Aristotle and the Emotions (original) (raw)
Worthington/A Companion, 2007
If you wish to consult an ancient Greek or Roman discussion of the emotions, the place to look is not-as one might have expected-in a treatise on psychology, or in classical terms, 'On the Soul' (for example, Aristotle's De anima), but rather an essay on rhetoric. First and foremost, on the Greek side, there is Aristotle's own Rhetoric, with its detailed treatment, in Book 2, of a dozen or more different passions. In Latin literature, Cicero examines the emotions in his youthful De inventione, as well as in other essays on oratory, although he also treats them at some length in his philosophical dialogue, The Tusculan Disputations (especially Books 3 and 4). As late as the third century AD, a certain Apsines-if that is his true name 1-surveyed the emotions in elaborate detail as part of an extensive handbook on rhetoric (only a portion survives, chiefly the part dealing with pity). It is not difficult to see why the emotions were of interest to writers on rhetoric. If an orator was to be convincing, he had to know how to arouse or allay the passions of his audience, whether in the courtroom, the Assembly, or some other public forum, and the composers of manuals duly undertook to catalogue the best ways of doing so. This, in turn, required at least an elementary understanding of what emotions are and how they function. The emotions may also affect human behavior in general, which is why they are discussed at least to some extent in treatises on ethics, for example Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But the close connection between rhetoric and the emotions in ancient Greece was not merely an accident of scientific compartmentalization. Classical Greece was an intensely verbal culture, and from the very beginning of Greek literature it is words that are the stimuli to emotion: Achilles' great wrath in the Iliad is a consequence of what he considers an intolerable insult on the part of Agamemnon, and the events that lead to Achilles' fateful withdrawal from the battle at Troy take the form of speeches. The intimate connection between emotion and discourse, in turn, contributed decisively to the way the Greeks conceived of and defined both emotion in general and the several specific passions. Richard Lazarus, one of the founders of the modern 'appraisal theory' of the emotions, which takes Worthington / Companion to reek Rhetoric 1405125519_4_027
Aristotle's Rhetoric _ SEP-Entry_new_ (2022)
Aristotle's Rhetoric, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (March 2022 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/., 2022
theory (see van Eemeren 2013 and, more generally, dialogical logic). Some authors have stressed the Rhetoric's affinity to Aristotle's ethical theory (see e.g. Woerner 1990), while others were attracted by Aristotle's rhetorical account of metaphor (see e.g. Ricoeur 1996 and, more generally, metaphor). Most significantly, philosophers and scholars began to turn their attention to the Rhetoric's account of the passions or emotions, which is not only richer than in any other Aristotelian treatise, but was also seen as manifesting an early example of cognitive, judgement-based accounts of emotions (see e.g. Nussbaum 1996, Konstan 2006 and, more generally, §5 of emotion). 1. Aristotle's Works on Rhetoric 2. The Structure of the Rhetoric 3. Rhetoric as a Counterpart to Dialectic 4. The Nature and Purpose of Rhetoric 4.1 The Definition of Rhetoric 4.2 What Rhetoric Is Useful for 4.3 Can Aristotle's Rhetoric Be Misused? 4.4 Is Aristotle's Conception of Rhetoric Normative? 5. The Three Means of Persuasion 5.1 Persuasion Through the Character of the Speaker 5.2 Persuasion Through the Emotions of the Hearer 5.3 Persuasion Through the Argument Itself 5.4 Is There an Inconsistency in Aristotle's Rhetorical Theory? 6. The Enthymeme 6.1 The Concept of Enthymeme 6.2 Formal Requirements 6.3 Enthymemes as Dialectical Arguments 6.4 The Brevity of the Enthymeme 6.5 Different Types of Enthymemes 7. The Topoi 7.1 The (Lacking) Definition of 'Topos' Aristotle's Rhetoric 2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 7.2 The Word 'Topos' and the Technique of Places 7.3 The Ingredients and the Function of Topoi 7.4 Rhetorical Topoi 8. Style: How to Say Things with Words 8.1 The Virtue of Style 8.2 Aristotelian Metaphors Glossary of Selected Terms Bibliography Translations, Editions and Commentaries Collections Monographs and Articles Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries Supplements: Judgemental and Non-Judgemental Accounts of Aristotelian Emotions The Thesis that Enthymemes are Relaxed Inferences The Brevity of the Enthymeme The Variety of Topoi in the Rhetoric 1. Aristotle's Works on Rhetoric The work that has come down to us as Aristotle's Rhetoric or Art of Rhetoric consists of three books, while the ancient catalogue of the Aristotelian works, reported e.g. by Diogenes Laertius, mentions only two books on rhetoric (probably our Rhetoric I & II), plus two further books on style (perhaps our Rhetoric III?). Whereas most modern authors agree that at least the core of Rhetoric I & II presents a coherent rhetorical theory, the two themes of Rhetoric III (style/diction and the partition of speeches) are not mentioned in the original agenda of Rhetoric I & II. The
2013
Robert Prus is a sociologist at the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. A symbolic interactionist, ethnographer, and social theorist, Robert Prus has been examining the conceptual and methodological connections of American pragmatist philosophy and its sociological offshoot, symbolic interactionism, with classical Greek and Latin scholarship. As part of this larger project, he also has been analyzing some of Emile Durkheim’s lesser known texts (on morality, education, religion, and philosophy) mindfully of their pragmatist affinities with symbolic interactionist scholarship and Aristotle’s foundational emphasis on the nature of human knowing and acting.
Anger, Hatred, and Judgment in Aristotle's Rhetoric
American Journal of Political Science
Aristotle's analysis in the Rhetoric of the intelligibility of passionately angry political speech is an urgently needed addition to the ongoing scholarly reassessment of his relevance to democratic practices. Aristotle shows his readers-both orators and their auditors, citizens who might both rule and be ruled-that anger is prone to exaggeration and distortion and is therefore liable to be amplified into hatred. He shows further though that if instead of simply being exaggerated, anger is taken "seriously," then a more sober and measured politics can ensue, one less destructive of a good legal order.
Emotions,'Phantasia'and Feeling in Aristotle's Rhetoric
2009
Over the past three decades, phlosophy has seen a remarkable revval of nterest n the concept of emoton and wth t a reassessment of the role of the pathê n the work of Arstotle. Qute a number of scholars clam hm as the first phlosopher to defend a cogntve approach n emoton theory. I wll argue that ths clam s one-sded and that hs dscussons of the passons dffer markedly from contemporary cogntve vews of emoton.
Redescriptions, 2014
In contrast to some recent articles, which try to bridge the gap between Aristotle's Rhetoric and contemporary concepts of deliberative democracy, it is argued that Aristotle in this work does not plead for a rational and unemotional way of political decision making. On the contrary, his Rhetoric should be read as a manual for strategically oriented actors if not for demagogues. Th e well-known tension between the more ethical and the political parts of Rhetoric can be resolved if a distinction is made between a form of rhetoric, which has its place in an ideal polis, and the kind of rhetoric that is necessary in a corrupt regime. For Aristotle the democratic regime of Athens is such a corrupt regime. In the last part of this paper, it is demonstrated that Aristotle in his Rhetoric highlights the non-cognitive and emotional features of deliberative procedures and thereby corrects one of the most serious shortcomings of the theory of deliberative democracy.
Part 1 Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such anINQUIRY is the function of an art. Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states-especially in well-governed states-were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity-one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him. Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that
The emotional dimension of friendship: notes on Aristotle's account of "philia in Rhetoric" II 4
“The Emotional Dimension of Friendship. Notes on Aristotle’s account of philia in Rhetoric II.4”, in: Anuario Filosófico 46 (2013), 23-47., 2013
This article endeavors to give an answer to the question whether and to what extent philia (friendship), as it is treated by Aristotle in Rhetoric II 4, can be considered a genuine emotion as, for example, fear and anger are. Three anomalies are identified in the definition and the account of philia (and of the associated verb philein), which suggest a negative response to the question. However, these anomalies are analysed and explained in terms of the specific notes of philia in order to show that Rhetoric II 4 does allow for a consideration of friendship as a genuine emotion.