Diego Maiorano | National University of Singapore (original) (raw)
Papers by Diego Maiorano
Asia Maior, 2022
The most important development of 2021 in India was a devastating second wave of COVID-19 infecti... more The most important development of 2021 in India was a devastating second wave of COVID-19 infections that brought the country’s healthcare system to its knees between April and June. While the management of the pandemic in a country like India represented an enormous challenge in itself, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government took a series of steps that failed to contain and most probably facilitated the spread of the virus. In particular, a combination of over-confidence, complacency and then outright political opportunism might have led to a huge increase in the number of infected people, which resulted in a very high death toll. The article will focus on the actions (and inactions) of the Modi government to explain the evolution of the pandemic during the first half of the year and then its economic impact. The other two developments that will be analysed concern domestic politics. On the one hand, a round of state elections in four important states demonstrated the fragility of the BJP at the state level. On the other hand, the repeal of three laws of agrarian reform in the wake of prolonged and sustained farmers’ protests showed the government’s inability to push reforms in the agricultural sector.
In 2017 the situation of Indian democracy deteriorated, as shown by the continuing attacks agains... more In 2017 the situation of Indian democracy deteriorated, as shown by the continuing
attacks against Muslims and Christians, and by the intimidation against the opponents
of political Hinduism. This intimidation culminated in the assassination of
well-known journalist and BJP critic Gauri Lankesh. Meanwhile Narendra Modi,
in spite of the unsatisfactory economic trend and botched economic reforms, continued
to be India’s most popular politician. Also, during the period under review, Modi’s
party, the BJP, went from one success to another, strengthening its political hold on
the country by conquering four Indian states (Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Uttar
Pradesh and Uttarakhand), and by retaining its hold on two more (Goa and Gujarat).
However, the latest of these elections, the one in Gujarat, although confirming
the BJP in power, saw an unexpected good result on the part of a resurgent Congress.
Some analysts saw this as an indication that the BJP’s tightening hold on the Indian
political system was not unbreakable.
India’s foreign policy continued to be characterised by the increasingly closer and
increasingly militarised connection with the US and by the ever more adversarial
relation with China. It was in this field that the Modi government conquered a
clear (although possibly temporary) success, by facing down China in the Himalayan
Doklam plateau.
Oxford Development Studies, 2018
Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these ques... more Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India's (and the world's) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan's decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh's centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find find that in both states local implementers have the incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in the Rajasthan's model, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.
As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra... more As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra Modi, the incumbent Prime Minister. Differently from what was the case in 2015, behind the pervasive self-praising rhetoric of the Indian government and the deafening chorus of applause of the bulk of the Indian media for Modi’s work, at least at the economic level some concrete results were reached, and some reforms were implemented. Particularly important was the passing of the Goods and Service Tax (GST), an objective which had been vainly pursued by several previous governments. If the objectives and potential benefits of the GST were clear to all to see, the situation was different in the case of the other major economic reform, abruptly carried out by the Modi government, namely the demonetisation of much of India’s paper currency. This quite unexpected measure was justified by the government in different ways at different times. What was clear at the time of the closing of the present article was that demonetisation had badly hurt particularly the poorer strata of the population, but, paradoxically enough, had not had any discernible adverse effect on Modi’s still burgeoning popularity. Also, in the state elections held during the year under review, Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), strengthened its position and was also able to get a resounding victory in Assam, where, for the first time ever, formed the state government.
Strangely enough, in spite of the fact that the Modi government’s economic policy had become more incisive in the year under review than in 2014 and 2015, the attitude of the US private capital, assiduously courted by Modi, continued to be, as it had become in 2015, one of disillusionment. US entrepreneurs, while convinced of Modi’s desire to open up India’s economy to foreign enterprise and capital, doubted his ability to do so. This, however, did not bring about a slowing down in the process of rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington, but made of the military aspect of such process its «major driver» (as claimed by US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter). In turn, the increasing US-India closeness – and the increasing relevance of its military dimension – contributed to the worsening of the relations between New Delhi and Beijing, which appeared more and more involved in a policy of reciprocal containment. This played a role in the evolution of the India-Pakistan and India-Nepal relations. In the year under review, the relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad spectacularly worsened, but the latter was able to withstand the pressure of the former also because of Beijing’s help. On the other hand, India was able to re-establish its paramountcy over Nepal, engineering the fall of the Oli Government, which had challenged New Delhi with the support of Beijing.
As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra... more As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra Modi, the incumbent Prime Minister. Differently from what was the case in 2015, behind the pervasive self-praising rhetoric of the Indian government and the deafening chorus of applause of the bulk of the Indian media for Modi’s work, at least at the economic level some concrete results were reached, and some reforms were implemented. Particularly important was the passing of the Goods and Service Tax (GST), an objective which had been vainly pursued by several previous governments. If the objectives and potential benefits of the GST were clear to all to see, the situation was different in the case of the other major economic reform, abruptly carried out by the Modi government, namely the demonetisation of much of India’s paper currency. This quite unexpected measure was justified by the government in different ways at different times. What was clear at the time of the closing of the present article was that demonetisation had badly hurt particularly the poorer strata of the population, but, paradoxically enough, had not had any discernible adverse effect on Modi’s still burgeoning popularity. Also, in the state elections held during the year under review, Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), strengthened its position and was also able to get a resounding victory in Assam, where, for the first time ever, formed the state government.
Strangely enough, in spite of the fact that the Modi government’s economic policy had become more incisive in the year under review than in 2014 and 2015, the attitude of the US private capital, assiduously courted by Modi, continued to be, as it had become in 2015, one of disillusionment. US entrepreneurs, while convinced of Modi’s desire to open up India’s economy to foreign enterprise and capital, doubted his ability to do so. This, however, did not bring about a slowing down in the process of rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington, but made of the military aspect of such process its «major driver» (as claimed by US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter). In turn, the increasing US-India closeness – and the increasing relevance of its military dimension – contributed to the worsening of the relations between New Delhi and Beijing, which appeared more and more involved in a policy of reciprocal containment. This played a role in the evolution of the India-Pakistan and India-Nepal relations. In the year under review, the relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad spectacularly worsened, but the latter was able to withstand the pressure of the former also because of Beijing’s help. On the other hand, India was able to re-establish its paramountcy over Nepal, engineering the fall of the Oli Government, which had challenged New Delhi with the support of Beijing.
Narendra Modi’s 2014 election generated enormous expectations in the economic sphere. However, in... more Narendra Modi’s 2014 election generated enormous expectations in the economic sphere. However, in 2015, on the one hand, Modi was unwilling or unable to push through any «big bang» reforms; on the other hand, jobs generation – one of Modi’s key electoral promises – proceeded at an excruciatingly slow pace. At the macroeconomic level, the Indian GDP grew by 7.3% during 2014/15, making India the fastest growing among the major economies. However, these data were the result of a new methodology, and most economists, including some politically close to the Modi government, were uncertain about its reliability. Moreover, when applied to the previous years, the new methodology unequivocally showed that the positive turn-around in the economy had happened before Modi’s government came to power. The Indian economy was also severely affected by a deepening rural crisis. Some of its causes were beyond the reach of Modi’s government, but it is a fact that its response was disappointingly inadequate.
Domestic politics was a constant source of difficulty for Modi. First, state elections in Delhi and Bihar dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Modi – and Amit Shah – led BJP, which was soundly defeated by local outfits. Second, the government struggled to pass key legislation in Parliament, also thanks to the unexpectedly successful opposition of the Congress party. Finally, the most worrying development on the domestic front was the rise of intolerance against non Hindus, who were victims of Fascist-like, sometimes deadly, aggressions by Hindu outfits. This happened while the Prime Minister appeared basically unconcerned about the climate of growing violence and some members of his government went so far to openly justify this state of affairs.
The aim of Modi’s foreign policy was projecting India as a major power on the world stage and getting all the possible foreign help in promoting India’s economic development. To this end, India’s foreign policy was articulated along two main axis: the India-US connection and the India-China connection. In turn, the latter had two faces: engaging China and containing China. At the end of the day, the India-US connection was high on hype but low on content, among other reasons because the US business community, after its initial enthusiasm for Modi, had come to perceive him as well intentioned but unable to further liberalise the Indian economy. India’s economic engagement with China brought about the signing of several MoUs and China’s promise to invest in India. However the concrete fall-out of all this was limited. More concrete appeared the containment aspect of Modi’s China policy, which, at a more general level was expression of India’s strategic surge, aimed at reclaiming the position of great power.
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India's (and the world's) largest e... more The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India's (and the world's) largest employment scheme. While many analysis exist on its impact and implementation faults, scant attention has been dedicated to how political dynamics influence its implementation. This paper will try to fill this gap with evidence from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. It will argue that the implementation performance of the scheme has been fairly good, despite the abysmal performance of the state government with previous employment schemes. The key factor in determining such a shift was the political commitment of the state's chief minister.
The growing importance of public works programmes (PWPs) as a social protection tool has attracte... more The growing importance of public works programmes (PWPs) as a social protection tool has attracted significant scholarly attention. However, despite the fact that the empowerment of marginalised communities is one of the key objectives of most PWPs, scant attention has been dedicated to this crucial issue. We contextualise these concerns in relation to India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). In particular, we propose two areas which are relatively unexplored. First, the methodologies currently used to research NREGA and PWP, more generally, need to be broadened. Second, the processes that lead to empowerment need to be researched empirically.
The International Spectator, 2015
In May 2014 Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in the wake of a historic electoral victo... more In May 2014 Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in the wake of a historic electoral victory. He has generated two kinds of expectations: on the one hand, his voters expect him to create millions of new jobs for a fast-growing working age population; on the other hand, Hindu extrem- ists hope that he will pursue an aggressive policy aimed at ‘hinduising’ India’s society. The first months of his premiership show that Modi is act- ing in both spheres, while pursuing a radical centralisation of power in his hands.
The Round Table, Jun 9, 2015
Asia Maior, Vol. XXV, 2014, 2015
Economic and Political Weekly, Dec 20, 2014
India's scheduled tribes are among the most deprived socio-economic groups and the Mahatma Gandhi... more India's scheduled tribes are among the most deprived socio-economic groups and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme has great potential in tribal areas. While the Andhra Pradesh government has made an effort to ensure implementation of the scheme in the scheduled areas, the gap between administrative orders and the grass-roots level is wide. This article lists measures that could radically improve implementation of the scheme in tribal areas.
Ideas 4 India
Employment generated under MNREGA has been on the decline in recent years across India. This colu... more Employment generated under MNREGA has been on the decline in recent years across India. This column analyses whether political dynamics influence the implementation of MNREGA by contrasting the implementation models of two of the top performing states – Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. It concludes that a combination of the top-down, supply-driven approach of AP and the demand-driven Rajasthan model is required. - See more at: http://ideasforindia.in/article.aspx?article_id=356#sthash.wnhuuJMa.dpuf
Economic and Political Weekly, Mar 1, 2014
The social coalition that benefited from India's central government's economic policies remained ... more The social coalition that benefited from India's central government's economic policies remained unchanged between the pre- and post-economic reforms periods. The economic policies promoted by the central government between 1980 and 2004 - irrespective of the political party heading the Cabinet - mostly benefited the middle class and the corporate sector, while the poor and the rural world were clearly relegated to a secondary position in the governments' policy priorities. From this point of view the election of the United Progressive Alliance government in 2004 might constitute a more important break with the past.
World Development, Jun 2014
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India’s (and the world’s) largest e... more The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India’s (and the world’s) largest employment scheme. While many analyses exist on the impact and implementation faults of this program, scant attention has been dedicated to how political dynamics have influenced implementation. This paper will try to fill this gap with evidence from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. It will argue that the implementation performance of the scheme has been fairly good, despite the abysmal performance of the state government with previous employment schemes; the key factor in determining such a shift was the political commitment of the state’s chief minister.
Economic and Political Weekly, Jun 1, 2013
Modern Asian Studies, 2014
In 1989 India’s political system underwent a process of profound change which affected the entire... more In 1989 India’s political system underwent a process of profound change which affected the entire institutional setup of the country. Power was radically redistributed, as it began to flow from the central government to the states, and from the Prime Minister Office to the other institutions of the state. The paper seeks to show how things worked on the eve of such a redrawing of India’s institutional setup, by analysing the sever institutional crisis which occurred during Mrs Gandhi’s final term in office as India’s Prime Minister. In addition, an effort is made to link the working of India’s institutions to the configuration of the party system, thus stressing the importance of political dynamics in the functioning of parliamentary democracies.
India Review, 2012
This article examines the impact that national economic policies adopted during Indira Gandhi's f... more This article examines the impact that national economic policies adopted during Indira Gandhi's final term in office (1980–84) had on four “national” social groups, namely the big industrialists, the middle class, the rich peasantry, and the poor. The study argues that the Congress (I) chose the former two as its major allies, while the rich peasantry and the poor were relegated to a secondary position. In the process, the focus of India's strategy of development shifted from the agrarian to the industrial sector, and from the rural to the urban world.
Books by Diego Maiorano
Indira Gandhi’s last years in office as India’s prime minister ran from January 1980 to her assas... more Indira Gandhi’s last years in office as India’s prime minister ran from January 1980 to her assassination in October 1984 but until now no book has been devoted to her final term. Among the principal themes discussed in this innovative volume are how Indian politics and society changed in the 1970s, including the state of Emergency (1975-77) Congress’s response to insurgency in Punjab, Assam and Kashmir, the rise of new forms of political mobilisation in the early 1980s and the prime minister’s relationship with the key institutions of state. Maiorano also reveals how Mrs Gandhi’s policies in the 1980s impacted on the big industrialists, the middle class, the rich peasantry and the poor, thereby crucially re-orienting India’s economic strategy. Autumn of the Matriarch is the first major study of MrsGandhi’s last years in power, an important juncture in India’s recent history, as it was then that emerged trends that influenced the country for the next three decades.
Asia Maior, 2022
The most important development of 2021 in India was a devastating second wave of COVID-19 infecti... more The most important development of 2021 in India was a devastating second wave of COVID-19 infections that brought the country’s healthcare system to its knees between April and June. While the management of the pandemic in a country like India represented an enormous challenge in itself, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government took a series of steps that failed to contain and most probably facilitated the spread of the virus. In particular, a combination of over-confidence, complacency and then outright political opportunism might have led to a huge increase in the number of infected people, which resulted in a very high death toll. The article will focus on the actions (and inactions) of the Modi government to explain the evolution of the pandemic during the first half of the year and then its economic impact. The other two developments that will be analysed concern domestic politics. On the one hand, a round of state elections in four important states demonstrated the fragility of the BJP at the state level. On the other hand, the repeal of three laws of agrarian reform in the wake of prolonged and sustained farmers’ protests showed the government’s inability to push reforms in the agricultural sector.
In 2017 the situation of Indian democracy deteriorated, as shown by the continuing attacks agains... more In 2017 the situation of Indian democracy deteriorated, as shown by the continuing
attacks against Muslims and Christians, and by the intimidation against the opponents
of political Hinduism. This intimidation culminated in the assassination of
well-known journalist and BJP critic Gauri Lankesh. Meanwhile Narendra Modi,
in spite of the unsatisfactory economic trend and botched economic reforms, continued
to be India’s most popular politician. Also, during the period under review, Modi’s
party, the BJP, went from one success to another, strengthening its political hold on
the country by conquering four Indian states (Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Uttar
Pradesh and Uttarakhand), and by retaining its hold on two more (Goa and Gujarat).
However, the latest of these elections, the one in Gujarat, although confirming
the BJP in power, saw an unexpected good result on the part of a resurgent Congress.
Some analysts saw this as an indication that the BJP’s tightening hold on the Indian
political system was not unbreakable.
India’s foreign policy continued to be characterised by the increasingly closer and
increasingly militarised connection with the US and by the ever more adversarial
relation with China. It was in this field that the Modi government conquered a
clear (although possibly temporary) success, by facing down China in the Himalayan
Doklam plateau.
Oxford Development Studies, 2018
Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these ques... more Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India's (and the world's) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan's decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh's centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find find that in both states local implementers have the incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in the Rajasthan's model, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.
As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra... more As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra Modi, the incumbent Prime Minister. Differently from what was the case in 2015, behind the pervasive self-praising rhetoric of the Indian government and the deafening chorus of applause of the bulk of the Indian media for Modi’s work, at least at the economic level some concrete results were reached, and some reforms were implemented. Particularly important was the passing of the Goods and Service Tax (GST), an objective which had been vainly pursued by several previous governments. If the objectives and potential benefits of the GST were clear to all to see, the situation was different in the case of the other major economic reform, abruptly carried out by the Modi government, namely the demonetisation of much of India’s paper currency. This quite unexpected measure was justified by the government in different ways at different times. What was clear at the time of the closing of the present article was that demonetisation had badly hurt particularly the poorer strata of the population, but, paradoxically enough, had not had any discernible adverse effect on Modi’s still burgeoning popularity. Also, in the state elections held during the year under review, Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), strengthened its position and was also able to get a resounding victory in Assam, where, for the first time ever, formed the state government.
Strangely enough, in spite of the fact that the Modi government’s economic policy had become more incisive in the year under review than in 2014 and 2015, the attitude of the US private capital, assiduously courted by Modi, continued to be, as it had become in 2015, one of disillusionment. US entrepreneurs, while convinced of Modi’s desire to open up India’s economy to foreign enterprise and capital, doubted his ability to do so. This, however, did not bring about a slowing down in the process of rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington, but made of the military aspect of such process its «major driver» (as claimed by US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter). In turn, the increasing US-India closeness – and the increasing relevance of its military dimension – contributed to the worsening of the relations between New Delhi and Beijing, which appeared more and more involved in a policy of reciprocal containment. This played a role in the evolution of the India-Pakistan and India-Nepal relations. In the year under review, the relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad spectacularly worsened, but the latter was able to withstand the pressure of the former also because of Beijing’s help. On the other hand, India was able to re-establish its paramountcy over Nepal, engineering the fall of the Oli Government, which had challenged New Delhi with the support of Beijing.
As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra... more As in 2015, in 2016 India’s political and economic landscape appeared to be dominated by Narendra Modi, the incumbent Prime Minister. Differently from what was the case in 2015, behind the pervasive self-praising rhetoric of the Indian government and the deafening chorus of applause of the bulk of the Indian media for Modi’s work, at least at the economic level some concrete results were reached, and some reforms were implemented. Particularly important was the passing of the Goods and Service Tax (GST), an objective which had been vainly pursued by several previous governments. If the objectives and potential benefits of the GST were clear to all to see, the situation was different in the case of the other major economic reform, abruptly carried out by the Modi government, namely the demonetisation of much of India’s paper currency. This quite unexpected measure was justified by the government in different ways at different times. What was clear at the time of the closing of the present article was that demonetisation had badly hurt particularly the poorer strata of the population, but, paradoxically enough, had not had any discernible adverse effect on Modi’s still burgeoning popularity. Also, in the state elections held during the year under review, Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), strengthened its position and was also able to get a resounding victory in Assam, where, for the first time ever, formed the state government.
Strangely enough, in spite of the fact that the Modi government’s economic policy had become more incisive in the year under review than in 2014 and 2015, the attitude of the US private capital, assiduously courted by Modi, continued to be, as it had become in 2015, one of disillusionment. US entrepreneurs, while convinced of Modi’s desire to open up India’s economy to foreign enterprise and capital, doubted his ability to do so. This, however, did not bring about a slowing down in the process of rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington, but made of the military aspect of such process its «major driver» (as claimed by US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter). In turn, the increasing US-India closeness – and the increasing relevance of its military dimension – contributed to the worsening of the relations between New Delhi and Beijing, which appeared more and more involved in a policy of reciprocal containment. This played a role in the evolution of the India-Pakistan and India-Nepal relations. In the year under review, the relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad spectacularly worsened, but the latter was able to withstand the pressure of the former also because of Beijing’s help. On the other hand, India was able to re-establish its paramountcy over Nepal, engineering the fall of the Oli Government, which had challenged New Delhi with the support of Beijing.
Narendra Modi’s 2014 election generated enormous expectations in the economic sphere. However, in... more Narendra Modi’s 2014 election generated enormous expectations in the economic sphere. However, in 2015, on the one hand, Modi was unwilling or unable to push through any «big bang» reforms; on the other hand, jobs generation – one of Modi’s key electoral promises – proceeded at an excruciatingly slow pace. At the macroeconomic level, the Indian GDP grew by 7.3% during 2014/15, making India the fastest growing among the major economies. However, these data were the result of a new methodology, and most economists, including some politically close to the Modi government, were uncertain about its reliability. Moreover, when applied to the previous years, the new methodology unequivocally showed that the positive turn-around in the economy had happened before Modi’s government came to power. The Indian economy was also severely affected by a deepening rural crisis. Some of its causes were beyond the reach of Modi’s government, but it is a fact that its response was disappointingly inadequate.
Domestic politics was a constant source of difficulty for Modi. First, state elections in Delhi and Bihar dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Modi – and Amit Shah – led BJP, which was soundly defeated by local outfits. Second, the government struggled to pass key legislation in Parliament, also thanks to the unexpectedly successful opposition of the Congress party. Finally, the most worrying development on the domestic front was the rise of intolerance against non Hindus, who were victims of Fascist-like, sometimes deadly, aggressions by Hindu outfits. This happened while the Prime Minister appeared basically unconcerned about the climate of growing violence and some members of his government went so far to openly justify this state of affairs.
The aim of Modi’s foreign policy was projecting India as a major power on the world stage and getting all the possible foreign help in promoting India’s economic development. To this end, India’s foreign policy was articulated along two main axis: the India-US connection and the India-China connection. In turn, the latter had two faces: engaging China and containing China. At the end of the day, the India-US connection was high on hype but low on content, among other reasons because the US business community, after its initial enthusiasm for Modi, had come to perceive him as well intentioned but unable to further liberalise the Indian economy. India’s economic engagement with China brought about the signing of several MoUs and China’s promise to invest in India. However the concrete fall-out of all this was limited. More concrete appeared the containment aspect of Modi’s China policy, which, at a more general level was expression of India’s strategic surge, aimed at reclaiming the position of great power.
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India's (and the world's) largest e... more The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India's (and the world's) largest employment scheme. While many analysis exist on its impact and implementation faults, scant attention has been dedicated to how political dynamics influence its implementation. This paper will try to fill this gap with evidence from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. It will argue that the implementation performance of the scheme has been fairly good, despite the abysmal performance of the state government with previous employment schemes. The key factor in determining such a shift was the political commitment of the state's chief minister.
The growing importance of public works programmes (PWPs) as a social protection tool has attracte... more The growing importance of public works programmes (PWPs) as a social protection tool has attracted significant scholarly attention. However, despite the fact that the empowerment of marginalised communities is one of the key objectives of most PWPs, scant attention has been dedicated to this crucial issue. We contextualise these concerns in relation to India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). In particular, we propose two areas which are relatively unexplored. First, the methodologies currently used to research NREGA and PWP, more generally, need to be broadened. Second, the processes that lead to empowerment need to be researched empirically.
The International Spectator, 2015
In May 2014 Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in the wake of a historic electoral victo... more In May 2014 Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in the wake of a historic electoral victory. He has generated two kinds of expectations: on the one hand, his voters expect him to create millions of new jobs for a fast-growing working age population; on the other hand, Hindu extrem- ists hope that he will pursue an aggressive policy aimed at ‘hinduising’ India’s society. The first months of his premiership show that Modi is act- ing in both spheres, while pursuing a radical centralisation of power in his hands.
The Round Table, Jun 9, 2015
Asia Maior, Vol. XXV, 2014, 2015
Economic and Political Weekly, Dec 20, 2014
India's scheduled tribes are among the most deprived socio-economic groups and the Mahatma Gandhi... more India's scheduled tribes are among the most deprived socio-economic groups and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme has great potential in tribal areas. While the Andhra Pradesh government has made an effort to ensure implementation of the scheme in the scheduled areas, the gap between administrative orders and the grass-roots level is wide. This article lists measures that could radically improve implementation of the scheme in tribal areas.
Ideas 4 India
Employment generated under MNREGA has been on the decline in recent years across India. This colu... more Employment generated under MNREGA has been on the decline in recent years across India. This column analyses whether political dynamics influence the implementation of MNREGA by contrasting the implementation models of two of the top performing states – Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. It concludes that a combination of the top-down, supply-driven approach of AP and the demand-driven Rajasthan model is required. - See more at: http://ideasforindia.in/article.aspx?article_id=356#sthash.wnhuuJMa.dpuf
Economic and Political Weekly, Mar 1, 2014
The social coalition that benefited from India's central government's economic policies remained ... more The social coalition that benefited from India's central government's economic policies remained unchanged between the pre- and post-economic reforms periods. The economic policies promoted by the central government between 1980 and 2004 - irrespective of the political party heading the Cabinet - mostly benefited the middle class and the corporate sector, while the poor and the rural world were clearly relegated to a secondary position in the governments' policy priorities. From this point of view the election of the United Progressive Alliance government in 2004 might constitute a more important break with the past.
World Development, Jun 2014
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India’s (and the world’s) largest e... more The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is India’s (and the world’s) largest employment scheme. While many analyses exist on the impact and implementation faults of this program, scant attention has been dedicated to how political dynamics have influenced implementation. This paper will try to fill this gap with evidence from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. It will argue that the implementation performance of the scheme has been fairly good, despite the abysmal performance of the state government with previous employment schemes; the key factor in determining such a shift was the political commitment of the state’s chief minister.
Economic and Political Weekly, Jun 1, 2013
Modern Asian Studies, 2014
In 1989 India’s political system underwent a process of profound change which affected the entire... more In 1989 India’s political system underwent a process of profound change which affected the entire institutional setup of the country. Power was radically redistributed, as it began to flow from the central government to the states, and from the Prime Minister Office to the other institutions of the state. The paper seeks to show how things worked on the eve of such a redrawing of India’s institutional setup, by analysing the sever institutional crisis which occurred during Mrs Gandhi’s final term in office as India’s Prime Minister. In addition, an effort is made to link the working of India’s institutions to the configuration of the party system, thus stressing the importance of political dynamics in the functioning of parliamentary democracies.
India Review, 2012
This article examines the impact that national economic policies adopted during Indira Gandhi's f... more This article examines the impact that national economic policies adopted during Indira Gandhi's final term in office (1980–84) had on four “national” social groups, namely the big industrialists, the middle class, the rich peasantry, and the poor. The study argues that the Congress (I) chose the former two as its major allies, while the rich peasantry and the poor were relegated to a secondary position. In the process, the focus of India's strategy of development shifted from the agrarian to the industrial sector, and from the rural to the urban world.
Indira Gandhi’s last years in office as India’s prime minister ran from January 1980 to her assas... more Indira Gandhi’s last years in office as India’s prime minister ran from January 1980 to her assassination in October 1984 but until now no book has been devoted to her final term. Among the principal themes discussed in this innovative volume are how Indian politics and society changed in the 1970s, including the state of Emergency (1975-77) Congress’s response to insurgency in Punjab, Assam and Kashmir, the rise of new forms of political mobilisation in the early 1980s and the prime minister’s relationship with the key institutions of state. Maiorano also reveals how Mrs Gandhi’s policies in the 1980s impacted on the big industrialists, the middle class, the rich peasantry and the poor, thereby crucially re-orienting India’s economic strategy. Autumn of the Matriarch is the first major study of MrsGandhi’s last years in power, an important juncture in India’s recent history, as it was then that emerged trends that influenced the country for the next three decades.