Johannes Harnischfeger | Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main (original) (raw)

Papers by Johannes Harnischfeger

(culled from ‘Tell’ magazine [Lagos], August 23, 2004 & May 6, 2002)

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Militias and vigilantes that assume public authority by fighting crime reject the laws of the sta... more Militias and vigilantes that assume public authority by fighting crime reject the laws of the state, yet they have no other set of rules to regulate their activities. Many of them claim to be accountable to their ethnic or religious community on whose behalf they operate. But their communities have found no means to institutionalise control over them. Moreover, there are no institutions to settle conflicts between different militias and vigilantes. On a local level, rival groups have reached informal arrangements. However, these compromises are unstable, as they reflect fragile alliances and shifting balances of power. Leaders of militias and other 'self-determination groups' have suggested organising a conference of all ethnic nationalities in Nigeria in order to design a new constitution that would give militias and vigilantes a legal role and define their authority. But the groups compared in this article – Oodua People's Congress, Sharia Vigilantes, Bakassi Boys, MASSOB, and Niger Delta militias – pursue very divergent interests, and they are far from reaching a consensus on how to contain violence between them.

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Jordi Thomas and Wolfgang Zeller (Eds.) "Secessionism in Africa" (forthcoming)

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The campaign to transform state and society on the basis of Shariah was begun by Muslim politicia... more The campaign to transform state and society on the basis of Shariah was begun by Muslim politicians in 1999, when military rule ended and power shifted to the Christian South. Although the pious campaign was mainly a matter of political intrigues, it established a paradigm that still frames political debates. Few
Muslims in the far north of Nigeria would openly question what the imams are preaching: that the will of God takes precedence over man-made laws and constitutions. Like most other Islamic organisations, Boko Haram refers to this principle. With its call for a consequent Islamisation, it seeks to achieve what Muslim politicians in the North have promised, but failed to deliver. This makes it difficult to denounce the aims of the rebels, and the Islamic establishment appears unable to formulate a coherent counter-paradigm. – My article will take a closer look at the disputes which Boko Haram has provoked among
Muslims. In doing so, I will draw on recent observations in some rural communities in Yobe State. Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, and Abubakar Shekau, its present leader, hail from Yobe; here and in neighbouring Borno, the insurgents enjoy some popular support. Yet my impression is that Boko Haram’s vision of a caliphate has very limited appeal. Most people do not want to live under a strict Shariah regime. However, Muslim critics of Boko Haram are themselves deeply divided. The two dominant religious organisations in north-east Nigeria, the Tijaniyya brotherhood and the Salafist Izala, cannot agree on an alternative model of an Islamic society which they
might set against the orthodoxy of the militants. Concepts of divine justice are vague and contradictory, and there are no clear boundaries between moderate and radical Muslims. In order to appease Boko Haram, villagers suggested a more consequent application of Shariah by eradicating drinking and gambling and by placing females under stricter supervision. However, they have shown little interest in using the divine laws to reform the dysfunctional public administration. Most citizens, including Izala and Tijaniyya functionaries, are entangled in the web of corruption that links villagers with the local government administration. They complain about the hypocrisy of politicians, who do not obey the laws they profess, but resemble them as they break their religious obligations at will.

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The story of the Okra-Lady, which European readers may take as a tale of the supernatural, has a ... more The story of the Okra-Lady, which European readers may take as a tale of the supernatural, has a more serious and disturbing significance for the Jukun (and other Africans) who are used to draw the line between fantasy and reality in a different way. When the tale is told to children, it may serve to initiate them into the frightening world of the occult. The story cautions against violence which may erupt within the family. And it tries to describe in a paradigmatic way, by grouping its figures in a series of abstract configurations, how domestic conflicts give rise to witchcraft and other forms of hidden aggression.

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In Nigeria the perception is widespread that wealth can be acquired only through witchcraft and r... more In Nigeria the perception is widespread that wealth can be acquired only through witchcraft and ritual murder. This assumption is confirmed, time and again, by sensational press reports about victims of ritual murders. In one provincial capital, even an ,uprising' against a sy ndicate of businessmen trading in human body parts occured towards the end of 1996. Such episodic occurrances hardly explain, however, why in the imagination of people the wealth of the new rich elite is generally associated with heinous forms of magic. And it also
remains unclear why people believe that particularly close family members are targeted as victims. That the fear of witchcraft, poisoning and ritual murder is finding fertile ground especially in the intimate environment of the family, is
obviously related to the decline of the moral economy. Social climbers and the nouveau riche having accumulated their wealth in the modern sector of society start behaving like a class of their own. They detach themselves from the rest of
the population by ignoring the legitimate claims of their families. Like traditional witches they turn into asocial creatures who - driven by greed - are no longer moved by the misery of their relatives.

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Introducing Islamic laws is a means of setting up claims over territory in which the will of Musl... more Introducing Islamic laws is a means of setting up claims over territory in which the will of Muslims reigns supreme. This has led to violent conflicts, especially in parts of the Middle Belt of Nigeria, where Muslim 'settlers' from the north, most of them Hausa and Fulani, have clashed with indigenous ethnic groups which are largely Christian and 'traditionalist'. The call for Sharia is popular among the migrants, as it provides them with
a divine mission: they have to assume supremacy over the local non-Muslim population in order to shape public institutions according to what they see as the will of God. The 'indigenes', however, have little interest in a religious confrontation. As 'sons of the soil', they want to defend their
ancestral land against 'foreign tribes'; they therefore emphasize ethnic, not religious, antagonisms.

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The Sudan Interior Mission, an American-based organisation which was the first to establish missi... more The Sudan Interior Mission, an American-based organisation which was the first to establish mission stations among the Tangale and other ethnic minorities in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, propagated a pure, evangelical form of Christianity. The Tangale converted in large numbers, but they appropriated the new religion as a cult, using its
rituals to drive away evil spirits, trying to gain health, prosperity and fertility. Theologians in the West assumed that with the process of modernisation Christianity in Africa would develop into the same direction as in Europe, embracing a liberal,
enlightened faith, which focuses on individual morality. Today's Christians, however, are more obsessed with occult forces then ever, and they make use of religion to further political aims. In rivalry with Islam, a militant brand of Christianity is emerging.

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Der Überblick, 2002

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State Decline and the Return of Occult Violence in Contemporary Africa. The state in Africa plays... more State Decline and the Return of Occult Violence in Contemporary Africa.
The state in Africa plays no prominent role in the prosecution of witches. Modem, secular institutions like the police and the judiciary are ill-equipped to deal with occult threats, whereas their rivals: ethnic militias and vigilante groups adopt magical and spiritual means to protect the population against invisible forces. The Bakassi Boys, for example, a private security group founded by market traders in Southeast Nigeria, demonstrated their superiority over a corrupt and timid police by executing a notorious sorcerer. Taking the case study of the Bakassi Boys as a starting point, the article discusses two trends in contemporary Africa which reinforce each other: The state 's failure to contain the rising threat of sorcery and witchcraft contributes to its loss of legitimacy, while the decline of the state contributes to the rise of occult violence.

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In the Middle Belt of Nigeria, between the Muslim north and the Christian south of the country, ... more In the Middle Belt of Nigeria, between the Muslim
north and the Christian south of the country, ownership of land
is contested between Hausa-Fulani "settlers" from the north
and "indigenous" ethnic groups which are mostly Christian
and traditionalist. The migrants, who are still a minority, try to
spread their faith among the "native" population. Those who
convert tend to assume the language, culture, and political
loyalties of the Hausa-Fulani settlers. This process of ethnic
conversion has been reinforced by the recent Sharia campaign.
With the call to fight for Sharia, indigenous Muslims are
put under pressure to prove that their new faith is more
important to them than their old "tribal" loyalties. Where armed
conflicts broke out, most converts sided with the Hausa-Fulani
migrants and fought, in the name of religion, against their
(former) Christian or traditionalist kin. [Nigeria, Middle Belt,
proselytism, Sharia, Hausa-Fulani domination, land conflicts,
minority rights]

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(culled from ‘Tell’ magazine [Lagos], August 23, 2004 & May 6, 2002)

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Jordi Thomas and Wolfgang Zeller (Eds.) "Secessionism in Africa" (forthcoming)

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Der Überblick, 2002

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List of publications and papers

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