Howard Curzer | Texas Tech University (original) (raw)

Papers by Howard Curzer

Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 1976

Let A be a Tychonoff space. As is well known, the points of the Stone-Cech compactification ßX "a... more Let A be a Tychonoff space. As is well known, the points of the Stone-Cech compactification ßX "are" the zero-set ultrafilters of X, and the points of the Hewitt real-compactification vX are the zero-set ultrafilters which are closed under countable intersection. It is shown here that a zeroset ultrafilter is a point of the Dieudonné topological completion SX iff the family of complementary cozero sets is a-discretely, or locally finitely, additive. From this follows a characterization of those dense embeddings X C Y such that each continuous metric space-valued function on X extends over Y, and a somewhat novel proof of the Katëtov-Shirota Theorem.

We do not need to know how to define 'dog' to know what a dog is. Why would justice be different?... more We do not need to know how to define 'dog' to know what a dog is. Why would justice be different? 2 Socrates famously wanted definitions, not mere examples, but in practice we often learn by example. Does philosophical training lead us to exaggerate the importance of definitions? As Nietzsche once remarked, 'only that which has no history is definable.' 3 And justice has a history. As concepts with a history are wont to do, justice resists specification with necessary and sufficient conditions. However, on almost any analysis, just relationships are those in which the parties involved get their due, and just persons are disposed to act so that partners get their due. 4 There was a time when justice was seen by philosophers as a virtue of persons-a feature of a person's character. Think of this as an internal harmony in which each part of a person's soul gets its due, as per Plato. Justice 1 Schmidtz wishes to thank the Property and Environment Research Center at Bozeman, Montana for providing a hospitable and productive research environment during the summer of 2012, when we were finishing this paper. We also thank Kevin Timpe for his warm encouragement and very helpful feedback. 2 For a superb concise discussion, see Gerald Gaus (2000). Gaus quotes Wittgenstein (1964), 31-2: Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games.' I mean board-games, cardgames, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say; there must be something common, or that they would not be called 'games'-but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships. And a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! 3 Nietzsche (1989), 2nd Essay }13, 80. 4 Likewise, on almost any analysis, justice is something we have reason to endorse. In other words, learning that our children would grow up to be just, or would live in a just society, should occasion joy, not despair. We think people being disposed to give each other their due (and able to count on each other being so disposed) is part of the glue that holds relationships together and enables people to live in such a way that their community is better off with them than without.

Philosophy in review, 1995

Jonathan Barnes, ed. , The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle Reviewed by.

Although courage is one of the few character traits which shows up on everyone's list of virtues,... more Although courage is one of the few character traits which shows up on everyone's list of virtues, there is no agreement about the nature and features of courage. Even within the ancient world we find substantial variation. For example, the Homeric view of courage as a certain role in a social structure differs from the Socratic view in the Laches that courage is a sort of knowledge, which differs from the Platonic view in the Republic that courage is a certain relationship of parts within the soul, which differs from the Aristotelian view in the Nicomachean Ethics that courage is a disposition to feel, choose, and act in certain ways. Although these days Aristotle is said to be the father of virtue ethics, Aristotle's account of courage is not widely accepted. Perhaps that is because Aristotle's account is thought to conflict with his architectonic and with the truth at crucial points. In particular, Aristotle is criticized (a) for narrowing the sphere of courage too severely, (b) for conflating what should be two separate virtues, (c) for applying an implausible version of the doctrine of the mean to courage, (d) for making courage into a form of continence, and (e) for both affirming and denying that courageous acts are pleasant for courageous people. I shall provide a passage-bypassage interpretation of Aristotle's account of courage in NE III.6-9 which will acquit Aristotle of these five charges. I shall argue that Aristotle (a) does not limit courage to lifethreatening situations on the battlefield; (b) is right to maintain that courage governs both fear and confidence; (c) applies a plausible doctrine of the mean to courage; (d) appropriately distinguishes courage from continence; and (e) does not affirm that courageous acts are overall pleasant for courageous people. In general, I hope to garner more respect for Aristotle's account of courage.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1997

Polis: the journal for ancient greek political thought, Jan 17, 2020

Many virtue ethicists implicitly or explicitly make use of an ideal—the concept of a perfect char... more Many virtue ethicists implicitly or explicitly make use of an ideal—the concept of a perfect character, a character that is at best approximated, but never realized. I shall argue against the use of ideals (idealization) in virtue ethics on both theoretical and practical grounds. The widespread, implicit assumption that ideals are necessary bits of theoretical machinery is not only false, but counterproductive. The widespread use of ideals as goals is not only unhelpful, but pernicious. I shall identify three familiar doctrines as idealizations: the corrective doctrine of virtue, the identification of right actions with characteristic actions of virtuous agents, and the reciprocity of virtues doctrine. I shall reject these doctrines and recommend alternatives.

Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Dec 1, 2010

The leader of a great nation ponders the invasion of a country in the Middle East. The majority r... more The leader of a great nation ponders the invasion of a country in the Middle East. The majority report of his intelligence agency indicates that an invasion would be a bad idea, but the leader invades anyway, citing a minority report. As predicted, the invasion runs into trouble. Later, the leader gives a distorted history of the events leading up to the war, portraying himself as blameless, and accusing the naysayers of lacking courage and faith. Of course, the leader is Moses; the incident is the Israelites’ abortive first invasion of the Promised Land; and the intelligence agency consists of twelve spies. This article presents a novel interpretation of Numbers 13—14, a hermeneutical maxim for dealing with inconsistencies between Deuteronomy and the rest of the Torah, and a political moral.

Southern Journal of Philosophy, Mar 1, 2006

Page 1. The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2006) Vol. XLIV Admirable Immorality, Dirty Hands, Ti... more Page 1. The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2006) Vol. XLIV Admirable Immorality, Dirty Hands, Ticking Bombs, and Torturing Innocents Howard J. Curzer Texas Tech University Abstract Is torturing innocent people ever morally required? ...

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2006

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Apeiron, 1991

All quotations from Aristotle are taken from Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. Ross, revised by J. Ur... more All quotations from Aristotle are taken from Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. Ross, revised by J. Urmson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle Revised Oxford Translation, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984), except that I translate 'αρετή' as 'virtue' rather than 'excellence'.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Jun 1, 1991

Journal of Value Inquiry, Jan 3, 2021

Review of Metaphysics, Dec 1, 2017

Philosophy & Technology, 2017

Vallor lists and describes seven complex features of moral self-cultivation shared by Aristotelia... more Vallor lists and describes seven complex features of moral self-cultivation shared by Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist traditions, a dozen virtues which technology renders particularly important, and seven threats to these virtues. Responding to one of Vallor's challenges, I offer eight ways in which these virtues must be transformed in light of our technology. Finally, I list four further challenges to virtue ethics posed by technology. Keywords Technology. Virtue. Aristotle. Confucius. Buddha Technology and the Virtues is a terrific book-ambitious in scope, successful in execution, and (as a bonus attraction) enjoyable to read. But this is an authormeets-critics session rather than an author-meets-admirers session, so I have struggled to find some points of disagreement. In this response, I shall superficially summarize and snipe at Vallor's main points and then propose extensions of her project. By my count, Vallor lists and describes seven complex features of moral self-cultivation shared by Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist traditions (section 1), a dozen virtues which technology renders particularly important (section 2), and seven threats to these virtues (section 3). Responding to one of Vallor's challenges, I offer eight ways in which these virtues must be transformed in light of our technology (section 4). Finally, I list four further challenges to virtue ethics posed by technology (section 5).

Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 2016

Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought, 2014

In the Lysis, Socrates argues that friendship is driven by a desire to use others for one’s own g... more In the Lysis, Socrates argues that friendship is driven by a desire to use others for one’s own gain (210b-d). Some commentators take Socrates to be speaking for Plato on this point. By contrast, I shall argue that the Lysis is a reductio ad absurdum of this instrumental account of friendship. First, three arguments in the Lysis (210c-d, 214b-215b, 216d-218a) reach counterintuitive conclusions which may be avoided by abandoning the common premise that friendship is instrumental. Second, the dramatic context includes counterexamples to the instrumental account of friendship (e.g. the two friendship trios: Lysis, Menexenus, and Socrates; Lysis, his mother, and his father). Third, Socrates distinguishes between people who are desirable because they are useful, and “true friends” who are desirable for their own sake (219c-221b). This is an explicit rejection of the instrumental account of friendship.