Philipp Haueis | Universität Bielefeld (original) (raw)

Papers by Philipp Haueis

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2023

Recent work in the philosophy of scientific concepts has seen the simultaneous revival of operati... more Recent work in the philosophy of scientific concepts has seen the simultaneous revival of operationalism and development of patchwork approaches to scientific concepts. We argue that these two approaches are natural allies. Both recognize an important role for measurement techniques in giving meaning to scientific terms. The association of multiple techniques with a single term, however, raises the threat of proliferating concepts (Hempel, 1966). While contemporary operationalists have developed some resources to address this challenge, these resources are inadequate to account for the full range of complex behaviors of scientific concepts. We adopt show how the patchwork approach's repertoire of inter-patch relations can expand the resources available to the operationalist. We focus on one especially important type of inter-patch relation: sharing a general reasoning strategy. General reasoning strategies serve two important functions: (1) they bind together distinct patches of scientific concepts, and (2) they provide normative guidance for extending concepts to new domains.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2022

Questions about phenomenology's role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. W... more Questions about phenomenology's role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence of this dilemma is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. We substantiate our two claims by offering three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science. Each case study points out a specific phenomenological contribution to experimental practice while also illustrating how phenomenological approaches face the explanatory dilemma we outline.

Philosophy of Science, 2022

Developing tools is a crucial aspect of experimental practice, yet most discussions of scientific... more Developing tools is a crucial aspect of experimental practice, yet most discussions of scientific change traditionally emphasize theoretical over technological change. To elaborate on the role of tools in scientific change, I offer an account that shows how scientists use tools in exploratory experiments to form novel concepts. I apply this account to two cases in neuroscience and show how tool development and concept formation are often intertwined in episodes of tool-driven change. I support this view by proposing common normative principles that specify when exploratory concept formation and tool development succeed (rather than fail) to initiate scientific change.

Synthese, 2022

Multiscale modeling techniques have attracted increasing attention by philosophers of science, bu... more Multiscale modeling techniques have attracted increasing attention by philosophers of science, but the resulting discussions have almost exclusively focused on issues surrounding explanation (e.g., reduction and emergence). In this paper, I argue that besides explanation, multiscale techniques can serve important exploratory func- tions when scientists model systems whose organization at different scales is ill- understood. My account distinguishes explanatory and descriptive multiscale mod- eling based on which epistemic goal scientists aim to achieve when using multiscale techniques. In explanatory multiscale modeling, scientists use multiscale techniques to select information that is relevant to explain a particular type of behavior of the target system. In descriptive multiscale modeling scientists use multiscale tech- niques to explore lower-scale features which could be explanatorily relevant to many different types of behavior, and to determine which features of a target system an upper-scale data pattern could refer to. Using multiscale models from data-driv- en neuroscience as a case study, I argue that descriptive multiscale models have an exploratory function because they are a sources of potential explanations and serve as tools to reassess our conception of the target system.

Casting Light on the Dark Side of Brain Imaging

Abstract While neuroimaging has provided the means to map brain activity, cognitive psychology ha... more Abstract While neuroimaging has provided the means to map brain activity, cognitive psychology has been a crucial partner in giving those maps meaning. However, with innovations in brain mapping techniques, current brain mapping research is developing a distinct framework based in network science and neuroanatomy. This shift toward looking at how the activity of brain regions connect (“connectomics”) replaces the prior footing of brain imaging in psychology. In this chapter, we discuss the consequences and challenges of connectivity as a basis for describing brain function and organization.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2021

Polysemous concepts with multiple related meanings pervade natural languages, yet some philosophe... more Polysemous concepts with multiple related meanings pervade natural languages, yet some philosophers argue that we should eliminate them to avoid miscommunication and pointless debates in scientific discourse. This paper defends the legitimacy of polysemous concepts in science against this eliminativist challenge. My approach analyses such concepts as patchworks with multiple scale-dependent, technique-involving, domain-specific and property-targeting uses (patches). I demonstrate the generality of my approach by applying it to "hardness" in materials science, "homology" in evolutionary biology, "gold" in chemistry and "cortical column" in neuroscience. Such patchwork concepts are legitimate if the techniques used to apply them produce reliable results, the domains to which they are applied are homogenous, and the properties they refer to are significant to describe, classify or explain the behavior of entities in the extension of the concept. By following these normative constraints, researchers can avoid miscommunication and pointless debates without having to eliminate polysemous patchwork concepts in scientific discourse.

NeuroImage, 2021

The gradient concept in neuroscience describes systematic and continuous progressions of features... more The gradient concept in neuroscience describes systematic and continuous progressions of features of cortical organization across the entire cortex. Recent multimodal studies revealed a macroscale gradient from primary sensory to transmodal association areas which is linked to increasing representational abstraction along the cortical hierarchy, and which is paralleled by microscale gradients of cytoarchitecture and gene expression profiles. Convergent or divergent evidence from these multimodal studies is then used to support inferences about the existence of one common or multiple scale-specific gradients of hierarchical information processing. This paper evaluates the validity of such inferences within the framework of multiscale modeling. In branches of physics and biology where multiscale modeling techniques are used, the simple averaging of microscale details can introduce errors in macroscale modeling if it ignores structures at the intermediate mesoscales of organization which affect system behavior. Conversely, information about mesoscale structures can be used to determine which microscale details are actually relevant to macroscale behavior. In this paper, I similarly argue that multiscale modeling of cortical gradients needs to take organization of mesoscale circuits into account if it affects the structure-function relation that the models describe. Information about these circuits provides crucial evidence for evaluating inferences from micro-and macroscale data to the role of cortical gradients in hierarchical information processing. My application of the multiscale modeling framework reveals that the gradient concept tracks multiple overlapping progressions of cortical properties, rather than one overall gradient of hierarchical information processing. I support this argument by proposing a mesoscale gradient of connectivity which describes architectural differences between granular and agranular circuits, and which helps us better understand the relation between neural connectivity and hierarchical information processing.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2020

In 1981, David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel received the Nobel Prize for their research on cortical c... more In 1981, David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel received the Nobel Prize for their research on cortical columns—vertical bands of neurons with similar functional properties. This success led to the view that “cortical column” refers to the basic building block of the mammalian neocortex. Since the 1990s, however, critics questioned this building block picture of “cortical column” and debated whether this concept is useless and should be replaced with successor concepts. This paper inquires which experimental results after 1981 challenged the building block picture and whether these challenges warrant the elimination “cortical column” from neuroscientific discourse. I argue that the proliferation of experimental techniques led to a patchwork of locally adapted uses of the column concept. Each use refers to a different kind of cortical structure, rather than a neocortical building block. Once we acknowledge this diverse-kinds picture of “cortical column”, the elimination of column concept becomes unnecessary. Rather, I suggest that “cortical column” has reached conceptual retirement: although it cannot be used to identify a neocortical building block, column research is still useful as a guide and cautionary tale for ongoing research. At the same time, neuroscientists should search for alternative concepts when studying the functional architecture of the neocortex. keywords: Cortical column, conceptual development, history of neuroscience, patchwork, eliminativism, conceptual retirement.

Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience, 2020

The notion of “hierarchy” is one of the most commonly posited organizational principles in system... more The notion of “hierarchy” is one of the most commonly posited organizational principles in systems neuroscience. To this date, however, it has received little philosophical analysis. This is unfortunate, because the general concept of hierarchy ranges over two approaches with distinct empirical commitments, and whose conceptual relations remain unclear. We call the first approach the “representational hierarchy” view, which posits that an anatomical hierarchy of feed-forward, feed-back, and lateral connections underlies a signal processing hierarchy of input-output relations. Because the representational hierarchy view holds that unimodal sensory representations are subsequently elaborated into more categorical and rule-based ones, it is committed to an increasing de-gree of abstraction along the hierarchy. The second view, which we call “topo-logical hierarchy,” is not committed to different representational functions or degrees of abstraction at different levels. Topological approaches instead posit that the hierarchical level of a part of the brain depends on how central it is to the pattern of connections in the system. Based on the current evidence, we argue that three conceptual relations between the two approaches are possible: topological hierarchies could substantiate the traditional representational hier-archy, conflict with it, or contribute to a plurality of approaches needed to un-derstand the organization of the brain. By articulating each of these possibilities, our analysis attempts to open a conceptual space in which further neuroscientific and philosophical reasoning about neural hierarchy can proceed.

Download at: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17598/

Erkenntnis, 2019

What kinds of norms constrain mechanistic discovery and explanation? In the mechanistic literatur... more What kinds of norms constrain mechanistic discovery and explanation? In the mechanistic literature, the norms for good explanations are directly derived from answers to the metaphysical question of what explanations are. Prominent mechanistic accounts thus emphasize either ontic (Craver 2014) or epistemic norms (Bechtel 2008). Still, mechanistic philosophers on both sides agree that there is no sharp distinction between the processes of discovery and explanation (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, Craver and Darden 2013). Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation will be accompanied by ontic and epistemic accounts of discovery, respectively. As we will show here, however, recent discovery accounts implicitly rely on both ontic and epistemic norms to characterize the discovery process. In this paper, we develop an account that makes explicit that, and how, ontic and epistemic norms work together throughout the discovery process. By describing mechanism discovery as a process of pattern recognition (Haugeland 1998) we demonstrate that scientists have to develop epistemic activities to distinguish a pattern from its background. Furthermore, they have to determine which epistemic activities successfully describe how the pattern is implemented by identifying the pattern's components. Our approach reveals that ontic and epistemic norms are equally important in mechanism discovery.

In this paper, I argue that looking at the concept of neural function through the lens of cogniti... more In this paper, I argue that looking at the concept of neural function through the lens of cognition alone risks cognitive myopia: it leads neuroscientists to focus only on mechanisms with cognitive functions that process behaviorally relevant information when conceptualizing " neural function ". Cognitive myopia tempts researchers to neglect neural mechanisms with noncognitive functions which do not process behaviorally relevant information but maintain and repair neural and other systems of the body. Cognitive myopia similarly affects philosophy of neuroscience because scholars overlook noncognitive functions when analyzing issues surrounding e.g., functional decomposition or the multifunctionality of neural structures. I argue that we can overcome cognitive myopia by adopting a patchwork approach that articulates cognitive and noncognitive " patches " of the concept of neural function. Cognitive patches describe mechanisms with causally specific effects on cognition and behavior which are likely operative in transforming sensory or other inputs into motor outputs. Noncognitive patches describe mechanisms that lack such specific effects; these mechanisms are enabling conditions for cognitive functions to occur. I use these distinctions to characterize two noncognitive functions at the mesoscale of neural circuits: subsistence functions like breathing are implemented by central pattern generators and are necessary to maintain the life of the organism. Infrastructural functions like gain control are implemented by canonical microcircuits and prevent neural system damage while cognitive processing occurs. By adding conceptual patches that describe these functions, a patchwork approach can overcome cognitive myopia and help us explain how the brain's capacities as an information processing device are constrained by its ability to maintain and repair itself as a physiological apparatus.

The term " connectome " is commonly taken to describe a complete map of neural connections in a n... more The term " connectome " is commonly taken to describe a complete map of neural connections in a nervous system of a given species. This chapter provides a critical perspective on the role of connectomes in neuroscientific practice and asks how the connectomic approach fits into a larger context in which network thinking permeates technology, infrastructure, social life and the economy. In the first part of this chapter, we argue that, seen from the perspective of ongoing research, the notion of connectomes as " complete descriptions " is misguided. Our argument combines Rachel Ankeny's analysis of neuroanatomical wiring diagrams as " descriptive models " with Hans-Jörg Rheinberger's notion of " epistemic objects " , i.e. targets of research that are still partially unknown. Combining these aspects we conclude that connectomes are constitutively epistemic objects: there just is no way to turn them into permanent and complete technical standards because the possibilities to map connection properties under different modeling assumptions are potentially inexhaustible. In the second part of the chapter, we use this understanding of connectomes as constitutively epistemic objects in order to critically assess the historical and political dimensions of current neuroscientific research. We argue that connectomics shows how the notion of the " brain as a network " has become the dominant metaphor of contemporary brain research. We further point out that this metaphor shares (potentially problematic) affinities to the form of contemporary " network societies ". We close by pointing out how the relation between connectomes and networks in society could be used in a more fruitful manner. Penultimate draft to appear in: N. Rose, T. Mahfoud, & S. McLean (eds.). Modeling Brains: The Making and Use of Animal Models in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Progress in Brain Research 233, Elsevier.

Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory: Thinking the Body Politic., 2012

We apply the perspective of "critical neuroscience" to the field of political theory, inquiring i... more We apply the perspective of "critical neuroscience" to the field of political theory, inquiring into the prospects and pitfalls of letting political theory take "the neuro turn", and analyzing what this might mean concretely in the first place. We will assess some of the most challenging work in the field of “neuropolitics” – such as William E. Connolly’s 2002 book that goes by this title. We contrast these invocations of the modish prefix “neuro,” that proclaim to break with (allegedly) time-honored, intellectualist positions, with our own account of a critical neuroscience of political theory. While drawing on some of the ideas outlined in John Protevi’s book Political Affect (2009), we develop a two-level critique of hermeneutic elements in neuroscience, opening up new avenues for intervention. On the intra-disciplinary level, we will criticize the neglect, within standard interpretations of neuroscientific results, of the social and political influences upon cognitive development. By using neuroscientific results more strategically, political theory can gain a powerful tool to show how normative systems in different forms of society shape the cognitive and affective make-up of its members. Neuropolitics, as a normative endeavor of assessing varieties of political cohabitation, would then employ brain research instrumentally instead of contributing to an unwarranted inflation of its discursive authority.

The concept of the cortical column refers to vertical cell bands with similar response properties... more The concept of the cortical column refers to vertical cell bands with similar response properties, which were initially observed by Vernon Mountcastle's mapping of single cell recordings in the cat somatic cortex. It has subsequently guided over 50 years of neuroscientific research, in which fundamental questions about the modularity of the cortex and basic principles of sensory information processing were empirically investigated. Nevertheless, the status of the column remains controversial today, as skeptical commentators proclaim that the vertical cell bands are a functionally insignificant by-product of ontogenetic development. This paper inquires how the column came to be viewed as an elementary unit of the cortex from Mountcastle's discovery in 1955 until David Hubel and Torsten Wie-sel's reception of the Nobel Prize in 1981. I first argue that Mountcastle's vertical electrode recordings served as criteria for applying the column concept to electro-physiological data. In contrast to previous authors, I claim that this move from electrophysiological data to the phenomenon of columnar responses was concept-laden, but not theory-laden. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Mount-castle's criteria provided Hubel Wiesel with a conceptual outlook, i.e. it allowed them to anticipate columnar patterns in the cat and macaque visual cortex. I argue that in the late 1970s, this outlook only briefly took a form that one could call a 'theory' of the cerebral cortex, before new experimental techniques started to diversify column research. I end by showing how this account of early column research fits into a larger project that follows the conceptual development of the column into the present.

The “Human Brain Project” (HBP) is a large-scale European neuroscience and information communicat... more The “Human Brain Project” (HBP) is a large-scale European neuroscience and information communication technology (ICT) project that has been a matter of heated controversy since its inception. With its aim to simulate the entire human brain with the help of supercomputing technologies, the HBP plans to fundamentally change neuroscientific research practice, medical diagnosis, and eventually the use of computers itself. Its controversial nature and its potential impacts render the HBP a subject of crucial importance for critical studies of science and society. In this paper, we provide a critical exploratory analysis of the potential mid- to long-term impacts the HBP and its ICT infrastructure could be expected to have, provided its agenda will indeed be implemented and executed to a substantive degree. We analyse how the HBP aspires to change current neuroscientific practice, what impact its novel infrastructures could have on research culture, medical practice and the use of ICT, and how, given a certain degree of successful execution of the project’s aims, potential clinical and methodological applications could even transform society beyond scientific practice. Furthermore, we sketch the possibility that research such as that projected by the HBP may eventually transform our everyday world, even beyond the scope of the HBP’s explicit agenda, and beyond the isolated ‘application’ of some novel technological device. Finally, we point towards trajectories for further philosophical, historical and sociological research on the HBP that our exploratory analysis might help to inspire. Our analysis will yield important insights regardless of the actual success of the HBP. What we drive at, for the most part, is the broader dynamics of scientific and technological development of which the HBP agenda is merely one particularly striking exemplification.

In contemporary human brain mapping, it is commonly assumed that the "mind is what the brain does... more In contemporary human brain mapping, it is commonly assumed that the "mind is what the brain does". Based on that assumption, task-based imaging studies of the last three decades measured differences in brain activity that are thought to reﬂect the exercise of human mental capacities (e.g., perception, attention, memory). With the advancement of resting state studies, tractography and graph theory in the last decade, however, it became possible to study human brain connectivity without relying on cognitive tasks or constructs. It therefore is currently an open question whether the assumption that “the mind is what the brain does” is an indispensable working hypothesis in human brain mapping. This paper argues that the hypothesis is, in fact, dispensable. If it is dropped, researchers can “meet the brain on its own terms” by searching for new, more adequate concepts to describe human brain organization. Neuroscientists can establish such concepts by conducting exploratory experiments that do not test particular cognitive hypotheses. The paper provides a systematic account of exploratory neuroscientiﬁc research that would allow researchers to form new concepts and formulate general principles of brain connectivity, and to combine connectivity studies with manipulation methods to identify neural entities in the brain. These research strategies would be most fruitful if applied to the mesoscopic scale of neuronal assemblies, since the organizational principles at this scale are currently largely unknown. This could help researchers to link microscopic and macroscopic evidence to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the human brain. The paper concludes by comparing this account of exploratory neuroscientiﬁc experiments to recent proposals for large-scale, discovery-based studies of human brain connectivity.

Croatian Journal of Philosophy

The problem of fuzzy boundaries when delineating cortical areas is widely known in human brain ma... more The problem of fuzzy boundaries when delineating cortical areas is widely known in human brain mapping and its adjacent subdisciplines (anatomy, physiology and functional neuroimaging). Yet, a conceptual framework for understanding indeterminacy in neuroscience is missing, and there has been no discussion in the philosophy of neuroscience whether indeterminacy poses an issue for good neuroscientifi c explanations. My paper addresses both these issues by applying philosophical theories of vagueness to three levels of neuroscientifi c research, namely to (i) cytoarchitectonic studies at the neuron level (ii) intra-areal neuronal interaction measured by the BOLD-signal of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and (iii) inter-areal connectivity between different cortical areas. The rest of the paper explores how this framework can be extended to mechanistic explanations in neuroscience. I discuss a semantic and an ontic interpretation of vagueness in mechanistic explanations and argue how both become scientifically interesting from the perspective of a philosophy of scientific practice.

Frontiers in Neuroanatomy

While the past century of neuroscientific research has brought considerable progress in defining ... more While the past century of neuroscientific research has brought considerable progress in defining the boundaries of the human cerebral cortex, there are cases in which the demarcation of one area from another remains fuzzy. Despite the existence of clearly demarcated areas, examples of gradual transitions between areas are known since early cytoarchitectonic studies. Since multi-modal anatomical approaches and functional connectivity studies brought renewed attention to the topic, a better understanding of the theoretical and methodological implications of fuzzy boundaries in brain science can be conceptually useful. This article provides a preliminary conceptual framework to understand this problem by applying philosophical theories of vagueness to three levels of neuroanatomical research. For the first two levels (cytoarchitectonics and fMRI studies), vagueness will be distinguished from other forms of uncertainty, such as imprecise measurement or ambiguous causal sources of activation. The article proceeds to discuss the implications of these levels for the anatomical study of connectivity between cortical areas. There, vagueness gets imported into connectivity studies since the network structure is dependent on the parcellation scheme and thresholds have to be used to delineate functional boundaries. Functional connectivity may introduce an additional form
of vagueness, as it is an organizational principle of the brain. The article concludes by discussing what steps are appropriate to define areal boundaries more precisely.

This paper explores how a non-reductionist account of Nietzsche’s influence on Michel Foucault ca... more This paper explores how a non-reductionist account of Nietzsche’s influence on Michel Foucault can enrich our understanding of key concepts in singular works of both philosophers. I assess this exegetical strategy by looking at the two dichotomies Apollonian/Dionysian and ars erotica/scientia sexualis in The Birth of Tragedy and The History of Sexuality Volume I, respectively. After exploring the relation between these two dichotomies, I link the science of sexuality to the Apollonian art instinct via the existence of Socratic culture, and argue against the "pleasure of analysis" as a sublated form of (Dionysian) ars erotica. These considerations lead to the notions of history in Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s philosophies that result in situating the polyvalent ‘Ursprung’ of Greek tragedy and the descent of ars erotica and scientia sexualis in an antimetaphysical and nonteleological picture of historical development.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2023

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2022

Philosophy of Science, 2022

Synthese, 2022

Casting Light on the Dark Side of Brain Imaging

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2021

NeuroImage, 2021

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2020

Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience, 2020

Download at: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/17598/

Erkenntnis, 2019

Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory: Thinking the Body Politic., 2012

Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Frontiers in Neuroanatomy

Using models to understand the human brain is hardly new. The practice has been used widely in th... more Using models to understand the human brain is hardly new. The practice has been used widely in the natural and life sciences since the 1800s, and continues today. Yet very little study by social scientists has been dedicated to how the neurosciences develop and use models to better understand what the brain is and how it works, including the complex entanglements between brains and the social. The workshop aims to understand the problems associated with modelling the brain by exploring the history and use of physical models of the brain, the development of digital models and simulations of the brain, and the development and use of animal models in neuroscience. The workshop will tackle four key questions: 1) How are brain models created and used in teaching and research? 2) What are the conceptual benefits, and limits of abstracting the brain from its context? 3) What would a 'vital' model of the brain look like? 4) What are the implications of brain modelling for the social?

As the rapid advances of medical and biotechnological research have dramatically changed the cond... more As the rapid advances of medical and biotechnological research have dramatically changed the conditions of human life, the question how homo sapiens is placed in the world demands renewed philosophical attention. In his recently published monograph Articulating the World. Conceptual Understanding and the Scientific Image (2015, U. of Chicago Press), Joseph Rouse develops such a reflexive and normative philosophy. The workshop aims to discuss Rouse's central theses on the unique character of human intentionality, the natural history of language and philosophical debates on how the world is disclosed by experimental research.

Explanations build on insights from scientific discoveries. But what does it take to make these d... more Explanations build on insights from scientific discoveries. But what does it take to make these discoveries and which norms guide scientific inquiry and explanation? Contemporary philosophy of science prominently features a mechanistic view according to which scientists discover mechanisms responsible for phenomena in the world by manipulation studies. However, there is disagreement about the primary norms for mechanistic explanations. According to the ontic conception explanations aim to get the causal structure of the world right. According to the epistemic conception explanations seek to render phenomena intelligible. We argue that both these are important norms but neither is fundamental. Drawing on John Haugeland's work and construing mechanisms as patterns we show that ontic and epistemic aspects of explanation are mutually implicating. Framing mechanistic discoveries in terms of pattern recognition, which forms part of a lager system of scientific practice, we also illustrate with what skills individual scientist contribute to scientific progress and the construction of mechanistic explanations spanning multiple levels. Squaring the mechanistic view with patterns not only illuminates the mechanistic picture, it also sheds light on Haugeland's pattern view.

Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience

The notion of "hierarchy" is one of the most commonly posited organizational principles in system... more The notion of "hierarchy" is one of the most commonly posited organizational principles in systems neuroscience. To this date, however, it has received little philosophical analysis. This is unfortunate, because the general concept of hierarchy ranges over two approaches with distinct empirical commitments , and whose conceptual relations remain unclear. We call the first approach the "representational hierarchy" view, which posits that an anatomical hierarchy of feed-forward, feedback , and lateral connections underlies a signal processing hierarchy of input-output relations. Because the representational hierarchy view holds that unimodal sensory representations are subsequently elaborated into more categorical and rule-based ones, it is committed to an increasing degree of abstraction along the hierarchy. The second view, which we call "topological hierarchy," is not committed to different representational functions or degrees of abstraction at different levels. Topological approaches instead posit that the hierarchical level of a part of the brain depends on how central it is to the pattern of connections in the system. Based on the current evidence, we argue that three conceptual relations between the two approaches are possible: topological hierarchies could substantiate the traditional representational hierarchy, conflict with it, or contribute to a plurality of approaches needed to understand the organization of the brain. By articulating each of these possibilities, our analysis attempts to open a conceptual space in which further neuroscientific and philosophical reasoning about neural hierarchy can proceed.

Metaphilosophy, 2022

This paper proposes an analysis of the discursive dynamics of high-impact concepts in the humanit... more This paper proposes an analysis of the discursive dynamics of high-impact concepts in the humanities. These are concepts whose formation and development has a lasting and wide-ranging effect on research and our understanding of discursive reality in general. The paper introduces the notion of a conceptual practice, which is based on a normative conception of practice. Practices are identified, on this perspective, according to the way their respective performances are held mutually accountable. This normative conception of practices will then be combined with recent work from philosophy of science that characterizes concepts in terms of conceptual capacities that are productive, open-ended, and applicable beyond the original context they were developed in. It is shown that the formation of concepts can be identified by changes in how practitioners hold exercises of their conceptual capacities accountable when producing knowledge about a phenomenon. In a manner similar to the use of operational definitions in scientific practices, such concepts can also be used to intervene in various discourses within or outside the conceptual practice. Using the formation of the concepts “mechanism” and “performative” as examples, the paper shows how high-impact concepts reconfigure what is at issue and at stake in conceptual practices. As philosophy and other humanities disciplines are its domain of interest, this paper is a contribution to the methodology of the humanities.