Bastian Matteo Scianna | Universitaet Potsdam (original) (raw)
Books by Bastian Matteo Scianna
This book analyses the currents of German foreign and more specifically Middle East policy with a... more This book analyses the currents of German foreign and more specifically Middle East policy with a focus on Berlin's reactions to the Syrian civil war.
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The Italian Army’s participation in Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union has remained unrecogniz... more The Italian Army’s participation in Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union has remained unrecognized and understudied. Bastian Matteo Scianna offers a wide-ranging, in-depth corrective. Mining Italian, German and Russian sources, he examines the history of the Italian campaign in the East between 1941 and 1943, as well as how the campaign was remembered and memorialized in the domestic and international arena during the Cold War. Linking operational military history with memory studies, this book revises our understanding of the Italian Army in the Second World War.
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Papers by Bastian Matteo Scianna
The Routledge History of the Second World War, 2021
After the Second World War, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were singled out as evil geniuses w... more After the Second World War, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were singled out as evil geniuses who misled the masses and plunged them into an “unwanted war.” In relation to their armed forces, this narrative argued that the generals under their command had been demoted to powerless tools in the hands of the dictators, having to follow orders and with no sway over decision-making. It was further asserted that Germany and Italy had not been able to secure a victory due to the dictators’ meddling. Yet, as this chapter shows, there are important differences between the German and Italian cases. The chapter compares both the command structures in which the dictators operated as well as their grand strategies and how they cooperated during the war. Their personal relationship will be also analyzed, as it is impossible to look at the Axis without understanding the complex personal relationship at the very top. The strategies of both Hitler and Mussolini will be looked at and how each leader behaved in terms of working with their closest ally, together with some examples of cooperation on the lower military rungs.
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Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2019
The German Sonderweg thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the mil... more The German Sonderweg thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the military, things differ: all conflicts before the Second World War are interpreted as prelude to the war of extermination between 1939–1945. This article specifically looks at the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71 and German behaviour vis-à-vis regular combatants, civilians and irregular guerrilla fighters, the so-called francs-tireurs. The author argues that the counter-measures were not exceptional for nineteenth century warfare and also shows how selective reading of the existing secondary literature has distorted our view on the war.
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War & Society, 2019
After the Civil War the Spanish army functioned as a guardian of domestic order, but suffered fro... more After the Civil War the Spanish army functioned as a guardian of domestic order, but suffered from antiquated material and little financial means. These factors have been described as fundamental reasons for the army’s low potential wartime capability. This article draws on British and German sources to demonstrate how Spanish military culture prevented an augmented effectiveness and organisational change. Claiming that the army merely lacked funding and modern equipment, falls considerably short in grasping the complexities of military effectiveness and organisational cultures, and might prove fatal for current attempts to develop foreign armed forces in conflict or post-conflict zones.
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War in History, 26:1, 2019
After the Second World War, a new Austrian Army (the Bundesheer) was formed to guarantee the coun... more After the Second World War, a new Austrian Army (the Bundesheer) was formed to guarantee the country's armed neutrality. But the period between 1938 and 1945 remained a point of contention. While some Austrian officers had been sidelined, the majority had served in the Wehrmacht and thus shared experiences and soldierly values. As Cold War realities necessitated a professional experienced army, a group around Erwin Fussenegger (1908-1986) dominated the new Bundesheer and contemplations about reforming the military culture and value system were postponed; while at the same time, the Bundesheer managed to prevent becoming a mere continuation of the Wehrmacht. In contrast to the rich literature on the German Bundeswehr, very little has been written about Austria's postwar military: the (Second) Bundesheer. This seems striking, considering the fact that both armies were founded one decade after the war and faced similar dilemmas in regards to creating operational capabilities while deciding which soldiers were desirable to reconstruct new armed forces. In Germany, time pressure and missing alternatives made a complete discontinuity with the Wehrmacht impossible. A similar 'foundation compromise' was reached for the Bundesheer and other civilian institutions where 'men of the last hours' also became 'men of the first hours'. Reinhard Stumpf has
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European Review of History / Revue européenne d'histoire, 2019
Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909–2010) has been turned into a public and military ... more Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909–2010) has been turned into a public and military hero. His exploits as a guerrilla leader in Italian East Africa in 1941 have been exaggerated to forge a narrative of an honourable resistance against overwhelming odds. Thereby, Guillet has been showcased as a romanticized colonial explorer who was an apolitical and timeless Italian officer. He has been compared to Lawrence of Arabia in order to raise his international visibility, while his genuine Italian brand is perpetuated domestically. By elevating him to an official role model, the Italian Army has gained a focal point for military heroism that was also acceptable in the public memory as the embodiment of a ‘glorious’ defeat narrative.
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The International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2018
The conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935–36 has been framed as a prelude to the Second Wor... more The conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935–36 has been framed as a prelude to the Second World War and as a watershed towards 'Total War'. One perspective has so far been neglected: the assessments of foreign military observers. This article examines American, British, German, and Austrian views on the operations and thereby also analyses the mindset of European officers at the time. The core argument emerging from these reports is that the war was perceived as a rather 'normal' colonial conflict. Neither the use of gas, nor the employment of aircraft against civilians was seen as a taboo or created significant outrage among the military observers. Instead, they lauded the Italians' steady logistical efforts and employment of artillery and airpower to overcome nature and the enemy's resistance.
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The International History Review, 2019
On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Be... more On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines’ barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.
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Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 2016
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The Journal of Military History, 2018
Erwin Rommel is by any standard a mythical figure. He has been the subject of countless studies i... more Erwin Rommel is by any standard a mythical figure. He has been the subject of countless studies in English and German. However, the “Ital- ian side of the hill” has been largely neglected, despite the fact that the foundation of the myth around him lies in the North African campaign, where, after all, thousands of soldiers of the Italian army fought along- side the Afrika Korps. This article will provide an Italian view of the “Des- ert Fox,” using new primary material that provides insights into Italian assessments during the war. A major source is material gathered by way of eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as POWs in Cairo and in England.
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Archibald Reiss reporting on atrocities during World War I in Serbia contributed to the public pe... more Archibald Reiss reporting on atrocities during World War I in Serbia contributed to the public perception of the role of civil- ians and the meaning of war crimes. His reports on Austrian and Bulgarian wrong-doings perfectly show the changing interpreta- tion of laws of war from the traditionalist pre-1914 approach and the new vulnerable, yet targeted civilian as a victim and not poten- tial source of rebellion. This article shows how situational aspects and the new industrial war led to a totalization of war and where restraining elements existed. The ethnic cleansing aspect of the Bulgarian case will be analyzed and the case made for its differ- ent character in comparison to the Austrian actions in 1914 which lacked a planned exterminatory character.
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Talks by Bastian Matteo Scianna
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This book analyses the currents of German foreign and more specifically Middle East policy with a... more This book analyses the currents of German foreign and more specifically Middle East policy with a focus on Berlin's reactions to the Syrian civil war.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The Italian Army’s participation in Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union has remained unrecogniz... more The Italian Army’s participation in Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union has remained unrecognized and understudied. Bastian Matteo Scianna offers a wide-ranging, in-depth corrective. Mining Italian, German and Russian sources, he examines the history of the Italian campaign in the East between 1941 and 1943, as well as how the campaign was remembered and memorialized in the domestic and international arena during the Cold War. Linking operational military history with memory studies, this book revises our understanding of the Italian Army in the Second World War.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The Routledge History of the Second World War, 2021
After the Second World War, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were singled out as evil geniuses w... more After the Second World War, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were singled out as evil geniuses who misled the masses and plunged them into an “unwanted war.” In relation to their armed forces, this narrative argued that the generals under their command had been demoted to powerless tools in the hands of the dictators, having to follow orders and with no sway over decision-making. It was further asserted that Germany and Italy had not been able to secure a victory due to the dictators’ meddling. Yet, as this chapter shows, there are important differences between the German and Italian cases. The chapter compares both the command structures in which the dictators operated as well as their grand strategies and how they cooperated during the war. Their personal relationship will be also analyzed, as it is impossible to look at the Axis without understanding the complex personal relationship at the very top. The strategies of both Hitler and Mussolini will be looked at and how each leader behaved in terms of working with their closest ally, together with some examples of cooperation on the lower military rungs.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2019
The German Sonderweg thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the mil... more The German Sonderweg thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the military, things differ: all conflicts before the Second World War are interpreted as prelude to the war of extermination between 1939–1945. This article specifically looks at the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71 and German behaviour vis-à-vis regular combatants, civilians and irregular guerrilla fighters, the so-called francs-tireurs. The author argues that the counter-measures were not exceptional for nineteenth century warfare and also shows how selective reading of the existing secondary literature has distorted our view on the war.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
War & Society, 2019
After the Civil War the Spanish army functioned as a guardian of domestic order, but suffered fro... more After the Civil War the Spanish army functioned as a guardian of domestic order, but suffered from antiquated material and little financial means. These factors have been described as fundamental reasons for the army’s low potential wartime capability. This article draws on British and German sources to demonstrate how Spanish military culture prevented an augmented effectiveness and organisational change. Claiming that the army merely lacked funding and modern equipment, falls considerably short in grasping the complexities of military effectiveness and organisational cultures, and might prove fatal for current attempts to develop foreign armed forces in conflict or post-conflict zones.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
War in History, 26:1, 2019
After the Second World War, a new Austrian Army (the Bundesheer) was formed to guarantee the coun... more After the Second World War, a new Austrian Army (the Bundesheer) was formed to guarantee the country's armed neutrality. But the period between 1938 and 1945 remained a point of contention. While some Austrian officers had been sidelined, the majority had served in the Wehrmacht and thus shared experiences and soldierly values. As Cold War realities necessitated a professional experienced army, a group around Erwin Fussenegger (1908-1986) dominated the new Bundesheer and contemplations about reforming the military culture and value system were postponed; while at the same time, the Bundesheer managed to prevent becoming a mere continuation of the Wehrmacht. In contrast to the rich literature on the German Bundeswehr, very little has been written about Austria's postwar military: the (Second) Bundesheer. This seems striking, considering the fact that both armies were founded one decade after the war and faced similar dilemmas in regards to creating operational capabilities while deciding which soldiers were desirable to reconstruct new armed forces. In Germany, time pressure and missing alternatives made a complete discontinuity with the Wehrmacht impossible. A similar 'foundation compromise' was reached for the Bundesheer and other civilian institutions where 'men of the last hours' also became 'men of the first hours'. Reinhard Stumpf has
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
European Review of History / Revue européenne d'histoire, 2019
Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909–2010) has been turned into a public and military ... more Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909–2010) has been turned into a public and military hero. His exploits as a guerrilla leader in Italian East Africa in 1941 have been exaggerated to forge a narrative of an honourable resistance against overwhelming odds. Thereby, Guillet has been showcased as a romanticized colonial explorer who was an apolitical and timeless Italian officer. He has been compared to Lawrence of Arabia in order to raise his international visibility, while his genuine Italian brand is perpetuated domestically. By elevating him to an official role model, the Italian Army has gained a focal point for military heroism that was also acceptable in the public memory as the embodiment of a ‘glorious’ defeat narrative.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 2018
The conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935–36 has been framed as a prelude to the Second Wor... more The conflict between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935–36 has been framed as a prelude to the Second World War and as a watershed towards 'Total War'. One perspective has so far been neglected: the assessments of foreign military observers. This article examines American, British, German, and Austrian views on the operations and thereby also analyses the mindset of European officers at the time. The core argument emerging from these reports is that the war was perceived as a rather 'normal' colonial conflict. Neither the use of gas, nor the employment of aircraft against civilians was seen as a taboo or created significant outrage among the military observers. Instead, they lauded the Italians' steady logistical efforts and employment of artillery and airpower to overcome nature and the enemy's resistance.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The International History Review, 2019
On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Be... more On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines’ barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Militaergeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 2016
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The Journal of Military History, 2018
Erwin Rommel is by any standard a mythical figure. He has been the subject of countless studies i... more Erwin Rommel is by any standard a mythical figure. He has been the subject of countless studies in English and German. However, the “Ital- ian side of the hill” has been largely neglected, despite the fact that the foundation of the myth around him lies in the North African campaign, where, after all, thousands of soldiers of the Italian army fought along- side the Afrika Korps. This article will provide an Italian view of the “Des- ert Fox,” using new primary material that provides insights into Italian assessments during the war. A major source is material gathered by way of eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as POWs in Cairo and in England.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Archibald Reiss reporting on atrocities during World War I in Serbia contributed to the public pe... more Archibald Reiss reporting on atrocities during World War I in Serbia contributed to the public perception of the role of civil- ians and the meaning of war crimes. His reports on Austrian and Bulgarian wrong-doings perfectly show the changing interpreta- tion of laws of war from the traditionalist pre-1914 approach and the new vulnerable, yet targeted civilian as a victim and not poten- tial source of rebellion. This article shows how situational aspects and the new industrial war led to a totalization of war and where restraining elements existed. The ethnic cleansing aspect of the Bulgarian case will be analyzed and the case made for its differ- ent character in comparison to the Austrian actions in 1914 which lacked a planned exterminatory character.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact