Kyla Ebels-Duggan | Northwestern University (original) (raw)
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Books by Kyla Ebels-Duggan
Experiences of value play a central role in providing reasons for our normative commitments. It ... more Experiences of value play a central role in providing reasons for our normative commitments. It is more common to hold such commitments on the basis of experience than to embrace them simply because one is convinced by some argument. Love for another person on the basis of direct experience and appreciation of him is a paradigm example. But the reasons that these experiences provide standardly outstrip any attempts to capture them in propositional form. Thus we can have good reason to value what we do, while being incapable of saying what these reasons are. To the extent that we are thus inarticulate about our reasons they cannot be fully communicated to others. This has important, and underappreciated, implications in moral and political philosophy. It places limits on the possibility of interpersonal justification in both personal and political contexts, and has related implications for the communication of values in moral education.
Research on this project will be supported by a grant from the Transformative Experience Initiative of the Experience Project.
Papers by Kyla Ebels-Duggan
Philosophy Compass, 2012
Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from e... more Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (i) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (ii) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (iii) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (iv) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?
Our ordinary talk reflects a deep tension in the way that we think about love. On the one hand, ... more Our ordinary talk reflects a deep tension in the way that we think about love. On the one hand, we regard love as an especially important expression of our agency. Yet, on the other hand, we also think of love as something that happens to us, in the face of which we are passive and can be powerless. While it’s hard to see how to hold these two ways of thinking of love together, in this paper I argue that we must find some way of doing so. I argue that we must think of love as a contentful attitude attributable to its agent, an expression of our selves. But familiar ways of understanding agency sort love into the category of things that happen to us, rather than that of things that we do: You cannot love at will, nor is love an attitude to which you could reason.
I conclude that questions about the relationship of our agency to what we love are not superficial, but stem from deep tensions about the relationship between love and reasons. A resolution to these difficulties would provide important insight not only into the character of love, but also the nature of agency, and its relationship to values, reasoning and reasons.
We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may ... more We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may thereby come to embrace a value that you did not grasp prior to the experience in question. Moreover, it seems that in a large and important subset of cases you could not have fully appreciated that value merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to establish that it is valuable. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy. In this paper I further specify the phenomenon of interest by developing a series of examples. Then I support the claim that philosophers routinely overlook it by surveying several significant philosophical positions that do so.
The principle that children’s freedom should be preserved in their upbringing is sometimes though... more The principle that children’s freedom should be preserved in their upbringing is sometimes thought to provide an alternative to imposing a particular conception of the good on them. But to sustain the alternative we must distinguish between those desires and proclivities that are educated into a person and those that are his own. Several philosophers appeal to innate or presocial tendencies to ground this distinction, but that approach fails. The ability to exercise first person authority over a desire or commitment provides a better conception of what it is for such a state to be one’s own. But such desires and commitments are not distinct from those educated into a person. While the ideal of autonomy, conceived in these terms, can still provide some guidance for upbringing, it will not substitute for teaching children a conception of the good. We require further norms, and these must be derivative from prior norms, both first and second order, that tell us how to form and govern our own commitments.
Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or co... more Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of Kant’s struggle to characterize the normative import of happiness.
Many thinkers agree that facilitating the development of students’ autonomy is a proper aim of ed... more Many thinkers agree that facilitating the development of students’ autonomy is a proper aim of education generally and higher education in particular. I defend a version of the autonomy view, but not as I think its other advocates imagine it. I suggest that an important aim of education is the facilitation of intellectual virtues. What is right about the idea that education should facilitate students’ autonomy is best captured in virtue terms as intellectual charity and humility.
I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of some formal conc... more I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires reliance on and communication of further, substantive normative commitments. This reveals that a standard contrast between an old-fashioned approach to education that aims to communicate a particular normative outlook, and a progressive approach that aims to develop skills of critical reasoning and reflection is confused and misleading.
I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach ... more I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach in state sponsored schools, but should allow reasonable citizens latitude to choose the worldview in which their own children are educated.
I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsi... more I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsibility or blame. I then diagnose the tendency to think that formative circumstances do matter in this way, arguing that knowledge of these circumstances can play an essential epistemic role in our interpersonal interactions.
In the first half of the essay I give a reading of Kant’s argument for the obligation to found th... more In the first half of the essay I give a reading of Kant’s argument for the obligation to found the state: Each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. So we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (1) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (2) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (3) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (4) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?
I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also exp... more I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also explain some of the most important internal disagreements in the field, contrasting two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Realism. I connect the former to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the latter to his Formula of Humanity. I end by discussing applications of the Formula of Humanity in normative ethics.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dec 2011
Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state aut... more Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case she is able to move her body in space unimpeded by others. I argue that this conception allows for a more convincing version of the Kantian argument.
Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in ... more Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in the children’s best interests. A growing movement for fathers’ rights asserts that an explicit recognition of parental rights should replace this standard, and further that this should lead us to favor split custody arrangements. I argue for the first part of the claim, appealing to the fundamental commitments of political liberalism. But I argue against the idea that this should make a 50/50 split the default custody arrangement. I explain how this proposal would license ongoing, intrusive state intervention, and so undermine the very parental rights it aims to recognize.
Philosophical Quarterly, Jan 2010
I argue that Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies that t... more I argue that Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies that they believe can be justified in public reason depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. I affirm the value of this ideal, and thus hold that citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But I argue that it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need to do so, and thus reject Rawls’ strong claim that we have an obligation to defend our views in public reason.
I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices... more I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices of our own. In The Doctrine of Right Kant argues that we have an obligation to leave the Juridical State of Nature and found the state. In a less familiar passage in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason he argues for an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. I read both texts as addressing and trying to resolve a tension between our individual freedom and our authority to make claims on one another. I explicate the political argument, and then develop the view that Kant sketches in the Religion, arguing that regarding others as capable of making choices that give you reasons to act is a condition of the full exercise of your autonomy.
I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share i... more I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share in their ends. The former stance runs the risk of being objectionably paternalistic and, as I explain, only the latter makes reciprocal relationships possible. I end by diagnosing our attraction to the idea that we should promote our loved-ones’ well-being.
Book Reviews by Kyla Ebels-Duggan
Experiences of value play a central role in providing reasons for our normative commitments. It ... more Experiences of value play a central role in providing reasons for our normative commitments. It is more common to hold such commitments on the basis of experience than to embrace them simply because one is convinced by some argument. Love for another person on the basis of direct experience and appreciation of him is a paradigm example. But the reasons that these experiences provide standardly outstrip any attempts to capture them in propositional form. Thus we can have good reason to value what we do, while being incapable of saying what these reasons are. To the extent that we are thus inarticulate about our reasons they cannot be fully communicated to others. This has important, and underappreciated, implications in moral and political philosophy. It places limits on the possibility of interpersonal justification in both personal and political contexts, and has related implications for the communication of values in moral education.
Research on this project will be supported by a grant from the Transformative Experience Initiative of the Experience Project.
Philosophy Compass, 2012
Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from e... more Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (i) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (ii) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (iii) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (iv) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?
Our ordinary talk reflects a deep tension in the way that we think about love. On the one hand, ... more Our ordinary talk reflects a deep tension in the way that we think about love. On the one hand, we regard love as an especially important expression of our agency. Yet, on the other hand, we also think of love as something that happens to us, in the face of which we are passive and can be powerless. While it’s hard to see how to hold these two ways of thinking of love together, in this paper I argue that we must find some way of doing so. I argue that we must think of love as a contentful attitude attributable to its agent, an expression of our selves. But familiar ways of understanding agency sort love into the category of things that happen to us, rather than that of things that we do: You cannot love at will, nor is love an attitude to which you could reason.
I conclude that questions about the relationship of our agency to what we love are not superficial, but stem from deep tensions about the relationship between love and reasons. A resolution to these difficulties would provide important insight not only into the character of love, but also the nature of agency, and its relationship to values, reasoning and reasons.
We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may ... more We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may thereby come to embrace a value that you did not grasp prior to the experience in question. Moreover, it seems that in a large and important subset of cases you could not have fully appreciated that value merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to establish that it is valuable. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy. In this paper I further specify the phenomenon of interest by developing a series of examples. Then I support the claim that philosophers routinely overlook it by surveying several significant philosophical positions that do so.
The principle that children’s freedom should be preserved in their upbringing is sometimes though... more The principle that children’s freedom should be preserved in their upbringing is sometimes thought to provide an alternative to imposing a particular conception of the good on them. But to sustain the alternative we must distinguish between those desires and proclivities that are educated into a person and those that are his own. Several philosophers appeal to innate or presocial tendencies to ground this distinction, but that approach fails. The ability to exercise first person authority over a desire or commitment provides a better conception of what it is for such a state to be one’s own. But such desires and commitments are not distinct from those educated into a person. While the ideal of autonomy, conceived in these terms, can still provide some guidance for upbringing, it will not substitute for teaching children a conception of the good. We require further norms, and these must be derivative from prior norms, both first and second order, that tell us how to form and govern our own commitments.
Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or co... more Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of Kant’s struggle to characterize the normative import of happiness.
Many thinkers agree that facilitating the development of students’ autonomy is a proper aim of ed... more Many thinkers agree that facilitating the development of students’ autonomy is a proper aim of education generally and higher education in particular. I defend a version of the autonomy view, but not as I think its other advocates imagine it. I suggest that an important aim of education is the facilitation of intellectual virtues. What is right about the idea that education should facilitate students’ autonomy is best captured in virtue terms as intellectual charity and humility.
I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of some formal conc... more I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires reliance on and communication of further, substantive normative commitments. This reveals that a standard contrast between an old-fashioned approach to education that aims to communicate a particular normative outlook, and a progressive approach that aims to develop skills of critical reasoning and reflection is confused and misleading.
I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach ... more I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach in state sponsored schools, but should allow reasonable citizens latitude to choose the worldview in which their own children are educated.
I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsi... more I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsibility or blame. I then diagnose the tendency to think that formative circumstances do matter in this way, arguing that knowledge of these circumstances can play an essential epistemic role in our interpersonal interactions.
In the first half of the essay I give a reading of Kant’s argument for the obligation to found th... more In the first half of the essay I give a reading of Kant’s argument for the obligation to found the state: Each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. So we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (1) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (2) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (3) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (4) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?
I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also exp... more I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also explain some of the most important internal disagreements in the field, contrasting two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Realism. I connect the former to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the latter to his Formula of Humanity. I end by discussing applications of the Formula of Humanity in normative ethics.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dec 2011
Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state aut... more Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case she is able to move her body in space unimpeded by others. I argue that this conception allows for a more convincing version of the Kantian argument.
Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in ... more Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in the children’s best interests. A growing movement for fathers’ rights asserts that an explicit recognition of parental rights should replace this standard, and further that this should lead us to favor split custody arrangements. I argue for the first part of the claim, appealing to the fundamental commitments of political liberalism. But I argue against the idea that this should make a 50/50 split the default custody arrangement. I explain how this proposal would license ongoing, intrusive state intervention, and so undermine the very parental rights it aims to recognize.
Philosophical Quarterly, Jan 2010
I argue that Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies that t... more I argue that Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies that they believe can be justified in public reason depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. I affirm the value of this ideal, and thus hold that citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But I argue that it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need to do so, and thus reject Rawls’ strong claim that we have an obligation to defend our views in public reason.
I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices... more I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices of our own. In The Doctrine of Right Kant argues that we have an obligation to leave the Juridical State of Nature and found the state. In a less familiar passage in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason he argues for an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. I read both texts as addressing and trying to resolve a tension between our individual freedom and our authority to make claims on one another. I explicate the political argument, and then develop the view that Kant sketches in the Religion, arguing that regarding others as capable of making choices that give you reasons to act is a condition of the full exercise of your autonomy.
I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share i... more I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share in their ends. The former stance runs the risk of being objectionably paternalistic and, as I explain, only the latter makes reciprocal relationships possible. I end by diagnosing our attraction to the idea that we should promote our loved-ones’ well-being.