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Papers by Rocío Cázares-Blanco

Agora. Papeles de Filosofía, 2024

An adult person’s grief over the death of a non-human animal tends to be perceived by those aroun... more An adult person’s grief over the death of a non-human animal tends to be perceived by those around him as ridiculous, frivolous or pathological. What typically underlies these disapproving attitudes are beliefs about the limited faculties of non-human animals and/or the supposed requirements for a flourishing human life. I will consider various arguments against such beliefs and I hope that neutralizes some of the objections that could be made to the following thesis which I seek to defend: Grief over a non-human animal can be adequately understood in terms of the frustration of categorical desires that lose their meaning after its death. To support this thesis, I will argue that the notions of a flourishing life and practical identity are constitutive of that of categorical desire as well as that of grief.

Devenires, 2024

Autora: Cheshire Calhoun. Traductores: Rocío Cázares-Blanco & Francisco J. Serrano.

Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin, 2023

In this paper, we examine the impact that bereavement can have on the practical identity of someo... more In this paper, we examine the impact that bereavement can have on the practical identity of someone who has lost a particularly significant person in his or her life. By practical identity we mean what makes a person the particular agent that he or she is and, as we will argue, this is closely connected to the interpersonal connections that he or she maintains with other people and to the conception that he or she has of himself or herself. We will argue that those who go through a process of grief can and usually do undergo transformations in at least two dimensions of their practical identity: an interpersonal one, which can be appreciated from the third person's point of view, and a personal one, which is often only perceptible from the first person's perspective. Grief obliges the mourner to rethink his or her conception of self, considering his or her relationship with the deceased and others who were part of the same network of interpersonal ties, and may also awaken the need to understand some self-reflective emotions that have the deceased as their object, such as the agent's remorse or agent regret. We will focus particularly on the analysis of these experiences associated with many grief processes.

Isegoría, 2022

In grief, we often ruefully relive the times we hurt the deceased, but some of those gloomy memor... more In grief, we often ruefully relive the times we hurt the deceased, but some of those gloomy memories bewilder us and can even drive us to doubt the sincerity of our love for him or her because, although we deeply regret the suffering we caused, we don’t feel remorse for having acted as we did. In this article I examine the nature, features and varieties of the emotion Bernard Williams called “agent-regret”, to argue that the aforementioned experience can be understood as a particular case of agent regret. In addition, I explore some of the ways in which the grieving process itself complicates the already difficult experience of agent regret.

Revista de Filosofía, 2022

Unlike the grief that ensues upon a death, anticipatory grief is a topic philosophy has paid litt... more Unlike the grief that ensues upon a death, anticipatory grief is a topic philosophy has paid little attention to. One obvious particularity of anticipatory grief is that it takes place while there is still an interpersonal relationship between the mourner and the mourned. In this article, I analyze the impact anticipatory grief can have on this relationship, especially concerning those punitive reactive attitudes belonging to interpersonal conflict.

Anuario Filosófico, 2020

In this paper I propose to conceive of forgiveness as a process of eliminating punitive reactive ... more In this paper I propose to conceive of forgiveness as a process of eliminating punitive reactive atti-tudes, which makes up part of the offended person’s willingness to reestablish a certain type of reciprocal relationship with the offender. Distinguishing among types of reciprocity allows us to realize that forgiveness is a more varied phenomenon than is usually assumed in the philosophical literature, as well as to understand why the dispute concerning the gratuitousness-conditionality of forgiveness is meaningless.

https://revistas.unav.edu/index.php/anuario-filosofico/article/view/27863

En-claves del pensamiento, 2019

The dominant approach in recent literature on forgiveness seems excessively moralizing. This, we ... more The dominant approach in recent literature on forgiveness seems excessively moralizing. This, we argue, stems from the attempt to offer an explanation that subsumes all instances of forgiveness under a single, monolithic paradigm. We propose to defend a view that acknowledges to a greater extent the heterogeneity of cases of forgiveness and thus also has a deflationary effect on moralizing excesses. Identifying different types of interpersonal relationships and their characteristic expectations of reciprocity will be the basis for understanding what constitutes an offense and the various conditions for forgiveness under different circumstances.

Open Insight, 2016

Warren Quinn has proposed an argument to reject the conceptions of practical rationality often re... more Warren Quinn has proposed an argument to reject the conceptions of practical rationality often referred as “Neo-Humean”; however, his argument is defective. In this paper I
reconstruct Quinn’s argument and I present reasons to demonstrate why it is unacceptable.

Devenires, 2016

Presenting a contrast with a Kantian perspective, we argue that shame is an emotion with moral va... more Presenting a contrast with a Kantian perspective, we argue that shame is an emotion with moral value, and that the study of the moral value of shame helps shape a theory of morality in which notions such as autonomy, guilt and freedom carry less weight than that given to them by the Kantian tradition. We think that the point of view of others is also constitutive of personal identity. Moral agents are socially-constructed, and the moral value of their identity, actions and thoughts is inseparable from the social practices in which they participate. This idea seems to us fundamental to understanding the identity of a moral agent. In this vein, our defense of the moral value of shame– and of an ethics consistent with it– comes closer to the ideas of Hume and Bernard Williams on these same themes.

Diánoia, 2010

Aristotelian conceptions of the good life are often criticized from several ethical positions, li... more Aristotelian conceptions of the good life are often criticized from several ethical positions, like G.E. Moore’s anti-naturalism or emotivism and prescriptivism. Aristotelians are accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy when they make a moral evaluation of features, actions, intentions and faculties of human beings. In this paper, I examine and refute Alfonso Gómez-Lobo’s strategy to reject that accusation; then, I propose another strategy and I argue that inclusivist Aristotelian conceptions of the good life could be freed from such criticism if they appeal to the concept of “brute facts relative to” as proposed by G.E. Anscombe.