Lauren N. Ross | University of California, Irvine (original) (raw)
Papers by Lauren N. Ross
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2024
A fundamental goal of research in neuroscience is to uncover the causal structure of the brain. T... more A fundamental goal of research in neuroscience is to uncover the causal structure of the brain. This focus on causation makes sense, because causal information can provide explanations of brain function and identify reliable targets with which to understand cognitive function and prevent or change neurological conditions and psychiatric disorders. In this research, one of the most frequently used causal concepts is ‘mechanism’ — this is seen in the literature and language of the field, in grant and funding inquiries that specify what research is supported, and in journal guidelines on which contributions are considered for publication. In these contexts, mechanisms are commonly tied to expressions of the main aims of the field and cited as the ‘fundamental’, ‘foundational’ and/or ‘basic’ unit for understanding the brain. Despite its common usage and perceived importance, mechanism is used in different ways that are rarely distinguished. Given that this concept is defined in different ways throughout the field — and that there is often no clarification of which definition is intended — there remains a marked ambiguity about the fundamental goals, orientation and principles of the field. Here we provide an overview of causation and mechanism from the perspectives of neuroscience and philosophy of science, in order to address these challenges.
In Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry VI, Edited by Kenneth Kendler, Peter Zachar, & Josef Parnas.
The proximal-distal model of disease causation is often used to capture how social causes influ-e... more The proximal-distal model of disease causation is often used to capture how social causes influ-ence health outcomes. This model serves as a conceptual framework for many analyses of “social determinants of health”—it does so by locating social factors as “distal” causes, which are up- stream of “proximal” biology. In a rich and influential paper, Krieger criticizes this model for being inaccurate and confused, and suggests that we “abandon the deeply confused language of the terms proximal and distal” (Krieger 2008). While we agree with many of Krieger’s criticisms, we examine different weaknesses of this model and argue that it has important strengths. We examine three causal scenarios to show how social and biological causes interrelate in various ways, which are only partly captured by this model. In particular, we show how social factors can play three types of causal roles: they can be distal causes, parallel causes, and proximal causes. We argue that— instead of eliminating “proximal” and “distal” causal terminology—accurate use of these terms is not only possible, but instrumental in capturing how social causes influence health and disease.
Philosophy of Science, 2023
This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. In influential work, La... more This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. In influential work, Lange (2018) suggests that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While Lange mainly focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that provide a unique type of causal explanation. This paper clarifies what it means for a factor to be a constraint, when such constraints are causal, and how they figure in scientific explanation.
Philosophy of Science
This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanati... more This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanation. This analysis clarifies main characteristics of explanatory constraints, ways in which they differ from "standard" explanatory factors, and the unique roles they play in scientific explanation. While current philosophical work appreciates two main types of explanatory constraints, this paper suggests a new taxonomy: law-based constraints, mathematical constraints, and causal constraints. This classification helps capture unique features of distinct constraint types, the different roles they play in explanation, and it includes causal constraints, which are often overlooked in this literature.
Noûs, 2023
Social scientists appeal to various "structures" in their explanations including public policies,... more Social scientists appeal to various "structures" in their explanations including public policies, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Significant debate surrounds the explanatory relevance of these factors for various outcomes such as health, behavioral, and economic patterns. This paper provides a causal account of social structural explanation that is motivated by Haslanger (2016). This account suggests that one way that social structure is explanatory is in virtue of operating as a causal constraint, which is a causal factor with unique characteristics. A novel causal framework is provided for understanding these explanations-this addresses puzzles regarding the mysterious causal influence of social structure, how to understand its relation to individual choice, and what makes it more explanatory (and causally responsible) for various outcomes.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2023
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mec... more According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic. As the term "mechanism" gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation. What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance. This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept-it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to. I argue that this concept is importantly different from the notion of mechanism and that this difference matters for our understanding of causation and explanation in science.
Trends in Neurosciences, 2022
In neuroscience, the term ‘causality’ is used to refer to different concepts, leading to confusio... more In neuroscience, the term ‘causality’ is used to refer to different concepts, leading to confusion. Here we illustrate some of those variations, and we suggest names for them. We then introduce four ways to enhance clarity around causality in neuroscience.
Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
This paper explores a distinction across causal relationships that has yet to receive attention i... more This paper explores a distinction across causal relationships that has yet to receive attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or irreversible. We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on whether the causation involved is reversible.
Biology & Philosophy
Recent philosophical work on causation has focused on distinctions across types of causal relatio... more Recent philosophical work on causation has focused on distinctions across types of causal relationships. Of the various ways that causal relationships can differ, differences that have been discussed in this literature include stability, specificity, and proportionality (Woodward 2010; Lombrozo et al. 2018). This paper argues for another distinction among causation that has yet to receive attention in this work. This distinction has to do with whether causal relationships have “material continuity” or not, which refers to the reliable movement of material from cause to effect. I provide an analysis of material continuity and argue that causes with this feature (1) are associated with a unique explanatory perspective, (2) are studied with distinct causal investigative methods, and (3) provide different types of causal control over the world.
Synthese
This paper examines tracer techniques in neuroscience, which are used to identify neural connecti... more This paper examines tracer techniques in neuroscience, which are used to identify neural connections in the brain and nervous system. These connections capture a type of "structural connectivity" that is expected to inform our understanding of the functional nature of these tissues (Sporns 2007). This is due to the fact that neural connectivity constrains the flow of signal propagation, which is a type of causal process in neurons. This work explores how tracers are used to identify causal information, what standards they are expected to meet, the forms of causal information they provide, and how an analysis of these techniques contributes to the philosophical literature, in particular, the literature on mark transmission and mechanistic accounts of causation.
Synthese
Recent philosophical work has explored the distinction between causal and non-causal forms of exp... more Recent philosophical work has explored the distinction between causal and non-causal forms of explanation. In this literature, topological explanation is viewed as a clear example of the non- causal variety–it is claimed that topology lacks temporal information, which is necessary for causal structure (Pincock 2012; Huneman 2010). This paper explores the distinction between topological and causal forms of explanation and argues that this distinction is not as clear cut as the literature suggests. One reason for this is that some explanations appear to involve features of both explanatory patterns. In these “borderline” cases, scientists explain some outcome by appealing to the topology of the system, where this topology contains causal information. These cases help clarify a type of topological explanation that is genuinely causal, but that differs from standard topological and interventionist forms of explanation (Woodward 2003).
Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science volume entitled "From Biological Practice to Scientific Metaphysics"
Over the past decade there have been increasingly common claims that psychiatry is in a “crisis” ... more Over the past decade there have been increasingly common claims that psychiatry is in a “crisis” (Hyman, 2013; Morgan, 2015; Poland and Tekin, 2017). These claims often target the lack of known or identifiable causal etiologies for psychiatric diseases, suggesting that they are “among the most intractable enigmas in medicine” (Sullivan et al., 2012, 537). While the intractable nature of these disorders is often associated with their “causal complexity” (Poland and Tekin, 2017, 5), it is not always clear exactly what is meant by this. How should we understand causal complexity in this domain? How does it challenge scientific efforts to understand and explain these diseases? This paper addresses these questions by examining two main types of causal complexity in psychiatry. My analysis clarifies what these types of causal complexity are, how they challenge efforts to understand and explain these disorders, and how scientists are working to overcome these challenges.
Philosophy of Science
This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings o... more This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in an influential paper by Sober (1999), in which he argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober's causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his set up fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizability thesis. After correcting for these issues, I argue that this causal framework reveals something quite different. It reveals how multiple realizability relates to a common type of causal complexity in biology, which poses problems for reductive explanation.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Over the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as ... more Over the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mechanistic explanation. A significant motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently use the term `mechanism' in their explanations of biological phenomena. Of course, biologists use a variety of causal concepts in their explanations, including concepts like pathways, cascades, triggers, and processes. Despite this variety, mainstream philosophical views interpret all of these concepts with the single notion of mechanism. In using the mechanism concept interchangeably with other causal concepts, it is not clear that these accounts well capture the diversity of causal structures in biology. This paper analyses two causal concepts in biology--the notions of `mechanism' and `pathway'--and how they figure in biological explanation. I argue that these concepts have unique features, that they are associated with distinct strategies of causal investigation, and that they figure in importantly different types of explanation.
Synthese
The periodic table represents and organizes all known chemical elements on the basis of their pro... more The periodic table represents and organizes all known chemical elements on the basis of their properties. While the importance of this table in chemistry is uncontroversial, the role that it plays in scientific reasoning remains heavily disputed. Many philosophers deny the explanatory role of the table and insist that it is “merely” classificatory (Shapere, 1977, 534-5) (Scerri, 1997a, 239). In particular, it has been claimed that the table does not figure in causal explanation because it “does not reveal causal structure” (Woody, 2014, 143). This paper provides an analysis of what it means to say that a scientific figure reveals causal structure and it argues that the modern periodic table does just this. It also clarifies why these “merely” classificatory claims have seemed so compelling–this is because these claims often focus on the earliest periodic tables, which lack the causal structure present in modern versions.
Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science volume on "Philosophical Perspectives on Causal Reasoning in Biology'', 2019
Causal selection has to do with the distinction we make between background conditions and "the" t... more Causal selection has to do with the distinction we make between background conditions and "the" true cause or causes of some outcome of interest. A longstanding consensus in philosophy views causal selection as lacking any objective rationale and as guided, instead, by arbitrary, pragmatic, and non-scientific considerations. I argue against this position in the context of causal selection for disease traits. In this domain, causes are selected on the basis of the type of causal control they exhibit over a disease of interest. My analysis clarifies the principled rationale that guides this selection and how it involves both pragmatic and objective considerations, which have been overlooked in the extant literature.
Biology & Philosophy
Modern medicine is often said to have originated with nineteenth century germ theory, which attri... more Modern medicine is often said to have originated with nineteenth century germ theory, which attributed diseases to bacterial contagions. The success of this theory is often associated with an underlying principle referred to as the “doctrine of specific etiology.” This doctrine refers to specificity at the level of disease causation or etiology. While the importance of this doctrine is frequently emphasized in the philosophical, historical, and medical literature, these sources lack a clear account of the types of specificity that it involves and why exactly they matter. This paper argues that the nineteenth century germ theory model involves two types of specificity at the level of etiology. One type receives significant attention in the literature, but its influence on modern medicine has been misunderstood. A second type is present in this model, but it has been completely overlooked in the extant literature. My analysis clarifies how these types of specificity led to a novel conception of etiology that continues to figure in medicine today.
Philosophy of Science, 2018
Causal selection has to do with a distinction between mere background conditions and the "true" c... more Causal selection has to do with a distinction between mere background conditions and the "true" cause or causes of some outcome of interest. Most philosophical work on this topic examines the selection of single causal factors and aims to clarify what grounds, if any, justify this selection. Such analyses overlook the fact that in scientific (and often ordinary life) contexts multiple factors are often selected as the important causes of some outcome. This analysis examines one such multicausal case where factors in causal pathways are selected in biological explanations. This work provides a novel analysis of the pathway concept, its role in causal selection, and the rationale behind this selection. It is argued that this rationale is guided by principled considerations, which have been overlooked in the extant literature.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2016
We argue that Koch's postulates are best understood within an interventionist account of causatio... more We argue that Koch's postulates are best understood within an interventionist account of causation, in the sense described in Woodward (2003). We show how this treatment helps to resolve interpretive puzzles associated with Koch's work and how it clarifies the different roles the postulates play in providing useful, yet not universal criteria for disease causation. Our paper is an effort at rational reconstruction; we attempt to show how Koch's postulates and reasoning make sense and are normatively justified within an interventionist framework and more difficult to understand within alternative frameworks for thinking about causation.
Philosophy of Science, 2015
Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to mechanisms. They extend t... more Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to
mechanisms. They extend this view to the use of mathematical models in
neuroscience and propose a constraint such models must meet in order to be
explanatory. I analyze a mathematical model used to provide explanations in
dynamical systems neuroscience and indicate how this explanation cannot be
accommodated by the mechanist framework. I argue that this explanation is
well characterized by Batterman’s account of minimal model explanations
and that it demonstrates how relationships between explanatory models in
neuroscience and the systems they represent is more complex than has been
appreciated.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2024
A fundamental goal of research in neuroscience is to uncover the causal structure of the brain. T... more A fundamental goal of research in neuroscience is to uncover the causal structure of the brain. This focus on causation makes sense, because causal information can provide explanations of brain function and identify reliable targets with which to understand cognitive function and prevent or change neurological conditions and psychiatric disorders. In this research, one of the most frequently used causal concepts is ‘mechanism’ — this is seen in the literature and language of the field, in grant and funding inquiries that specify what research is supported, and in journal guidelines on which contributions are considered for publication. In these contexts, mechanisms are commonly tied to expressions of the main aims of the field and cited as the ‘fundamental’, ‘foundational’ and/or ‘basic’ unit for understanding the brain. Despite its common usage and perceived importance, mechanism is used in different ways that are rarely distinguished. Given that this concept is defined in different ways throughout the field — and that there is often no clarification of which definition is intended — there remains a marked ambiguity about the fundamental goals, orientation and principles of the field. Here we provide an overview of causation and mechanism from the perspectives of neuroscience and philosophy of science, in order to address these challenges.
In Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry VI, Edited by Kenneth Kendler, Peter Zachar, & Josef Parnas.
The proximal-distal model of disease causation is often used to capture how social causes influ-e... more The proximal-distal model of disease causation is often used to capture how social causes influ-ence health outcomes. This model serves as a conceptual framework for many analyses of “social determinants of health”—it does so by locating social factors as “distal” causes, which are up- stream of “proximal” biology. In a rich and influential paper, Krieger criticizes this model for being inaccurate and confused, and suggests that we “abandon the deeply confused language of the terms proximal and distal” (Krieger 2008). While we agree with many of Krieger’s criticisms, we examine different weaknesses of this model and argue that it has important strengths. We examine three causal scenarios to show how social and biological causes interrelate in various ways, which are only partly captured by this model. In particular, we show how social factors can play three types of causal roles: they can be distal causes, parallel causes, and proximal causes. We argue that— instead of eliminating “proximal” and “distal” causal terminology—accurate use of these terms is not only possible, but instrumental in capturing how social causes influence health and disease.
Philosophy of Science, 2023
This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. In influential work, La... more This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. In influential work, Lange (2018) suggests that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While Lange mainly focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that provide a unique type of causal explanation. This paper clarifies what it means for a factor to be a constraint, when such constraints are causal, and how they figure in scientific explanation.
Philosophy of Science
This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanati... more This paper provides an analysis of explanatory constraints and their role in scientific explanation. This analysis clarifies main characteristics of explanatory constraints, ways in which they differ from "standard" explanatory factors, and the unique roles they play in scientific explanation. While current philosophical work appreciates two main types of explanatory constraints, this paper suggests a new taxonomy: law-based constraints, mathematical constraints, and causal constraints. This classification helps capture unique features of distinct constraint types, the different roles they play in explanation, and it includes causal constraints, which are often overlooked in this literature.
Noûs, 2023
Social scientists appeal to various "structures" in their explanations including public policies,... more Social scientists appeal to various "structures" in their explanations including public policies, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Significant debate surrounds the explanatory relevance of these factors for various outcomes such as health, behavioral, and economic patterns. This paper provides a causal account of social structural explanation that is motivated by Haslanger (2016). This account suggests that one way that social structure is explanatory is in virtue of operating as a causal constraint, which is a causal factor with unique characteristics. A novel causal framework is provided for understanding these explanations-this addresses puzzles regarding the mysterious causal influence of social structure, how to understand its relation to individual choice, and what makes it more explanatory (and causally responsible) for various outcomes.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2023
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mec... more According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic. As the term "mechanism" gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation. What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance. This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept-it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to. I argue that this concept is importantly different from the notion of mechanism and that this difference matters for our understanding of causation and explanation in science.
Trends in Neurosciences, 2022
In neuroscience, the term ‘causality’ is used to refer to different concepts, leading to confusio... more In neuroscience, the term ‘causality’ is used to refer to different concepts, leading to confusion. Here we illustrate some of those variations, and we suggest names for them. We then introduce four ways to enhance clarity around causality in neuroscience.
Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
This paper explores a distinction across causal relationships that has yet to receive attention i... more This paper explores a distinction across causal relationships that has yet to receive attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or irreversible. We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on whether the causation involved is reversible.
Biology & Philosophy
Recent philosophical work on causation has focused on distinctions across types of causal relatio... more Recent philosophical work on causation has focused on distinctions across types of causal relationships. Of the various ways that causal relationships can differ, differences that have been discussed in this literature include stability, specificity, and proportionality (Woodward 2010; Lombrozo et al. 2018). This paper argues for another distinction among causation that has yet to receive attention in this work. This distinction has to do with whether causal relationships have “material continuity” or not, which refers to the reliable movement of material from cause to effect. I provide an analysis of material continuity and argue that causes with this feature (1) are associated with a unique explanatory perspective, (2) are studied with distinct causal investigative methods, and (3) provide different types of causal control over the world.
Synthese
This paper examines tracer techniques in neuroscience, which are used to identify neural connecti... more This paper examines tracer techniques in neuroscience, which are used to identify neural connections in the brain and nervous system. These connections capture a type of "structural connectivity" that is expected to inform our understanding of the functional nature of these tissues (Sporns 2007). This is due to the fact that neural connectivity constrains the flow of signal propagation, which is a type of causal process in neurons. This work explores how tracers are used to identify causal information, what standards they are expected to meet, the forms of causal information they provide, and how an analysis of these techniques contributes to the philosophical literature, in particular, the literature on mark transmission and mechanistic accounts of causation.
Synthese
Recent philosophical work has explored the distinction between causal and non-causal forms of exp... more Recent philosophical work has explored the distinction between causal and non-causal forms of explanation. In this literature, topological explanation is viewed as a clear example of the non- causal variety–it is claimed that topology lacks temporal information, which is necessary for causal structure (Pincock 2012; Huneman 2010). This paper explores the distinction between topological and causal forms of explanation and argues that this distinction is not as clear cut as the literature suggests. One reason for this is that some explanations appear to involve features of both explanatory patterns. In these “borderline” cases, scientists explain some outcome by appealing to the topology of the system, where this topology contains causal information. These cases help clarify a type of topological explanation that is genuinely causal, but that differs from standard topological and interventionist forms of explanation (Woodward 2003).
Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science volume entitled "From Biological Practice to Scientific Metaphysics"
Over the past decade there have been increasingly common claims that psychiatry is in a “crisis” ... more Over the past decade there have been increasingly common claims that psychiatry is in a “crisis” (Hyman, 2013; Morgan, 2015; Poland and Tekin, 2017). These claims often target the lack of known or identifiable causal etiologies for psychiatric diseases, suggesting that they are “among the most intractable enigmas in medicine” (Sullivan et al., 2012, 537). While the intractable nature of these disorders is often associated with their “causal complexity” (Poland and Tekin, 2017, 5), it is not always clear exactly what is meant by this. How should we understand causal complexity in this domain? How does it challenge scientific efforts to understand and explain these diseases? This paper addresses these questions by examining two main types of causal complexity in psychiatry. My analysis clarifies what these types of causal complexity are, how they challenge efforts to understand and explain these disorders, and how scientists are working to overcome these challenges.
Philosophy of Science
This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings o... more This paper examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. The beginnings of this framework are found in an influential paper by Sober (1999), in which he argues that the multiple realizability thesis poses no challenge to reductive explanation. While Sober's causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his set up fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizability thesis. After correcting for these issues, I argue that this causal framework reveals something quite different. It reveals how multiple realizability relates to a common type of causal complexity in biology, which poses problems for reductive explanation.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Over the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as ... more Over the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mechanistic explanation. A significant motivation for these accounts is that scientists frequently use the term `mechanism' in their explanations of biological phenomena. Of course, biologists use a variety of causal concepts in their explanations, including concepts like pathways, cascades, triggers, and processes. Despite this variety, mainstream philosophical views interpret all of these concepts with the single notion of mechanism. In using the mechanism concept interchangeably with other causal concepts, it is not clear that these accounts well capture the diversity of causal structures in biology. This paper analyses two causal concepts in biology--the notions of `mechanism' and `pathway'--and how they figure in biological explanation. I argue that these concepts have unique features, that they are associated with distinct strategies of causal investigation, and that they figure in importantly different types of explanation.
Synthese
The periodic table represents and organizes all known chemical elements on the basis of their pro... more The periodic table represents and organizes all known chemical elements on the basis of their properties. While the importance of this table in chemistry is uncontroversial, the role that it plays in scientific reasoning remains heavily disputed. Many philosophers deny the explanatory role of the table and insist that it is “merely” classificatory (Shapere, 1977, 534-5) (Scerri, 1997a, 239). In particular, it has been claimed that the table does not figure in causal explanation because it “does not reveal causal structure” (Woody, 2014, 143). This paper provides an analysis of what it means to say that a scientific figure reveals causal structure and it argues that the modern periodic table does just this. It also clarifies why these “merely” classificatory claims have seemed so compelling–this is because these claims often focus on the earliest periodic tables, which lack the causal structure present in modern versions.
Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science volume on "Philosophical Perspectives on Causal Reasoning in Biology'', 2019
Causal selection has to do with the distinction we make between background conditions and "the" t... more Causal selection has to do with the distinction we make between background conditions and "the" true cause or causes of some outcome of interest. A longstanding consensus in philosophy views causal selection as lacking any objective rationale and as guided, instead, by arbitrary, pragmatic, and non-scientific considerations. I argue against this position in the context of causal selection for disease traits. In this domain, causes are selected on the basis of the type of causal control they exhibit over a disease of interest. My analysis clarifies the principled rationale that guides this selection and how it involves both pragmatic and objective considerations, which have been overlooked in the extant literature.
Biology & Philosophy
Modern medicine is often said to have originated with nineteenth century germ theory, which attri... more Modern medicine is often said to have originated with nineteenth century germ theory, which attributed diseases to bacterial contagions. The success of this theory is often associated with an underlying principle referred to as the “doctrine of specific etiology.” This doctrine refers to specificity at the level of disease causation or etiology. While the importance of this doctrine is frequently emphasized in the philosophical, historical, and medical literature, these sources lack a clear account of the types of specificity that it involves and why exactly they matter. This paper argues that the nineteenth century germ theory model involves two types of specificity at the level of etiology. One type receives significant attention in the literature, but its influence on modern medicine has been misunderstood. A second type is present in this model, but it has been completely overlooked in the extant literature. My analysis clarifies how these types of specificity led to a novel conception of etiology that continues to figure in medicine today.
Philosophy of Science, 2018
Causal selection has to do with a distinction between mere background conditions and the "true" c... more Causal selection has to do with a distinction between mere background conditions and the "true" cause or causes of some outcome of interest. Most philosophical work on this topic examines the selection of single causal factors and aims to clarify what grounds, if any, justify this selection. Such analyses overlook the fact that in scientific (and often ordinary life) contexts multiple factors are often selected as the important causes of some outcome. This analysis examines one such multicausal case where factors in causal pathways are selected in biological explanations. This work provides a novel analysis of the pathway concept, its role in causal selection, and the rationale behind this selection. It is argued that this rationale is guided by principled considerations, which have been overlooked in the extant literature.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2016
We argue that Koch's postulates are best understood within an interventionist account of causatio... more We argue that Koch's postulates are best understood within an interventionist account of causation, in the sense described in Woodward (2003). We show how this treatment helps to resolve interpretive puzzles associated with Koch's work and how it clarifies the different roles the postulates play in providing useful, yet not universal criteria for disease causation. Our paper is an effort at rational reconstruction; we attempt to show how Koch's postulates and reasoning make sense and are normatively justified within an interventionist framework and more difficult to understand within alternative frameworks for thinking about causation.
Philosophy of Science, 2015
Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to mechanisms. They extend t... more Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to
mechanisms. They extend this view to the use of mathematical models in
neuroscience and propose a constraint such models must meet in order to be
explanatory. I analyze a mathematical model used to provide explanations in
dynamical systems neuroscience and indicate how this explanation cannot be
accommodated by the mechanist framework. I argue that this explanation is
well characterized by Batterman’s account of minimal model explanations
and that it demonstrates how relationships between explanatory models in
neuroscience and the systems they represent is more complex than has been
appreciated.