raimondello orsini | Università di Bologna (original) (raw)

Papers by raimondello orsini

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, 2021

The aim of this paper is to highlight the position of John Bates Clark about the Treaty of Versai... more The aim of this paper is to highlight the position of John Bates Clark about the Treaty of Versailles and the U.S. approach to Foreign Policy in the aftermath of World War I. To achieve this goal, we analyze some unpublished manuscripts from the Rare Book & Manuscript Library of Columbia University and four pub-lished articles written by Clark between 1918 and 1919 about the consequences of the Treaty and, more generally, the future of Europe. The main ideas emerging from this material are that Clark supported the Trea-ty because he thought that given the threat of a resurgent Germany, only a League of Nations including the U.S. could be able to maintain world peace. On the other hand, he also criticized it because he shared with Keynes the view that the very harsh provisions imposed on Germany would generate another World War in the near future. Finally, Clark saw the union among European countries as a tool for preventing another war.

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, 2019

We analyze the content of four articles by John Bates Clark published between 1878 and 1887, duri... more We analyze the content of four articles by John Bates Clark published between 1878 and 1887, during his Christian Socialist period in order to show that next to the marginalist Clark and beyond the neoclassical principles outlined in The Distribution of Wealth, the whole Clark’s work is a strongly coherent body, deeply rooted in positions less extreme than the ones held by more reformer-minded economists like Richard T. Ely or John R. Commons containing an array of different contributions to political economy displaying a certain originality and coherence, and enrolling in a thematic environment that today would be broadly defined as social economy. In particular, the main ideas emerging from this selection of papers are his organismic idea of society, the role of moral forces in shaping economic activity, and his promotion of profit sharing and cooperation as better regimes for production and distribution with respect to competition.

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, 2016

This note reports some information about the life of John Bates Clark which come from an unpublis... more This note reports some information about the life of John Bates Clark which come from an unpublished family history written in 1968 by John Bates Clark’s nephew, Frederick Clark Lyman, the son of his sister Elizabeth Huntington Clark Lyman. This new material and the biographical details are checked and complemented with other sources, in particular Alden H. Clark’s memorial publication written in 1938.

La fama di John Bates Clark (1847-1938) e legata soprattutto al suo contributo alla teoria margin... more La fama di John Bates Clark (1847-1938) e legata soprattutto al suo contributo alla teoria marginalista della distribuzione del reddito e alla diffusione del marginalismo negli Stati Uniti. La sua opera di gran lunga piu conosciuta e The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits, pubblicato nel 1899, che mostra come in un’economia statica la distribuzione della ricchezza tra i fattori di produzione sia proporzionale alla produttivita marginale di ciascuno di essi. Nonostante la sua produzione scientifica abbia spaziato su un'ampia gamma di questioni, sia di teoria economica e sociale, sia di politica economica, con approcci metodologici anche molto diversi, gia i suoi allievi diretti ed i suoi colleghi ebbero la tendenza a enfatizzare il suo ruolo di teorico, didatta e divulgatore dell'economia marginalista, e quindi principalmente i suoi contributi funzionali alla migliore definizione e sistematizzazione dell'analisi microeconomica neoclassica. Gia nel 1927, in un volume pubblicato in occasione degli ottanta anni di Clark, il suo collega alla Columbia University, Jacob H. Hollander, scrive: The real work of John B. Clark as an economist lies within the thirteen years from 1886 to 1899.

La fama di John Bates Clark (1847-1938) è legata soprattutto al suo contributo alla teoria margin... more La fama di John Bates Clark (1847-1938) è legata soprattutto al suo contributo alla teoria marginalista della
distribuzione del reddito e alla diffusione del marginalismo negli Stati Uniti. La sua opera di gran lunga più
conosciuta è The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits, pubblicato nel 1899, che
mostra come in un’economia statica1
la distribuzione della ricchezza tra i fattori di produzione sia
proporzionale alla produttività marginale di ciascuno di essi.
Nonostante la sua produzione scientifica abbia spaziato su un'ampia gamma di questioni, sia di teoria
economica e sociale, sia di politica economica, con approcci metodologici anche molto diversi, già i suoi allievi
diretti ed i suoi colleghi ebbero la tendenza a enfatizzare il suo ruolo di teorico, didatta e divulgatore
dell'economia marginalista, e quindi principalmente i suoi contributi funzionali alla migliore definizione e
sistematizzazione dell'analisi microeconomica neoclassica. L'obiettivo di questa nota è quello di mostrare che accanto al Clark marginalista e al di là dei principi
neoclassici esposti in The Distribution, vi sono una serie di altri contributi di Clark all'economia politica che
presentano una loro originalità e coerenza, iscrivendosi in un ambito tematico che oggi definiremmo di
economia sociale.

... come beneficiari dei soggetti appartenenti ad un&#x27;area grigia, poco propensi o no... more ... come beneficiari dei soggetti appartenenti ad un&#x27;area grigia, poco propensi o non in grado di accedere a politiche assistenziali pubbliche e al ... Il libero professionista che non riesce a pagare la rata del leasing per uno strumento necessario alla sua attività viene ...

Australian Economic Papers, 2002

We analyse positional effects in a monopoly market with vertical differentiation, comparing monop... more We analyse positional effects in a monopoly market with vertical differentiation, comparing monopoly and social planning. The provision of quality under monopoly depends upon the relative size of positional effects and the hedonic evaluation of quality. An elitarian equilibrium where quality increases in the level of positional concern emerges under monopoly, only if the market is sufficiently rich. Under social planning, quality increases in the level of positional externality, independently of market affluency. As long as partial market coverage obtains under both regimes, the monopoly deadweight loss decreases as the positional externality becomes more relevant. 1 The linear model of horizontal differentiation with convex transportation costs is a special case of a vertical differentiation model with quadratic costs of quality improvements . Moreover, as in , if firms are allowed to locate also outside the linear segment along which consumers are distributed, then there exist location pairs giving rise to vertical differentiation . 2 The behaviour of a monopolist in a market where buyers' satisfaction increases in the number of consumers excluded from purchase is analysed in , who suggests that the positional concern may be traced back to either quality signalling by the firm or status seeking by consumers.

Economics Letters, 2000

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We investigate the bearings of network externalities on product quality improvements requiring co... more We investigate the bearings of network externalities on product quality improvements requiring costly R&D investments. The model considers the dynamic behaviour of a monopolist alternatively maximising profits or social welfare. On the one hand, we confirm much of the acquired wisdom from the static literature on the same topic, about the arising of quality undersupply at the private optimum. On the other, we identify the initial conditions that must be met for R&D activity to be observed under profit-seeking behaviour.

Journal of Economics, 2004

We show that Rohlfs’s (1974) model is a special case of a spatial monopoly model á la Hotelling (... more We show that Rohlfs’s (1974) model is a special case of a spatial monopoly model á la Hotelling (1929) with uniform consumer distribution and quadratic transportation costs, where location is exogenous and the good yields no intrinsic utility. By relaxing these assumptions, we prove that the coordination problem typically thought to affect markets for network goods may not arise in general. Endogenizing location makes it easier for the monopolist to extract consumer surplus but also to cover the entire market. We also show that the main conclusions remain qualitatively unmodified if consumer distribution is triangular.

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Recherches Economiques De Louvain-louvain Economic Review, 2005

ABSTRACT We investigate the behavior of a monopolist supplying a vertically differentiated good w... more ABSTRACT We investigate the behavior of a monopolist supplying a vertically differentiated good with network externalities. Assuming a convex unit cost of quality improvements, we show that the presence of network externalities may yield oversupply of quality compared with the social optimum, when partial market coverage emerges at equilibrium. Overall, the incentive to expand output increases in the extent of network externalities, thereby partially counterbalancing the social damage produced by the quality distortion.

We describe the behaviour of a monopolist supplying a vertically di¤erentiated good with network ... more We describe the behaviour of a monopolist supplying a vertically di¤erentiated good with network externalities. Assuming a …xed cost of quality improvements, we show that the presence of network externalities enhances the incentive to expand output associated with scale economies. Although the quality distortion operated by the monopolist increases with network externalities, the output expansion e¤ect is dominant, so that the welfare loss due to monopoly power shrinks as the role of network externalities in determining consumers' satisfaction becomes more relevant. J.E.L. Classi…cation: D62, L12, L52

Central European Journal of Operations Research, 2007

We reconsider the role of network externalities in a dynamic spatial monopoly where the firm must... more We reconsider the role of network externalities in a dynamic spatial monopoly where the firm must invest in order to accumulate capacity, while consumers may have either linear or quadratic preferences. We (1) characterise saddle point equilibria, (2) prove that the extent of market coverage is increasing in the network effect and (3) unlike the existing static literature on the same problem, the monopolist may not make introductory price offers. Then, we briefly deal with the socially optimal solution, showing that, in general, a planner would serve more consumers than a profit-seeking monopolist.

Networks & Spatial Economics, 2010