Derek Green | University of Central Florida (original) (raw)
Research Papers by Derek Green
Erkenntnis, 2022
The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigatio... more The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality. This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content ascription alleged by the paradox is no flaw at all, rather a necessary component of the proper method of propositional-attitude ascription. On either lemma, rational explanation defuses the paradox.
Acta Analytica, 2020
Mental content normativists hold that the mind's conceptual contents are essentially normative. M... more Mental content normativists hold that the mind's conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think facts of the form 'subject S possesses concept C' imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of C in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S's possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the 'Source Objection'. This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2015
Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers ca... more Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another. If it is correct, there can be no such thing as meaning anything by a word. I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not frequently satisfy the well-motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails.
Erkenntnis, 2021
The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigatio... more The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality.
This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content ascription alleged by the paradox is not a flaw at all, but a necessary component of the proper method of propositional-attitude ascription. On either lemma, rational explanation defuses the paradox.
Acta Analytica, 2020
Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. M... more Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think facts of the form ‘subject S possesses concept C’ imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of C in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S’s possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the ‘Source Objection’.
This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
Saul Kripke’s influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers ca... more Saul Kripke’s influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another (1982, 7-54). If it is correct, ‘[t]here can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word’ (Ibid., 55).
I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not frequently satisfy the well-motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails.
An apology may be in order. There are few greater contemporary philosophical clichés than "x, y, ... more An apology may be in order. There are few greater contemporary philosophical clichés than "x, y, and z" titles. But the intersection of intentionality, determinacy, and rules really is exactly what the dissertation is about.
Book Reviews by Derek Green
Drafts by Derek Green
This paper provides a new theory of belief. Belief is judgment hypostasized. Its essential featur... more This paper provides a new theory of belief. Belief is judgment hypostasized. Its essential feature is its privileged relationship to judgment about what is so, which no other mental state has. The state of belief serves to mark what the believer judges, has judged, or would, in certain relevant circumstances, judge to be true.
The new view neatly explains some of the state's distinctive epistemic features, a virtue that its closest cousin, the dispositionalist view of belief, struggles to duplicate in a principled way. It accords with intuitions about who believes what and when. It properly distinguishes belief from 'near-belief' phenomena, like mere preintentional 'stances' (Searle 1983), traditionally difficult for similar views to distinguish from beliefs, and 'aliefs', automatic attitude-like states that involve belief-like dispositions (Gendler 2008a & b). It also provides a straightforward, satisfying answer to Kripke's "puzzle about belief" (1979) that makes sense of contradictory beliefs more generally.
The synthetic a priori is all but consigned to history. But the consignment is mistaken. Given an... more The synthetic a priori is all but consigned to history. But the consignment is mistaken. Given an ecumenical, reasonable, Kant-inspired (though not orthodox Kantian) notion of the synthetic a priori, at least one truth qualifies. It is true, but not merely in virtue of its meaning. It is not known via perception or other empirical means. It is a proposition or thought that the thinking subject can know to be true just by being its self-conscious judger.
I argue that Kripke’s “puzzle about belief” (1979) can be solved entirely with uncontroversial, e... more I argue that Kripke’s “puzzle about belief” (1979) can be solved entirely with uncontroversial, essentially “lay” assessments of what the believers in the cases generating the puzzle believe and think about. Kripke argues that the believers in the cases cannot really have the “inconsistent” or “contradictory” beliefs they straightforwardly seem to. But the straightforward seeming is correct. They do; that fact need not generate any mystery.
Kripke anticipates and rejects similar solutions. His objections, however, reveal the flaws in the principles of belief ascription Kripke relies on to generate the puzzle. The objections also allege that the solution ascribes believers “inconsistent” or “contradictory” beliefs that no minimally rational subject has. This is false. The “inconsistencies” and “contradictions” involved are common among believers. They are actually exhibited by believers in the puzzle’s cases, as they seem to be. Hence they aren’t grounds for reductio on views ascribing such beliefs. As a bonus, the solution doesn’t substantively constrain, much less threaten, the two major conventional approaches to the meaning of proper names. It also may have revealing implications for the necessary conditions for de dicto belief.
David Lewis (1979) presents a case in which two gods have omniscient propositional knowledge. Bu... more David Lewis (1979) presents a case in which two gods have omniscient propositional knowledge. But each god fails to know something very basic: which of the two gods it is (520-1). It thus seems that the content of one’s de se knowledge (hence belief) is not propositional. Call it the ‘Two Gods’ problem for propositional accounts of de se thought and expression. This paper argues that Two Gods is no problem for a view under which thoughts (de se or otherwise) have Fregean propositions as their contents, given it includes the account of de se and indexical propositional thought from John McDowell (e.g., 1984) and Gareth Evans (1981; 1982).
This paper offers an argument for content normativism, the view that the mind's intentional conte... more This paper offers an argument for content normativism, the view that the mind's intentional contents are essentially, prescriptively normative entities. The argument shows that the most prominent objection to the view is unsound. To make this argument, the paper advances a new conception of prescriptive normativity. If this conception is correct, there are three notable consequences. First, the aforementioned objection fails: it rests on a (pervasive) misunderstanding of the requirements for being prescriptively normative (section 2). Second, facts of the form 'subject S possesses concept C' imply that S ought to accord with some conceptual rules, described in the paper, that genuinely prescribe acts that involve C (section 3). Third, it becomes much easier to show, as the last section of the paper does (section 4), that S's obligation to accord with these rules is an essential part of what it is to possess C, and does not follow from other sources of obligation.
Recent critics of views under which intentionality is a distinctively normative phenomenon object... more Recent critics of views under which intentionality is a distinctively normative phenomenon object that the apparent rules expressed in ‘ought’-claims about intentional states or acts are not genuinely prescriptive (i.e., guiding) rules, and thus that the views are false.
This paper refutes the objection. To be prescriptive, the rules in question need not to guide the standardly-abled agents they enjoin. In fact, agents with non-standard cognitive capacities can accept guidance from these rules. Because they can, and they are otherwise relevantly similar to standardly-abled agents, the rules are prescriptive; if they enjoin one type of agent, they enjoin the other.
Talks by Derek Green
▫ (As will become clear, Aristotelian conceptions of abstracta have a lessthan-straightforward re... more ▫ (As will become clear, Aristotelian conceptions of abstracta have a lessthan-straightforward relationship with the argument.)
Erkenntnis, 2022
The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigatio... more The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality. This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content ascription alleged by the paradox is no flaw at all, rather a necessary component of the proper method of propositional-attitude ascription. On either lemma, rational explanation defuses the paradox.
Acta Analytica, 2020
Mental content normativists hold that the mind's conceptual contents are essentially normative. M... more Mental content normativists hold that the mind's conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think facts of the form 'subject S possesses concept C' imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of C in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S's possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the 'Source Objection'. This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2015
Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers ca... more Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another. If it is correct, there can be no such thing as meaning anything by a word. I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not frequently satisfy the well-motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails.
Erkenntnis, 2021
The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigatio... more The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality.
This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content ascription alleged by the paradox is not a flaw at all, but a necessary component of the proper method of propositional-attitude ascription. On either lemma, rational explanation defuses the paradox.
Acta Analytica, 2020
Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. M... more Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think facts of the form ‘subject S possesses concept C’ imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of C in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S’s possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the ‘Source Objection’.
This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
Saul Kripke’s influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers ca... more Saul Kripke’s influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule-following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another (1982, 7-54). If it is correct, ‘[t]here can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word’ (Ibid., 55).
I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not frequently satisfy the well-motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails.
An apology may be in order. There are few greater contemporary philosophical clichés than "x, y, ... more An apology may be in order. There are few greater contemporary philosophical clichés than "x, y, and z" titles. But the intersection of intentionality, determinacy, and rules really is exactly what the dissertation is about.
This paper provides a new theory of belief. Belief is judgment hypostasized. Its essential featur... more This paper provides a new theory of belief. Belief is judgment hypostasized. Its essential feature is its privileged relationship to judgment about what is so, which no other mental state has. The state of belief serves to mark what the believer judges, has judged, or would, in certain relevant circumstances, judge to be true.
The new view neatly explains some of the state's distinctive epistemic features, a virtue that its closest cousin, the dispositionalist view of belief, struggles to duplicate in a principled way. It accords with intuitions about who believes what and when. It properly distinguishes belief from 'near-belief' phenomena, like mere preintentional 'stances' (Searle 1983), traditionally difficult for similar views to distinguish from beliefs, and 'aliefs', automatic attitude-like states that involve belief-like dispositions (Gendler 2008a & b). It also provides a straightforward, satisfying answer to Kripke's "puzzle about belief" (1979) that makes sense of contradictory beliefs more generally.
The synthetic a priori is all but consigned to history. But the consignment is mistaken. Given an... more The synthetic a priori is all but consigned to history. But the consignment is mistaken. Given an ecumenical, reasonable, Kant-inspired (though not orthodox Kantian) notion of the synthetic a priori, at least one truth qualifies. It is true, but not merely in virtue of its meaning. It is not known via perception or other empirical means. It is a proposition or thought that the thinking subject can know to be true just by being its self-conscious judger.
I argue that Kripke’s “puzzle about belief” (1979) can be solved entirely with uncontroversial, e... more I argue that Kripke’s “puzzle about belief” (1979) can be solved entirely with uncontroversial, essentially “lay” assessments of what the believers in the cases generating the puzzle believe and think about. Kripke argues that the believers in the cases cannot really have the “inconsistent” or “contradictory” beliefs they straightforwardly seem to. But the straightforward seeming is correct. They do; that fact need not generate any mystery.
Kripke anticipates and rejects similar solutions. His objections, however, reveal the flaws in the principles of belief ascription Kripke relies on to generate the puzzle. The objections also allege that the solution ascribes believers “inconsistent” or “contradictory” beliefs that no minimally rational subject has. This is false. The “inconsistencies” and “contradictions” involved are common among believers. They are actually exhibited by believers in the puzzle’s cases, as they seem to be. Hence they aren’t grounds for reductio on views ascribing such beliefs. As a bonus, the solution doesn’t substantively constrain, much less threaten, the two major conventional approaches to the meaning of proper names. It also may have revealing implications for the necessary conditions for de dicto belief.
David Lewis (1979) presents a case in which two gods have omniscient propositional knowledge. Bu... more David Lewis (1979) presents a case in which two gods have omniscient propositional knowledge. But each god fails to know something very basic: which of the two gods it is (520-1). It thus seems that the content of one’s de se knowledge (hence belief) is not propositional. Call it the ‘Two Gods’ problem for propositional accounts of de se thought and expression. This paper argues that Two Gods is no problem for a view under which thoughts (de se or otherwise) have Fregean propositions as their contents, given it includes the account of de se and indexical propositional thought from John McDowell (e.g., 1984) and Gareth Evans (1981; 1982).
This paper offers an argument for content normativism, the view that the mind's intentional conte... more This paper offers an argument for content normativism, the view that the mind's intentional contents are essentially, prescriptively normative entities. The argument shows that the most prominent objection to the view is unsound. To make this argument, the paper advances a new conception of prescriptive normativity. If this conception is correct, there are three notable consequences. First, the aforementioned objection fails: it rests on a (pervasive) misunderstanding of the requirements for being prescriptively normative (section 2). Second, facts of the form 'subject S possesses concept C' imply that S ought to accord with some conceptual rules, described in the paper, that genuinely prescribe acts that involve C (section 3). Third, it becomes much easier to show, as the last section of the paper does (section 4), that S's obligation to accord with these rules is an essential part of what it is to possess C, and does not follow from other sources of obligation.
Recent critics of views under which intentionality is a distinctively normative phenomenon object... more Recent critics of views under which intentionality is a distinctively normative phenomenon object that the apparent rules expressed in ‘ought’-claims about intentional states or acts are not genuinely prescriptive (i.e., guiding) rules, and thus that the views are false.
This paper refutes the objection. To be prescriptive, the rules in question need not to guide the standardly-abled agents they enjoin. In fact, agents with non-standard cognitive capacities can accept guidance from these rules. Because they can, and they are otherwise relevantly similar to standardly-abled agents, the rules are prescriptive; if they enjoin one type of agent, they enjoin the other.
▫ (As will become clear, Aristotelian conceptions of abstracta have a lessthan-straightforward re... more ▫ (As will become clear, Aristotelian conceptions of abstracta have a lessthan-straightforward relationship with the argument.)