Inwook Kim | Sungkyunkwan University (original) (raw)

Papers by Inwook Kim

Journal of Global Security Studies, 2022

What determines states' willingness to institutionalize alliances? Contrary to conventional empha... more What determines states' willingness to institutionalize alliances? Contrary to conventional emphasis on system-level conditions, we argue that states pay close attention to the domestic political consequences of institutionalizing alliances. This is particularly true for unequal allies. Client regimes are disproportionately sensitive to alliance design, as it affects patron allies' ability to influence their military, distribute finance and arms, and legitimate preferred political groups. Two factors-power consolidation and political compatibility-determine whether the client views alliance institutionalization as complementary or conflictual with regime survival. The divergent alliance designs North and South Korea chose after the Korean War support our argument. An unresolved power consolidation process forced Kim Il-Sung to refuse formalizing the wartime alliance with the PRC, and Kim concluded a minimal treaty in 1961 after consolidating his power. In contrast, rapid consolidation left Rhee Syngman little to fear from continuing the highly institutionalized wartime alliance arrangement with the United States, which accepted his authority in the south. Our findings have important implications for alliance design, intra-alliance politics, and civil-military relations.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2022

What accounts for the pace, timing, and scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance's evolution? Through the p... more What accounts for the pace, timing, and scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance's evolution? Through the prism of historical institutionalism, I construct a novel explanation for how the alliance, in particular its rule on operational control, has been subject to the confluence of internally generated dynamics, exogenous junctures, and historical processes. First, I illustrate how three crises-a coup in 1961, ROK forces deployment to Vietnam in 1965, and North Korea's provocations in 1968-were instrumental in exposing flaws and gaps, unanticipated in the original alliance design. Second, episodic analysis shows how each juncture temporarily loosened the structural constraints and allowed ROK to push for incremental revisions on U.S. vertical and unilateral exercise of operational control over ROK forces. Third, they collectively generated negative feedback, contributing to the establishment of more horizontal and institutionalized Combined Forces Command in 1978. The study highlights a client ally's agency and historical institutionalism's promise in understanding international security institutions.

International Studies Quarterly , 2020

Security Studies, Sep 23, 2019

Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer security in exchange for o... more Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer security in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies, is a widely used and yet undertheorized energy security strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is that great powers choose different levels of security commitment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do great powers rank oil states? How do we conceptualize different types of petro-alignments? What exactly do great powers and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type? I posit that a mix of market power and geostrategic location determines the strategic value and vulnerability of individual client oil states, which then generates four corresponding types of petro-alignment—security guarantee, strategic alignment, strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case comparisons—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970–91, and Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990–2013—show how great powers created, utilized, and maintained petro-alignments under the unique logic of oil markets and across varying geopolitical settings. The findings have important implications on great powers’ grand strategies, strategic behaviors of oil states, and the role of oil in international security.

Contemporary Security Policy, 2019

The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has genera... more The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the U.S. extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability.

Asian Perspective, 2019

When do sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? Is there a generalizable framework to estimate s... more When do sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? Is there a generalizable framework to estimate sanction effectiveness against nuclear aspirants? Instead of relying on partial equilibrium analysis, we conceptualize sanctions as three sequential phases—imposition of economic pain, conversation to political pressure, and creation (or failure thereof) of zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). The effectiveness of each phase is subject to phase-specific contextual variables, an aggregation of which helps measure individual sanction's effectiveness, conduct cross-case comparison, and estimate one's replicability in other cases. To illustrate its analytical utility, we analyze the divergent sanction outcomes between Iran in 2012–2015 and North Korea in 2013–2017. Iran was economically more vulnerable and politically less resilient, and its bargaining position was closer to a ZOPA than North Korea was. Our analysis questions the utility of economic sanctions against North Korea and helps expand the discussion away from the policy obsession with the role of China. Theoretically, it rectifies an imbalance against qualitative and holistic approach in the sanction literature and contributes to discussions about nuclear inhibition strategies.

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2007

... broad economic reforms with rather unsuccessful results, the Stalinist economic developmental... more ... broad economic reforms with rather unsuccessful results, the Stalinist economic developmental strategy had persisted in North Korea for decades ... Because the nationalist discourse was ideologically powerful in Romania before the Second World War, the Romanian communist ...

What causes petro-aggression? Conventional wisdom maintains that the regime type of petrostates h... more What causes petro-aggression? Conventional wisdom maintains that the regime
type of petrostates has significant effects on the likelihood that petrostates
will launch revisionist militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). While
domestic politics is an important factor that might explain the motivation
and behavioral patterns of a petrostate, it says little about the international
environment in which a petrostate decides to initiate conflicts. One significant
factor that presents opportunities and constraints for petro-aggression
is a great power alliance. In essence, the great power has strong incentives
not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic
and economic reasons and, hence, tends not to oppose military adventurism
by its ally. Consequently, the petrostate’s anticipation of great power inaction
or even protection for its revisionist policy creates a moral hazard
problem. Overall, by offering favorable circumstances, a great power alliance
has a positive effect on petro-aggression. Although not without caveats,
our large-n model and case study bear out this conclusion.

Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, oil refineries have played integral roles in China... more Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, oil refineries have played integral roles in China's quest for oil security. And yet, the capacity, security, and configurations of refineries were rarely featured in the discussions about China's oil policy. To fill this gap, this paper explains the basics of refinery economics and technology, and details the development in China's refining industry since the early 1990s. By taking refineries into consideration, it then revisits and reassesses the existing literature regarding the motives and drivers behind China's foreign oil policy, its effectiveness, and the political interactions between China and crude oil producers.