The Supremely Happy Life in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (original) (raw)
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The Supremely Happy Life in Aristotle’s Ethics
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Aristotle's Pursuit of the Good Life
Aristotle's Pursuit of the Good Life , 2017
In Book I of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, three types of lives that are generally observed to be conventional permutations of ways of living are presented as candidates for the good life. They are the life of pleasure, the political life, and the life of philosophical contemplation. The life of pleasure is immediately dismissed as a viable candidate because those that equate the good with pleasure lack the essential qualities that are required for the cultivation of a good and meaningful life. The political life, i.e. a life that is centered on action and doing good deeds for the benefit of other citizens is not so easily dismissed as a candidate for the good life due to the moral virtues that are practiced in such a life. In Book X Aristotle declares that it is indeed the life of philosophical contemplation that is the best candidate for achieving the good life. The greatest good and the goal of all action is to attain eudaimonia, i.e. happiness, or well-being, which is, according to Aristotle, not a state but an activity. Choosing a life dedicated to philosophical contemplation, however, in itself, does not necessarily assure the attainment of eudaimonia, which is a permanent possession of the soul. In addition to choosing the right kind of life to live, Aristotle argues, one's life must also be comprised of partaking in good, correct actions, which, throughout time, lead to the development of virtues. Aristotle states that there are two different kinds of virtues, moral virtues and intellectual virtues, which are, respectively, developed through practice and instruction, and are, in almost all circumstances, achieved by striving for what is moderate in things and situations. Additionally, the external goods, as in sufficient material possessions, and having a few good friends are also essential constituents of the good life. This paper will examine the components required for attaining the good life according to Aristotle's arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics, and will propose that an awareness of the teleological aspect of human nature is indeed necessary for the acquisition of eudaimonia.
Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics
For Aristotle, happiness corresponds to the highest kind of virtue. In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats practical virtues, and in Book X, he treats theoretical contemplation as the best practice that might guarantee happiness. Thus, Aristotle might be said to have given two answers (naturalistic and theological) to the question of the nature of happiness. This is because the self-sufficient character of happiness implies its intrinsic value, and practical activities-which are deemed intrinsically valuable in Book I are treated as having secondary value, in Book X, as a means to the higher (theoretical) happiness. Some people believe that Aristotle has finally failed to remain committed to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, falling into a contradiction in his definition of happiness. In this paper, in the first place, we draw on the analytic method and revisit the notion of kalon to show that the function of theo
The Highest Good and the Best Activity: Aristotle on the Well-Lived Life
2011
The question of how Aristotle characterizes eudaimonia, or living-well, in the Nicomachean Ethics has long been a contentious issue amongst Aristotelian scholars. The secondary literature has been roughly divided between inclusivist readers, who argue that Aristotle designates both theoria, or contemplation, and the practical virtues, and exclusivist readers, who argue that Aristotle singles out theoria alone. This thesis seeks to forge a middle ground between these two perspectives by focusing on the central claim of Book I that the eudaimonia is virtuous activity. Reading Book X in light of Book I's claim then allows one to show that both the practical virtues and theoria are able to attain eudaimonia, and that the well-lived life will be one that draws upon both activities.
Human ability to freely choose requires knowledge of human nature and the final end of man. For Aristotle, this end is happiness or full flourishing, which involves various virtues. Modern scholarship has led to debate over which virtues are absolutely necessary. Taking into account the hierarchical nature of the soul and the fact that relationships with the divine and with others are necessary for human flourishing, it can be seen that human flourishing requires contemplation, phronesis and all the moral virtues, as perfections of the various parts of the soul. The truly happy person has actualized all of his faculties and potential relationships. Rather than taking one of the standard exclusivist or inclusivist viewpoints on this 'problem of the two lives,' this paper argues that a holistic reading of Aristotle's ethical works requires a hierarchical and relational view of the virtues, with all of them necessary for human flourishing.
Aristotle`s concept of the good Life
According to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle [384-322 BCE] everything has a purpose or a final end (telos). The meaning of the word must be carefully studied by looking at objects created by human beings. Consider a knife you can describe its size and shape but also its ability to cut things which relate to its telos, so in order to make a complete description of the knife and to understand its nature the ability to cut must be included. This definition counts not only for things but also for all kind of living beings. Our primary concern here is not of the telos of a knife but that of a human being
Aristotle on What to Praise and What to Prize: An Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics I.12
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. XXXIV , 2019
This essay offers an analysis and interpretation of the rarely commented-on chapter I.12 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle’s goal in this chapter is to prove that human happiness belongs to the class of prized goods, also characterized as divine goods, whereas virtue ranks lower, being a merely praiseworthy good. It is not easy to see why this chapter is placed at the end of Aristotle’s general discussion of the highest human good in Book I or why he included it at all. My goal is to show that it does make a contribution to the architecture of the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole by helping to prepare the ground for one of the main argumentative strategies in the treatise X.6–8 on scientific contemplation as the key component of supreme happiness. To this end, I analyze each step of the argumentation in I.12, drawing also on relevant material from other Aristotelian texts, and then demonstrate the connection with some of the arguments in X.6–8.
The Pursuit of Happiness in Aristotle ' s Nicomachean Ethics : Three Readings of the ἔργον Argument
2013
1 Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (henceforth NE) famously features an argument, central to the logic of the whole work, called the 'ergon' argument or function argument, which admits of at least two prominent, and one novel, competing interpretations, leaving peripatetic scholars divided on how to properly interpret Aristotle's argument. The first prominent reading is variously called the exclusive, intellectualist or monistic reading, while the second is called, by contrast, inclusive. The third reading, proposed by Stephen S. Bush, is called a dualist reading according to which man has two distinct natures. In this paper I will argue that the correct way of reading Aristotle concerning εὐδαιμονία and man's ἔργον is the monistic one. I will cite reasons to reject the inclusive reading, argue that the dualist reading admits of a conspicuous problem, and then propose a monistic reading, inspired by Richardson Lear, which synthesizes tidily the exegetical tensions ...
The main topic of both Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and his Politics (P) is the achievement of happiness ("eudaimonia") or the good life. In this essay I will briefly introduce the background of Aristotle and his Politics. Then after defining the key terms of the discussion, I will Present Aristotle's teleological argument and his argument based on the rule of law for the value of participation in politics. However I will also point out why both arguments are insufficient if the family is observed more carefully in Aristotle's conception. I will conclude by looking at the conflict between the philosophical life and the practical life and how they create an argument for the necessity of politics in achieving a good life. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) migrated from Stagira to Athens and was a student at Plato's Academy. He then founded his own school in the city, the Lyceum. It is ironic that, while he argues for the intrinsic value of participation in politics, he himself was never a citizen of Athens where he lived most of his life. 1 Ober notes that the analytical detail of the Politics might be rooted in the rare chance he had as an academic, that his ideas would be applied for the improvement of the government of the newly founded Greek colonies of Egypt and Asia. 2 This would explain Aristotle's pragmatic approach and careful attention to feasibility as opposed to Plato's idealist Republic.