleged impossibility of rational free action

Chris Tucker

Erkenntnis, 2007

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Free Action and Interventionist Theories of Causality

Gaetano Licata

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2020

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Dynamics and the Perception of Causal Events

Phillip Wolff

Understanding Events, 2008

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