Robert Barry | Providence College (original) (raw)

Papers by Robert Barry

Research paper thumbnail of Albert's Appropriation of Aristotle and (pseudo-)Dionysius in his Metaphysics of Evil in Paris in the 1240s

Thomas Aquinas is recognized as developing Augustine’s privation account of evil in light of Aris... more Thomas Aquinas is recognized as developing Augustine’s privation account of evil in light of Aristotle’s metaphysics and (pseudo-)Dionysius’s account of creation as participation. Unexplored at this point is the extent to which Thomas is indebted to his Master Albert for both the habit of relying on the thought of these ancient authorities, as well as the conclusions drawn from their thought, on the issue of evil as a privation of the good. This paper aims to identify the extent to which Albert appropriates the thought of Aristotle and (pseudo-) Dionysius in his explanation of the possibility for evil emerging in the creation of a good God.

Research paper thumbnail of Original Sin and Pure Nature: What's the Difference,and What Difference Does it Make

Josephinum Journal of Theology, 2018

This article aims to show that for Thomas Aquinas the condition of humanity in the state of origi... more This article aims to show that for Thomas Aquinas the condition of humanity in the state of original sin, and the condition of man in the state of pure nature are one and the same. I show that Thomas holds the natural principles from which humanity is composed to be incapable of producing a state of Integral Nature. Deprived of the sanctifying grace that produces the state of Original Justice, and left in a condition of "pure nature," operating by the principles that it possesses through its nature alone, humanity necessarily suffers the disorders of the state of Original Sin.

Research paper thumbnail of Matthew Lamb on Retrieval in Catholic Theology

Wisdom and the Renewal of Catholic Theology, 2016

Research paper thumbnail of Marriage as a Sacrament for Young Adult Catholics

Talks by Robert Barry

Research paper thumbnail of Why Pure Nature is Not Integral, and Why Integral Nature is Not Pure- Garrigou Lagrange on Pure and Integral Nature

Recent Thomistic discussions about Divine Grace and Human Freedom continue to consider the prospe... more Recent Thomistic discussions about Divine Grace and Human Freedom continue to consider the prospects of human moral action in the state of “Pure Nature,” influenced on this point especially by the writings of Garrigou-Lagrange and his taxonomy of the different possible states in which humanity might exist, both actually and hypothetically. Two of the hypothetical states of human existence that Garrigou-Lagrange presents are those of Pure Nature and of Integral Nature, in both of which humanity is not ordered to or raised to any end beyond those which it can attain by its natural principles of operation.
These two states differ, however, for in the state of Pure Nature, those natural principles operate at cross-purposes, resulting in a necessarily-disordered human life that fails to attain its proper natural end. In this condition of Pure Nature, humanity lacks integrity of body, of powers and of operation. Garrigou-Lagrange thus distinguishes a separate hypothetical state, whereby humanity is aided by an infusion of grace that is supernatural in origin, but not in its end or its operation. By these praeternatural gifts, humanity is given the additional help necessary for the integrity of body, of virtues and of operations, such that some (perhaps very few) people are able to attain the perfect happiness proportionate to human nature. Yet by positing this gratuitous integrity as a principle of perfect natural operation, this hypothesis runs up against a limit: this perfect operation of adhering to God as one’s object of natural beatitude is taken to both the cause of integrity, but also the result of a prior integrity whereby the diverse powers of the soul pose no obstacle to that perfect operation (as they do in the state of Pure Nature).
Present discussions of grace and free-will that seek to continue the commentatorial tradition and employ the hypothetical state of Integral Nature will need to distinguish explicitly the state of Pure Nature from the state of Integral Nature, and also to account for the integrating principle, either internal or external, by which that integrity is effected such that it is capable of producing, but not presupposing, an attainment of a happiness proportionate to the unelevated powers of human reason. Some authors such as Steve Long do this implicitly, but might benefit from explicitly accounting for how those principles function, and how this account diverges from the account Thomas Aquinas gives of this same possibility.

Research paper thumbnail of Albert's Appropriation of Aristotle and (pseudo-)Dionysius in his Metaphysics of Evil in Paris in the 1240s

Thomas Aquinas is recognized as developing Augustine’s privation account of evil in light of Aris... more Thomas Aquinas is recognized as developing Augustine’s privation account of evil in light of Aristotle’s metaphysics and (pseudo-)Dionysius’s account of creation as participation. Unexplored at this point is the extent to which Thomas is indebted to his Master Albert for both the habit of relying on the thought of these ancient authorities, as well as the conclusions drawn from their thought, on the issue of evil as a privation of the good. This paper aims to identify the extent to which Albert appropriates the thought of Aristotle and (pseudo-) Dionysius in his explanation of the possibility for evil emerging in the creation of a good God.

Research paper thumbnail of Original Sin and Pure Nature: What's the Difference,and What Difference Does it Make

Josephinum Journal of Theology, 2018

This article aims to show that for Thomas Aquinas the condition of humanity in the state of origi... more This article aims to show that for Thomas Aquinas the condition of humanity in the state of original sin, and the condition of man in the state of pure nature are one and the same. I show that Thomas holds the natural principles from which humanity is composed to be incapable of producing a state of Integral Nature. Deprived of the sanctifying grace that produces the state of Original Justice, and left in a condition of "pure nature," operating by the principles that it possesses through its nature alone, humanity necessarily suffers the disorders of the state of Original Sin.

Research paper thumbnail of Matthew Lamb on Retrieval in Catholic Theology

Wisdom and the Renewal of Catholic Theology, 2016

Research paper thumbnail of Marriage as a Sacrament for Young Adult Catholics

Research paper thumbnail of Why Pure Nature is Not Integral, and Why Integral Nature is Not Pure- Garrigou Lagrange on Pure and Integral Nature

Recent Thomistic discussions about Divine Grace and Human Freedom continue to consider the prospe... more Recent Thomistic discussions about Divine Grace and Human Freedom continue to consider the prospects of human moral action in the state of “Pure Nature,” influenced on this point especially by the writings of Garrigou-Lagrange and his taxonomy of the different possible states in which humanity might exist, both actually and hypothetically. Two of the hypothetical states of human existence that Garrigou-Lagrange presents are those of Pure Nature and of Integral Nature, in both of which humanity is not ordered to or raised to any end beyond those which it can attain by its natural principles of operation.
These two states differ, however, for in the state of Pure Nature, those natural principles operate at cross-purposes, resulting in a necessarily-disordered human life that fails to attain its proper natural end. In this condition of Pure Nature, humanity lacks integrity of body, of powers and of operation. Garrigou-Lagrange thus distinguishes a separate hypothetical state, whereby humanity is aided by an infusion of grace that is supernatural in origin, but not in its end or its operation. By these praeternatural gifts, humanity is given the additional help necessary for the integrity of body, of virtues and of operations, such that some (perhaps very few) people are able to attain the perfect happiness proportionate to human nature. Yet by positing this gratuitous integrity as a principle of perfect natural operation, this hypothesis runs up against a limit: this perfect operation of adhering to God as one’s object of natural beatitude is taken to both the cause of integrity, but also the result of a prior integrity whereby the diverse powers of the soul pose no obstacle to that perfect operation (as they do in the state of Pure Nature).
Present discussions of grace and free-will that seek to continue the commentatorial tradition and employ the hypothetical state of Integral Nature will need to distinguish explicitly the state of Pure Nature from the state of Integral Nature, and also to account for the integrating principle, either internal or external, by which that integrity is effected such that it is capable of producing, but not presupposing, an attainment of a happiness proportionate to the unelevated powers of human reason. Some authors such as Steve Long do this implicitly, but might benefit from explicitly accounting for how those principles function, and how this account diverges from the account Thomas Aquinas gives of this same possibility.