Daniel Dohrn | RWTH Aachen University (original) (raw)

Papers by Daniel Dohrn

Behavioral and brain sciences, 2024

Journal of Philosophical Logic, Dec 10, 2023

While knowledge of mere possibilities is difficult to understand, knowledge of possibilities that... more While knowledge of mere possibilities is difficult to understand, knowledge of possibilities that are actual seems unproblematic (as far as we know the actual world). The principle that what is actual is possible has been near-universally accepted. After summarizing some sporadic dissent, I present a proposal for how the validity of the principle might be restricted. While the principle certainly holds for sufficiently inclusive objective and epistemic possibilities, it may not hold when the accessibility of possibilities is contextually restricted.

Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Feb 18, 2013

McDowell und das Regelfolgenproblem John McDowell hat eine einflussreiche Interpretation von Witt... more McDowell und das Regelfolgenproblem John McDowell hat eine einflussreiche Interpretation von Wittgensteins Überlegungen zum Regelfolgen vorgelegt. Wenn Regeln einer Interpretation bedürfen, bricht die Unterscheidung von richtigen und falschen Anwendungen zusammen, denn jede Anwendung lässt sich durch eine geeignete Interpretation mit der Regel in Einklang bringen, es sei denn, man akzeptiert einen metaphysisch unattraktiven Platonismus. Wenn Regeln naturalistisch durch bloße Verhaltensregularitäten rekonstruiert werden, geht der normative Begriff der Richtigkeit verloren. Nach McDowells Überzeugung kann nur die Auffassung, Regeln würden von einer Praxis getragen, die einem direkten Zugang zu ihnen ermöglicht, dieses Problem lösen. Es soll untersucht werden, ob er damit Wittgenstein gerecht wird, und inwieweit er eine haltbare Position bietet. Die Motivationslage: das Objektivitätsproblem Das Regelfolgenproblem, wie es gegenwärtig diskutiert wird, hat zwei Dimensionen (vgl. PU §186): 1) Konstitutive Frage: Was bestimmt die korrekte Anwendung allgemeiner Regeln? 2) Erkenntnistheoretische Frage: Was ist erforderlich, die korrekte Anwendung allgemeiner Regeln zu kennen? McDowell will die Objektivität von Regeln sichern. Eine Regel ist genau dann objektiv, wenn gilt: 3) Ihre richtige Anwendung fällt nicht mit dem zusammen, was der einzelne dafür hält. 4) Ihre richtige Anwendung fällt nicht mit dem zusammen, was die Gemeinschaft dafür hält. Für viele Normen sprachlicher Gehalte lassen sich weitere Anforderungen formulieren. Sie legen unendlich viele Anwendungen fest (PU § 185). Sie tragen Tatsachen Rechnung, z.B. der Ausdruck "Pferd" der Tatsache, dass es eine entsprechende natürliche Art gibt (McDowell 1989, 256). Wittgenstein selbst bietet Anlass zur Sorge um diese Objektivität. Er will primär die folgende Philosophie des Geistes zurückweisen: Regeln werden konstituiert durch bewusste geistige Zustände oder Vorgänge des Meinens, z.B. Intentionen, die unbegrenzt viele korrekte Anwendungen festlegen (PU § 205). Diesen Zuständen korrespondieren quasi-perzeptive geistige Zustände, z.B. Intuitionen, in denen die richtige Anwendung erfasst wird (PU § 213). Wittgenstein stellt diesem Bild eines gegenüber, in dem die Praxis einer Gemeinschaft Regeln konstituiert. Diese ist durch die übereinstimmenden Verhaltensregularitäten ihrer Mitglieder bestimmt (PU § 207). Der einzelne wird abgerichtet, Regeln blind zu folgen (PU § § 198, 206, 219). Regelfolgen muss daher keinen Anspruch auf Wissen oder Rechtfertigung beinhalten. Angesichts dieser Interessenlage kann wenig Interesse daran erwartet werden, die Bedingungen objektiver Regeln herauszustellen.

Synthese

Counterfactual reasoning has been used to account for many aspects of scientific reasoning. More ... more Counterfactual reasoning has been used to account for many aspects of scientific reasoning. More recently, it has also been used to account for the scientific practice of modeling. Truth in a model is truth in a situation considered as counterfactual. When we reason with models, we reason with counterfactuals. Focusing on selected models like Bohr’s atom model or models of population dynamics, I present an account of how the imaginative development of a counterfactual supposition leads us from reality to interesting model assumptions; how it guides our reasoning from these assumptions to interesting consequences for the model scenario via counterfactual entailment; and how it leads us back to conclusions on real target phenomena.

GAP.7, 2012

In order to critically scrutinize the well-known modal argument Simon Blackburn forwards against ... more In order to critically scrutinize the well-known modal argument Simon Blackburn forwards against moral realism, I propose to distinguish weak and strong conceptual relativism: In contrast to the former, the latter takes into account all natural facts. Given the former, I want to show how moral realism can solve Blackburn\u2019s problem while projectivism as endorsed by Blackburn cannot. Given the latter, I firstly attempt a consistent formulation of Blackburn\u2019s challenge. Secondly, I argue that Blackburn\u2019s version of projectivism cannot adequately deal with it. Thirdly, I uncover general difficulties for moral realism resulting from moral relativism.Um Blackburns modales Argument gegen den modalen Realismus zu rekonstruieren, schlage ich eine Unterscheidung zwischen schwachem und starkem begrifflichen Relativismus vor. Im Gegensatz zum ersten bezieht der letztere alle nat\ufcrlichen Fakten ein. Gegeben den ersteren, m\uf6chte ich zeigen, wie der moralische Realismus Blackburns Problem l\uf6st, w\ue4hrend der Projektivismus, wie ihn Blackburn unterstellt, es nicht l\uf6st. Gegeben den letzeren, versuche ich erstens eine konsistente Formulierung von Blackburns Herausforderung. Zweitens argumentiere ich, dass Blackburns Version des Projektivismus nicht angemessen damit umgehen kann. Drittens lege ich allgemeine Schwierigkeiten des moralischen Realismus dar, die aus dem begrifflichen Relativismus resultieren

European Society for Aesthetics, 2018

Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2018

Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, philosophers have struggled with t... more Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, philosophers have struggled with the question of how thought experiments manage to provide knowledge. Ernst Mach’s seminal contribution has eclipsed other approaches in the Austrian tradition. I discuss one of these neglected approaches. Faced with the challenge of how to reconcile his empiricist position with his use of thought experiments, Moritz Schlick proposed the following ‘Sinnkriterium’: a thought experiment is meaningful if it allows to answer a question under discussion by imagining the experiences that would confi rm that the thought experimental scenario is actual. I trace this view throughout three exemplary thought experiments of Schlick’s.

Mimesis, 2020

In Counterfactual Conditionals, Daniel Dohrn discusses the standard account of counterfactuals, c... more In Counterfactual Conditionals, Daniel Dohrn discusses the standard account of counterfactuals, conditionals of the form ‘If A had been the case, then B would have been the case’. According to the standard account, a counterfactual is true if the then-sentence is true in all closest worlds in which the if-sentence is true. Closeness is spelled out in terms of an ordering of worlds by their similarity. Dohrn explores resources of defending the standard account against several challenges. In particular, he defends the standard logics for counterfactuals. He discusses exemplary doubts as to whether conditionals have truth conditions. He inquires into the interaction between truth and probability of counterfactuals. He tackles problems with the similarity ordering. He address the interaction between counterfactuals and normalcy conditions. He closes with elaborating peculiarities of future-directed counterfactuals

Robert Brandoms expressive Vernunft, 2011

I discuss Brandom's use of Kant

I discuss Caspar Hare\u2019s solution to a new variant of Parfit\u2019s Non-Identity Problem. Har... more I discuss Caspar Hare\u2019s solution to a new variant of Parfit\u2019s Non-Identity Problem. Hare\u2019s solution rests on distinguishing two kinds of ought: The Ought of Omniscient Desire: what you oughtOD to do is what an omniscient, rational creature with appropriate interests would want you to do. The Ought of Most Reason: what you oughtMR to do is what there is most reason to do. I argue that the distinction does not dissolve the problem. Moreover, I show that Hare\u2019s proposal to spell out his distinction in terms of an embedded counterfactual (if you had not done what you did, then, if you had done what you did, what would the consequence have been?) is flawed

Lato Sensu Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences, Apr 6, 2021

Can’t one truly judge that one is judging? Matthew Soteriou provides an analysis of authoritative... more Can’t one truly judge that one is judging? Matthew Soteriou provides an analysis of authoritatively knowing one’s own mental acts which depends on a surprising assumption: One cannot truly judge that one is judging. After briefly criticizing his account of one’s awareness that one is judging, I critically scrutinize two of his arguments against the possibility of truly judging that one is judging. Firstly, assuming such a possibility leads to a regress. Secondly, the second-order judgement inevitably replaces the first-order judgement such as to make the former wrong. Matthew Soteriou (2005) has provided a thorough analysis of our intuitive claims to be directly and authoritatively aware of our own mental activity. Soteriou opposes non-occurrent belief and conscious judgement. The latter is a mental act, the former is not. Conscious judgement is identified with occurrent belief (Soteriou 2005, 96). While one can have a non-occurrent belief that one is believing that p despite not be...

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2021