Albert's Appropriation of Aristotle and (pseudo-)Dionysius in his Metaphysics of Evil in Paris in the 1240s (original) (raw)
Related papers
“Goodness comes from a single and whole cause, while evil comes from numerous partial deficiencies.” This brief saying from Pseudo-Dionysius is one of the crowning principles of chapter 4 “on good and evil” in his work On The Divine Names. It is a crown because it is the final conclusion that follows logically from all that comes before in the chapter on the nature of goodness, but it is likewise a principle for two of his faithful commentators, St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas, who use it in their moral theology to manifest why all the elements of an act must be good in order for the act itself to be good. In this paper I will seek to clarify how Dionysius arrives at this principle of the integrity of goodness, showing that it flows from his understanding of the nature of good and evil, then, I will examine how this principle was interpreted and developed by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas and used by them as a source for the rest of their moral theology.
How Evil Happens to Be: Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite on the Origin of Evil
2024
In monistic metaphysics like that of Dionysius, in which the absolute One/Good is conceived as the sole principle, "evil" (κακόν/kakon) does not seem to fit in. Hence, there have been numerous attempts to locate evil within the Dionysian ontology. To research it is obvious that evil cannot be an ontological category at all. Rather, it is a purely ethical concept that points to the existential philosophical orientation of Dionysian thought. Dionysius emphasizes our own responsibility: we as human beings are the reason for the realization of evil. But how does the Good as the sole principle fit into this scheme? If the Good is nothing other than omnipotence, how can the genesis of evil be explained? In this paper, I wish to demonstrate that Dionysius answers these questions through a concept adapted from Proclus: the concept of πρόνοια.
There has been a new reception and revival of interest in the Pseudo-Dionysius in recent times both in popular and academic circles which has also impacted on Thomistic scholarship. Scholars roughly from the time of Vatican II onwards have stressed the importance of Pseudo-Dionysius to Thomistic thought in reaction to a previous emphasis on the "Aristotelian" and analytic aspects of Thomistic thought and also as a corrective to the metaphysical move towards univocity made by influential scholastics such as Cajatan, Scotus and Ockham after Thomas himself. Whilst this approach uncovered a largely neglected area,
European Journal for the Study of Thomas Aquinas
This article broadly considers the commentaries on Job of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great as offering a helpful theological alternative to some modern philosophical approaches to the ‘problem of evil’. We seek to show that whereas some modern philosophers understand evil as a problem for the very existence of God, whether and how God can coexist with evil was never a question that evil seriously raised in the minds of Aquinas and Albert. In fact, although the suffering of the just in particular led our medieval Dominicans to wonder about divine providence and our ability to know God in this life, they understood the reality of evil as compelling evidence for the existence of God.
“Thomas Aquinas and the Modern and Contemporary Debate on Evil”
This article aims to demonstrate that Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics of being, in which evil is considered a privation or lack of perfection introduced only by the creature against God's intention, is a remarkable starting point for solving the main problems involved in the modern and contemporary debate on the problem of evil. It also seeks to prove that Aquinas's position is neither reducible to an 'optimistic theodicy' -such as Leibniz's theodicy-nor to a 'free will defence'.
Albert, Aquinas, and Dionysius
Modern Theology, 2008
Beyond the usual distinction between East and West, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas stand not only as commentators, but also appear to be close readers, of Dionysius' works. While Albert's own metaphysics of the Good tends to underline the diffusive dimension of the Good in a creation conceived of as an emanation, Thomas uses Dionysius to elaborate his notion of God as a free creator and to define His unique relation to creatures. If Albert's own via negativa is closer to Dionysius than one might have expected, it nonetheless stands within the same scope as Thomas' conception of proximity to God, as they both borrow the Dionysian exitus/reditus pattern to offer a divinization process of salvation through peace and praise.
Greek Philosophy and the Problem of Evil in Clement of Alexandria and Origen
2013
In spite of the acrimonious criticism issued against it, Greek philosophy always exerted an irresistible attraction to Christian writers of the fi rst centuries. Not only did their censure of divine anthropomorphism, mythology, and polytheism rely on Greek philosophical precedents. Surprisingly, also their attacks against Greek philosophy itself often resorted to philosophical interschool polemics. This paper, however, focuses on the positive and creative side of this appropriation: during the second and third centuries Clement of Alexandria and Origen raised the cultural level of Christian theology by their large use of the Greek philosophical discourse. The present study focuses on how they dealt with the problem of the existence of evil in the context of God's creation and traces their approach back to Greek philosophical precedents.
Aquinas on 'The Good' as the Principal Name of God: An Aristotelian Reading of Dionysius
Analogia, 2023
On a number of occasions, when considering the names that can properly be said of God, Aquinas notably holds that the most proper name is 'He Who Is'. In this way, Aquinas's account of divine naming could be seen to stand in contrast to the Platonic tradition of favoring the name of 'Good' for the first principle since, in that tradition, the Good is beyond being. With that said, it is important to note that Aquinas himself at times speaks in terms similar to the Platonists, observing both that God is beyond being (supra ens) and that the name of 'Good' should, in a respect, be seen as the 'principal name of God' (principale nomen dei), namely, inasmuch as he is a cause. This paper offers clarification on how Aquinas reconciles this claim about 'Good' as the principal name of God with his position that 'He Who Is' is the most proper name of God. Fundamental to this investigation is a consideration of Aquinas's treatment of as he presents them in his commentary The Divine Names of Ps.-Dionysius.
Aristotle and the Origins of Evil
forthcoming in Phronesis, 2020
The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of human non-rational desires.