Steve (stephen) Leighton | Queen's University at Kingston (original) (raw)
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Papers by Steve (stephen) Leighton
The Journal of Philosophy, 1988
Emotion, Space and Society, 2008
Philosophical Inquiry, 2018
Can Aristotle's reflections on fear explain fear-begotten activity? How and how well can any expl... more Can Aristotle's reflections on fear explain fear-begotten activity? How and how well can any explanation offered be utilized in the diverse settings in which he takes fear to arise, e.g. on the battlefield, in the courts, aboard a storm-ravaged ship, in the face of illness, upon viewing a tragedy? These questions are worth pursuing not only insofar as they can help us to appreciate Aristotle's thinking on the nature and roles that fear can take in our lives, but also because his thought contrasts interestingly with some common suppositions of our own. Indeed, it may help to reveal the direction and originality of Aristotle's reflections by beginning with our common suppositions.
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2018
Phronesis (1982)
Since the object of rhetoric is judgment (Rhetoric 1377b2l) and since what appears does vary with... more Since the object of rhetoric is judgment (Rhetoric 1377b2l) and since what appears does vary with the emotions (ibid. 1378al), a concern for rhetoric provided Aristotle with the opportunity to develop his most sustained thoughts on emotions; not only does he define, explicate, compare and contrast various emotions, but also he characterizes emotions themselves. 1 His observation is quite striking.
Classical Quarterly (1984)
When characterizing ta pathē in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle claims that they are usually accomp... more When characterizing ta pathē in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle claims that they are usually accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain. 1 He says:
Phronesis (1988)
How do the courageous feel upon the field of battle? Aristotle's answer concerns fear and confide... more How do the courageous feel upon the field of battle? Aristotle's answer concerns fear and confidence, but stating his position with precision is difficult, not only because Aristotle does not approach the issue in this way, but also because his thoughts that do bear on an answer are limited and seem discordant. Although the difficulties of detail and discord could be dismissed as carelessness or inattention, a more telling explanation has to do with the intrusion by certain ethical doctrines, forcing Aristotle in different directions. To show this I discuss that and how certain doctrines intrude on this question, chart the directions in which they force Aristotle, and do so in such a way as to ascertain Aristotle's most plausible answer to the question. By so doing I hope to come to a better appreciation of the issues connecting courage and the passions for Aristotle. I begin with the question itself.
Apeiron (1992)
When characterizing excellence, Aristotle tells us that the mean state it consists in is one rela... more When characterizing excellence, Aristotle tells us that the mean state it consists in is one relative to us. He writes:
Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean (1995)
A striking qualification in the Nicomachean Ethics' characterization of virtue is the use of 'pro... more A striking qualification in the Nicomachean Ethics' characterization of virtue is the use of 'pro\ j h( ma= j', 'relative to us'.
Southwest Philosophy Review, 1995
Ratio (2002)
This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle’s account of anger... more This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle’s account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle’s valuing of anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle’s account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing a deeper appreciation of Aristotle’s understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts
between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its connections to value, and our own understanding of these matters.
Ancient Philosophy
This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle's account of anger... more This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle's account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle's valuing of anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle's account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing a deeper appreciation of Aristotle's understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its connections to value and our own understanding of these matters.
Blackwell's Companion to Aristotle (2009)
Cambridge's Aristotle 'Nicomachean Ethics' (2011)
In his Metaphysics Aristotle repudiates the poets' claim that envy (phthonos) is natural to the D... more In his Metaphysics Aristotle repudiates the poets' claim that envy (phthonos) is natural to the Deity, citing the adage that bards tell many lies (982b32-983a4). The repudiation is noteworthy: Aristotle does not normally deny passions to Gods or quarrel with poets. His thinking seems indebted to the Nicomachean Ethics' view that envy is named in a way that involves badness (1107a8-13), and the Rhetoric's view that envy is bad and felt by those who are bad (1388a34-36). Still, several questions arise. What is Aristotle's understanding of envy and its badness? How does that badness compare to inappropriate realisations of passions such as anger and fear? How do all such passions relate to the character(s) of those who experience them? Does (and, if so, how does) Aristotle's understanding of passions' inappropriateness in ethical matters fit with his understanding of their value elsewhere?
Philosophy Study (2013)
Can the insights that poetry seems capable of providing illuminate our lives? The present study a... more Can the insights that poetry seems capable of providing illuminate our lives? The present study addresses this question from the perspective of Aristotle’s understanding of tragedy, fear, and the emotions more generally. It argues that and explains how fear as understood by Aristotle can foster insight in a tragedy’s audience, depicts the nature and the bases for such insight, and suggests several ways in which insight that fear brings to tragedy can be especially or particularly illuminating. The argument for these conclusions considers Aristotle’s understanding of fear in some detail, noting particularly its epistemological powers, that and how it (and also the emotions more generally) can be clarifying and bring insight (sections I-III). The argument then reflects on fear’s realisation in response to tragedy, arguing that and explaining how tragedy’s form and a number of its distinctive features shape fear in ways that more readily foster insight than is found in fear felt in more ordinary circumstances (section IV).
Review of Metaphysics (1984)
American Philosophical Quarterly (1985)
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1986)
The Journal of Philosophy, 1988
Emotion, Space and Society, 2008
Philosophical Inquiry, 2018
Can Aristotle's reflections on fear explain fear-begotten activity? How and how well can any expl... more Can Aristotle's reflections on fear explain fear-begotten activity? How and how well can any explanation offered be utilized in the diverse settings in which he takes fear to arise, e.g. on the battlefield, in the courts, aboard a storm-ravaged ship, in the face of illness, upon viewing a tragedy? These questions are worth pursuing not only insofar as they can help us to appreciate Aristotle's thinking on the nature and roles that fear can take in our lives, but also because his thought contrasts interestingly with some common suppositions of our own. Indeed, it may help to reveal the direction and originality of Aristotle's reflections by beginning with our common suppositions.
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2018
Phronesis (1982)
Since the object of rhetoric is judgment (Rhetoric 1377b2l) and since what appears does vary with... more Since the object of rhetoric is judgment (Rhetoric 1377b2l) and since what appears does vary with the emotions (ibid. 1378al), a concern for rhetoric provided Aristotle with the opportunity to develop his most sustained thoughts on emotions; not only does he define, explicate, compare and contrast various emotions, but also he characterizes emotions themselves. 1 His observation is quite striking.
Classical Quarterly (1984)
When characterizing ta pathē in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle claims that they are usually accomp... more When characterizing ta pathē in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle claims that they are usually accompanied by perceptual pleasure or pain. 1 He says:
Phronesis (1988)
How do the courageous feel upon the field of battle? Aristotle's answer concerns fear and confide... more How do the courageous feel upon the field of battle? Aristotle's answer concerns fear and confidence, but stating his position with precision is difficult, not only because Aristotle does not approach the issue in this way, but also because his thoughts that do bear on an answer are limited and seem discordant. Although the difficulties of detail and discord could be dismissed as carelessness or inattention, a more telling explanation has to do with the intrusion by certain ethical doctrines, forcing Aristotle in different directions. To show this I discuss that and how certain doctrines intrude on this question, chart the directions in which they force Aristotle, and do so in such a way as to ascertain Aristotle's most plausible answer to the question. By so doing I hope to come to a better appreciation of the issues connecting courage and the passions for Aristotle. I begin with the question itself.
Apeiron (1992)
When characterizing excellence, Aristotle tells us that the mean state it consists in is one rela... more When characterizing excellence, Aristotle tells us that the mean state it consists in is one relative to us. He writes:
Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean (1995)
A striking qualification in the Nicomachean Ethics' characterization of virtue is the use of 'pro... more A striking qualification in the Nicomachean Ethics' characterization of virtue is the use of 'pro\ j h( ma= j', 'relative to us'.
Southwest Philosophy Review, 1995
Ratio (2002)
This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle’s account of anger... more This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle’s account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle’s valuing of anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle’s account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing a deeper appreciation of Aristotle’s understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts
between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its connections to value, and our own understanding of these matters.
Ancient Philosophy
This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle's account of anger... more This paper considers an allegation by M. Stocker and E. Hegeman that Aristotle's account of anger yields a narcissistic passion bedevilled by illusions of self-sufficiency. The paper argues on behalf of Aristotle's valuing of anger within a virtuous and flourishing life, showing that and why Aristotle's account is neither narcissistic nor involves illusions of self-sufficiency. In so arguing a deeper appreciation of Aristotle's understanding of a self-sufficient life is reached, as are some interesting contrasts between Aristotle's understanding of anger, its connections to value and our own understanding of these matters.
Blackwell's Companion to Aristotle (2009)
Cambridge's Aristotle 'Nicomachean Ethics' (2011)
In his Metaphysics Aristotle repudiates the poets' claim that envy (phthonos) is natural to the D... more In his Metaphysics Aristotle repudiates the poets' claim that envy (phthonos) is natural to the Deity, citing the adage that bards tell many lies (982b32-983a4). The repudiation is noteworthy: Aristotle does not normally deny passions to Gods or quarrel with poets. His thinking seems indebted to the Nicomachean Ethics' view that envy is named in a way that involves badness (1107a8-13), and the Rhetoric's view that envy is bad and felt by those who are bad (1388a34-36). Still, several questions arise. What is Aristotle's understanding of envy and its badness? How does that badness compare to inappropriate realisations of passions such as anger and fear? How do all such passions relate to the character(s) of those who experience them? Does (and, if so, how does) Aristotle's understanding of passions' inappropriateness in ethical matters fit with his understanding of their value elsewhere?
Philosophy Study (2013)
Can the insights that poetry seems capable of providing illuminate our lives? The present study a... more Can the insights that poetry seems capable of providing illuminate our lives? The present study addresses this question from the perspective of Aristotle’s understanding of tragedy, fear, and the emotions more generally. It argues that and explains how fear as understood by Aristotle can foster insight in a tragedy’s audience, depicts the nature and the bases for such insight, and suggests several ways in which insight that fear brings to tragedy can be especially or particularly illuminating. The argument for these conclusions considers Aristotle’s understanding of fear in some detail, noting particularly its epistemological powers, that and how it (and also the emotions more generally) can be clarifying and bring insight (sections I-III). The argument then reflects on fear’s realisation in response to tragedy, arguing that and explaining how tragedy’s form and a number of its distinctive features shape fear in ways that more readily foster insight than is found in fear felt in more ordinary circumstances (section IV).
Review of Metaphysics (1984)
American Philosophical Quarterly (1985)
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1986)