Miranda Fricker | New York University (original) (raw)
Drafts by Miranda Fricker
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
I start by acquainting the reader with key themes from my 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice: Power a... more I start by acquainting the reader with key themes from my 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, sketching the background of British academic culture from which it grew. Moving swiftly into the present, and to the social context of the U.S., I then offer some new thoughts concerning institutional epistemic vices and explore, in particular, one important form of institutionalized epistemic vice that is exemplified by a standardly recommended police procedure for interrogating suspects. Combining with Jennifer Lackey's recent work on Agential Testimonial Injustice, I offer a three-phase analysis as Institutionalized Testimonial Injustice.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversat... more Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical '-isms'. All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought-its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum-still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons; the relativism of distance; and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously under-determine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams' ethical philosophy taken as a whole.
Epistemic Vice, 2020
This paper argues for a conception of institutional epistemic vice; and it identifies a particula... more This paper argues for a conception of institutional epistemic vice; and it identifies a particular vice of Inferential Inertia, where a hearer may believe information given and yet does not engage in any inferential follow-through, so it is almost as if they did not believe. Where a prejudice drives the inertia, the vice will belong to the family of testimonial injustices. To illustrate one way in which this vice may manifest in an institution, the case of the BBC is explored, drawing from the commissioned Dame Janet Smith Review Report 2016.
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2018
Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we ... more Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we make sense of this apparent conflict? This paper argues that we should learn something from each, seeing these views as representing opposing moments in a perennial and well-grounded moral ambivalence towards forgiveness. Once we are correctly positioned, we shall see an aspect of forgiveness that recommends precisely this ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key psychological mechanisms of moral-epistemic influence-other-addressed and self-addressed mechanisms of moral social construction-that enable forgiveness to function well when it is well-functioning, but which are also intrinsically prone to deterioration into one or another form of bad faith. Thus forgiveness is revealed as necessarily containing seeds of its own corruption, showing ambivalence to be a generically appropriate attitude. Moreover, it is emphasized that where forgiver and forgiven are relating to one another in the context of asymmetries of social power, the practice of forgiveness is likely to be further compromised, notably increasing the risk of negative influence on the moral-epistemic states of either the forgiver or the forgiven, or both. Ambivalence About Forgiveness …We will only shout with joy, and keep saying, 'It's all over! It's all over!' Listen to me, Nora. You don't seem to realise that it is all over.
The literature on forgiveness displays a broad division between a conception of forgiveness as es... more The literature on forgiveness displays a broad division between a conception of forgiveness as essentially earned through remorse, and a conception of it as fundamentally non-earned or ‘elective’—a gift. The two are plainly very different; yet each describes a real kind of forgiveness. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. How can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This paper explains how, by hypothesizing Moral Justice Forgiveness as a candidate explanatorily basic case; then identifying the primary role that it plays in moral life, and looking to see how far Gifted Forgiveness discreetly serves the same basic purpose. I show that indeed it does serve the same purpose, though in an intriguingly disguised manner—for in one or another formation of Gifted Forgiveness the shared moral understanding, which in the culprit takes the form of remorse, has become displaced in social space and/or time. In Gifted Forgiveness, remorse is no longer demanded from the culprit in the now, but has been displaced in time to become something hoped for in the future, and/or in social space to become something sourced from the moral community. The resulting account is pluralism about the two broad kinds of forgiveness, each with its own psychology and surface normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration.
Epistemic Vice eds. Ian J. Kidd, Heather Battaly, Quassim Cassam eds. Epistemic Vice (Routledge), 2020
This paper puts forward an account of epistemic vice as culpable failure in any element in an epi... more This paper puts forward an account of epistemic vice as culpable failure in any element in an epistemic virtue; and this is shown to be applicable in the case of individual or institutional epistemic subjects. A specific epistemic vice of Inferential Inertia is identified and illustrated in relation to the BBC considered as an institutional epistemic subject, drawing on findings of the 2016 independent inquiry known as the 'Savile Report'.
Papers by Miranda Fricker
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 2022
Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clear... more Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clearly so of unconditional forms of forgiveness, where we forgive even in the absence of apology, for in such cases our forgiveness is fully elective or discretionary—a piece of extraordinary moral generosity. However, it is deeply puzzling to think how it might be true of conditional forms of forgiveness. In conditional cases a sufficient apology is seen to generate some sort of obligation to forgive, and there is a natural tension between the idea of obligation and the idea of a gift. I will dispel this tension, however, by showing that the obligation to forgive is an instance of the general Normativity of the Gift, according to which it is entirely ordinary to have an obligation to give a gift, and yet that gift can never be demanded as of right—not without radical pragmatic self-defeat. I thus explain our starting intuition, that all forgiveness is basically gift-like, not in terms of its never being obligatory (we often owe each other gifts), but rather in terms of its never being demandable as of right. There is no right to be forgiven, even when you are owed forgiveness, and this, I contend, is what explains our deep sense of the gift at the heart of all forgiveness.
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 2022
Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clear... more Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clearly so of unconditional forms of forgiveness, where we forgive even in the absence of apology, for in such cases our forgiveness is fully elective or discretionary—a piece of extraordinary moral generosity. However, it is deeply puzzling to think how it might be true of conditional forms of forgiveness. In conditional cases a sufficient apology is seen to generate some sort of obligation to forgive, and there is a natural tension between the idea of obligation and the idea of a gift. I will dispel this tension, however, by showing that the obligation to forgive is an instance of the general Normativity of the Gift, according to which it is entirely ordinary to have an obligation to give a gift, and yet that gift can never be demanded as of right—not without radical pragmatic self-defeat. I thus explain our starting intuition, that all forgiveness is basically gift-like, not in terms of its never being obligatory (we often owe each other gifts), but rather in terms of its never being demandable as of right. There is no right to be forgiven, even when you are owed forgiveness, and this, I contend, is what explains our deep sense of the gift at the heart of all forgiveness.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversat... more Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical '-isms'. All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought-its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum-still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons; the relativism of distance; and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously under-determine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams' ethical philosophy taken as a whole.
When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy f... more When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified— 'Communicative Blame'—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised.
The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, 2016
Other things equal, if one is seen to have made judgements that are significantly influenced by p... more Other things equal, if one is seen to have made judgements that are significantly influenced by prejudicial bias, then one is epistemically at fault, so that epistemic blame would be justified. What about cases where the prejudice in question is an ‘implicit bias’? Here too, even if our degree of control and awareness is very limited, we may well be blameworthy—compare character traits of which we’re unaware, such as ‘implicit’ selfishness.
In this paper I ask whether there are there circumstances under which we may be guilty of implicit prejudice and yet not epistemically blameworthy. An example might be a case of (what we might call) environmental bad epistemic luck: where there is prejudice in the epistemic environment, and one has no reason to suspect that this is so, resulting in an epistemically innocent inheritance of environmental prejudice. Where this is so, we see a space for no-fault epistemic responsibility—the epistemic analogue of ‘agent regret’. This epistemic counterpart of Williams’ original notion demarcates a space of no-fault epistemic responsibility where, crucially, the subject incurs ameliorative epistemic obligations. Finally it is argued that in most cases such individual obligations will either already constitute or else quickly generate collective or institutional obligations to improve the epistemic environment—which is just as well, given that institutional bodies have far greater power to change things for the better.
Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified... more Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the 'relativism of distance'. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain 'fantasy'). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams' moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance.
The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice, 2015
This paper argues that there is a social-epistemic human capability worth distinguishing from, an... more This paper argues that there is a social-epistemic human capability worth distinguishing from, and adding to, those ‘central human capabilities’ recognised in Martha Nussbaum’s canonical list. There we see ‘practical reason’ featured; but representing the theoretical side of human rationality we find only ‘Senses, imagination, thought’, supplemented with the mention of education. The proposal of this is that participation in everyday exchanges of epistemic materials—from plain information to contested social interpretations—constitutes a sufficiently unified functioning to indicate a specific epistemic capability, and one that looks sufficiently fundamental to human flourishing to qualify for a place on Nussbaum’s list if anything does. I label this capability Epistemic Contribution. More specifically, I propose Epistemic Contribution as a ‘combined’ capability in Nussbaum’s sense, and in presenting it as plausibly requisite for human flourishing I take my cues from Elizabeth Anderson’s approach to capabilities as providing a criterion of equality, where the internal purpose of equality is understood to be the eradication of oppressive social relations. I argue that Epistemic Contribution is a capability of special egalitarian concern by showing its necessity to two fundamental liberal egalitarian values: freedom of speech, and non-domination.
Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, 2012
When someone speaks but is not heard because of their accent, or their sex, or the colour of thei... more When someone speaks but is not heard because of their accent, or their sex, or the colour of their skin, they suffer a distinctive form of injustice—they are undermined as a knower. This kind of injustice, which I call testimonial injustice, is not only an ethical problem but also a political one; for citizens are not free unless they get a fair hearing when they try to contest wrongful treatment. I shall argue that not only individuals but also public institutions need to have the virtue of testimonial justice. If our police, our juries, our complaints panels lack that virtue, then some groups cannot contest. And if you can't do that, you do not have political freedom. Silence and Institutional Prejudice Let me begin where I shall end: with the concept of silence. There are many kinds of silence; but at the most general level, we might say that silence has two aspects—a positive and a negative. In the negative aspect, there is the imposed silence of those who are in some way prevented from making their voices heard. This kind of silence is normally effected by way of an injustice. In the positive aspect, there is the active, attentive silence of those who are listening, perhaps trying to make out a voice that is seldom heard. This kind of silence belongs with a moral attitude of attention to others—an openness to who they are and what they have to say. Most of what I want to discuss in this paper can be brought under one or other of these aspects of silence.
Books by Miranda Fricker
Preface to the German edition of Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, 2023
This is the English version of the new Preface to Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Kn... more This is the English version of the new Preface to Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Epistemische Ungerechtigkeit), published 2023 by C. H. Beck, translated into German by Antje Korsmeier.
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
I start by acquainting the reader with key themes from my 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice: Power a... more I start by acquainting the reader with key themes from my 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, sketching the background of British academic culture from which it grew. Moving swiftly into the present, and to the social context of the U.S., I then offer some new thoughts concerning institutional epistemic vices and explore, in particular, one important form of institutionalized epistemic vice that is exemplified by a standardly recommended police procedure for interrogating suspects. Combining with Jennifer Lackey's recent work on Agential Testimonial Injustice, I offer a three-phase analysis as Institutionalized Testimonial Injustice.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversat... more Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical '-isms'. All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought-its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum-still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons; the relativism of distance; and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously under-determine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams' ethical philosophy taken as a whole.
Epistemic Vice, 2020
This paper argues for a conception of institutional epistemic vice; and it identifies a particula... more This paper argues for a conception of institutional epistemic vice; and it identifies a particular vice of Inferential Inertia, where a hearer may believe information given and yet does not engage in any inferential follow-through, so it is almost as if they did not believe. Where a prejudice drives the inertia, the vice will belong to the family of testimonial injustices. To illustrate one way in which this vice may manifest in an institution, the case of the BBC is explored, drawing from the commissioned Dame Janet Smith Review Report 2016.
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2018
Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we ... more Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we make sense of this apparent conflict? This paper argues that we should learn something from each, seeing these views as representing opposing moments in a perennial and well-grounded moral ambivalence towards forgiveness. Once we are correctly positioned, we shall see an aspect of forgiveness that recommends precisely this ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key psychological mechanisms of moral-epistemic influence-other-addressed and self-addressed mechanisms of moral social construction-that enable forgiveness to function well when it is well-functioning, but which are also intrinsically prone to deterioration into one or another form of bad faith. Thus forgiveness is revealed as necessarily containing seeds of its own corruption, showing ambivalence to be a generically appropriate attitude. Moreover, it is emphasized that where forgiver and forgiven are relating to one another in the context of asymmetries of social power, the practice of forgiveness is likely to be further compromised, notably increasing the risk of negative influence on the moral-epistemic states of either the forgiver or the forgiven, or both. Ambivalence About Forgiveness …We will only shout with joy, and keep saying, 'It's all over! It's all over!' Listen to me, Nora. You don't seem to realise that it is all over.
The literature on forgiveness displays a broad division between a conception of forgiveness as es... more The literature on forgiveness displays a broad division between a conception of forgiveness as essentially earned through remorse, and a conception of it as fundamentally non-earned or ‘elective’—a gift. The two are plainly very different; yet each describes a real kind of forgiveness. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. How can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This paper explains how, by hypothesizing Moral Justice Forgiveness as a candidate explanatorily basic case; then identifying the primary role that it plays in moral life, and looking to see how far Gifted Forgiveness discreetly serves the same basic purpose. I show that indeed it does serve the same purpose, though in an intriguingly disguised manner—for in one or another formation of Gifted Forgiveness the shared moral understanding, which in the culprit takes the form of remorse, has become displaced in social space and/or time. In Gifted Forgiveness, remorse is no longer demanded from the culprit in the now, but has been displaced in time to become something hoped for in the future, and/or in social space to become something sourced from the moral community. The resulting account is pluralism about the two broad kinds of forgiveness, each with its own psychology and surface normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration.
Epistemic Vice eds. Ian J. Kidd, Heather Battaly, Quassim Cassam eds. Epistemic Vice (Routledge), 2020
This paper puts forward an account of epistemic vice as culpable failure in any element in an epi... more This paper puts forward an account of epistemic vice as culpable failure in any element in an epistemic virtue; and this is shown to be applicable in the case of individual or institutional epistemic subjects. A specific epistemic vice of Inferential Inertia is identified and illustrated in relation to the BBC considered as an institutional epistemic subject, drawing on findings of the 2016 independent inquiry known as the 'Savile Report'.
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 2022
Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clear... more Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clearly so of unconditional forms of forgiveness, where we forgive even in the absence of apology, for in such cases our forgiveness is fully elective or discretionary—a piece of extraordinary moral generosity. However, it is deeply puzzling to think how it might be true of conditional forms of forgiveness. In conditional cases a sufficient apology is seen to generate some sort of obligation to forgive, and there is a natural tension between the idea of obligation and the idea of a gift. I will dispel this tension, however, by showing that the obligation to forgive is an instance of the general Normativity of the Gift, according to which it is entirely ordinary to have an obligation to give a gift, and yet that gift can never be demanded as of right—not without radical pragmatic self-defeat. I thus explain our starting intuition, that all forgiveness is basically gift-like, not in terms of its never being obligatory (we often owe each other gifts), but rather in terms of its never being demandable as of right. There is no right to be forgiven, even when you are owed forgiveness, and this, I contend, is what explains our deep sense of the gift at the heart of all forgiveness.
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 2022
Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clear... more Many sense something gift-like at the heart of all forgiveness, and this seems right. It is clearly so of unconditional forms of forgiveness, where we forgive even in the absence of apology, for in such cases our forgiveness is fully elective or discretionary—a piece of extraordinary moral generosity. However, it is deeply puzzling to think how it might be true of conditional forms of forgiveness. In conditional cases a sufficient apology is seen to generate some sort of obligation to forgive, and there is a natural tension between the idea of obligation and the idea of a gift. I will dispel this tension, however, by showing that the obligation to forgive is an instance of the general Normativity of the Gift, according to which it is entirely ordinary to have an obligation to give a gift, and yet that gift can never be demanded as of right—not without radical pragmatic self-defeat. I thus explain our starting intuition, that all forgiveness is basically gift-like, not in terms of its never being obligatory (we often owe each other gifts), but rather in terms of its never being demandable as of right. There is no right to be forgiven, even when you are owed forgiveness, and this, I contend, is what explains our deep sense of the gift at the heart of all forgiveness.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversat... more Interpreting Bernard Williams' ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical '-isms'. All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought-its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum-still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons; the relativism of distance; and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously under-determine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams' ethical philosophy taken as a whole.
When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy f... more When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified— 'Communicative Blame'—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised.
The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, 2016
Other things equal, if one is seen to have made judgements that are significantly influenced by p... more Other things equal, if one is seen to have made judgements that are significantly influenced by prejudicial bias, then one is epistemically at fault, so that epistemic blame would be justified. What about cases where the prejudice in question is an ‘implicit bias’? Here too, even if our degree of control and awareness is very limited, we may well be blameworthy—compare character traits of which we’re unaware, such as ‘implicit’ selfishness.
In this paper I ask whether there are there circumstances under which we may be guilty of implicit prejudice and yet not epistemically blameworthy. An example might be a case of (what we might call) environmental bad epistemic luck: where there is prejudice in the epistemic environment, and one has no reason to suspect that this is so, resulting in an epistemically innocent inheritance of environmental prejudice. Where this is so, we see a space for no-fault epistemic responsibility—the epistemic analogue of ‘agent regret’. This epistemic counterpart of Williams’ original notion demarcates a space of no-fault epistemic responsibility where, crucially, the subject incurs ameliorative epistemic obligations. Finally it is argued that in most cases such individual obligations will either already constitute or else quickly generate collective or institutional obligations to improve the epistemic environment—which is just as well, given that institutional bodies have far greater power to change things for the better.
Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified... more Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the 'relativism of distance'. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain 'fantasy'). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams' moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance.
The Equal Society: Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice, 2015
This paper argues that there is a social-epistemic human capability worth distinguishing from, an... more This paper argues that there is a social-epistemic human capability worth distinguishing from, and adding to, those ‘central human capabilities’ recognised in Martha Nussbaum’s canonical list. There we see ‘practical reason’ featured; but representing the theoretical side of human rationality we find only ‘Senses, imagination, thought’, supplemented with the mention of education. The proposal of this is that participation in everyday exchanges of epistemic materials—from plain information to contested social interpretations—constitutes a sufficiently unified functioning to indicate a specific epistemic capability, and one that looks sufficiently fundamental to human flourishing to qualify for a place on Nussbaum’s list if anything does. I label this capability Epistemic Contribution. More specifically, I propose Epistemic Contribution as a ‘combined’ capability in Nussbaum’s sense, and in presenting it as plausibly requisite for human flourishing I take my cues from Elizabeth Anderson’s approach to capabilities as providing a criterion of equality, where the internal purpose of equality is understood to be the eradication of oppressive social relations. I argue that Epistemic Contribution is a capability of special egalitarian concern by showing its necessity to two fundamental liberal egalitarian values: freedom of speech, and non-domination.
Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, 2012
When someone speaks but is not heard because of their accent, or their sex, or the colour of thei... more When someone speaks but is not heard because of their accent, or their sex, or the colour of their skin, they suffer a distinctive form of injustice—they are undermined as a knower. This kind of injustice, which I call testimonial injustice, is not only an ethical problem but also a political one; for citizens are not free unless they get a fair hearing when they try to contest wrongful treatment. I shall argue that not only individuals but also public institutions need to have the virtue of testimonial justice. If our police, our juries, our complaints panels lack that virtue, then some groups cannot contest. And if you can't do that, you do not have political freedom. Silence and Institutional Prejudice Let me begin where I shall end: with the concept of silence. There are many kinds of silence; but at the most general level, we might say that silence has two aspects—a positive and a negative. In the negative aspect, there is the imposed silence of those who are in some way prevented from making their voices heard. This kind of silence is normally effected by way of an injustice. In the positive aspect, there is the active, attentive silence of those who are listening, perhaps trying to make out a voice that is seldom heard. This kind of silence belongs with a moral attitude of attention to others—an openness to who they are and what they have to say. Most of what I want to discuss in this paper can be brought under one or other of these aspects of silence.
Preface to the German edition of Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, 2023
This is the English version of the new Preface to Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Kn... more This is the English version of the new Preface to Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Epistemische Ungerechtigkeit), published 2023 by C. H. Beck, translated into German by Antje Korsmeier.