Fabio Bacchini | Università di Sassari (original) (raw)

Papers by Fabio Bacchini

Southern Semiotic Review, 2024

In this paper I address the question whether specular images are signs, that is, whether mirror p... more In this paper I address the question whether specular images are signs, that is, whether mirror phenomena possess a semiosic status. The general semiotic theoretical framework I refer to is the one developed by Umberto Eco (1976; 1984; 1999). Although Eco himself invariantly answered the question I raise by the negative, I explore the issue independently of his conclusion.
In section 1, I show why it is not the case that all specular images are signs on all occasions. In section 2, I argue that specular images are signs only under specific conditions. In section 3, I cope with a couple of doubts that can be raised about the legitimacy of considering specular images as signs even under the specific conditions I have identified. Finally, in section 4, I deal with Eco’s main objection against considering specular images as signs, and I show that this objection can easily be dismissed with regards to the thesis I advance here. My conclusion is that some though not all specular images are definitely signs.

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 2024

Although the presumption that norms are necessarily expressed by words has traditionally prevaile... more Although the presumption that norms are necessarily expressed by words has traditionally prevailed in the scientific community, some scholars are challenging verbal-centrism in the normative domain. While sympathising with this cause, this paper argues that not every case in which a norm is expressible by a non-verbal sign is a case in which that norm is genetically or ontologically word-free. After mapping the different relations that can exist between a sign and a norm, the paper shows that the holding of many of them should not be taken per se as evidence for the thesis that some norms are genetically or ontologically word-independent, no matter that the sign is non-verbal. In particular, the paper analyses why some eminent examples of normative non-verbal signs like red traffic lights, traffic warden’s outstretched arms, referee’s whistles, and word-free no smoking signs, are not good evidence for the claim that some norms are not produced by or do not consist of verbal signs.

S&F_scienzaefilosofia.it, 2024

When plant-based meats enter the foodscape, they face the challenge of how to communicate their n... more When plant-based meats enter the foodscape, they face the challenge of how to communicate their nature and function to consumers: one strategy for navigating the tension between portraying conventional meat as something to be replaced and affirming their unique meaty tastiness is through ironic claims and performances. This paper seeks to analyse the moral stance of irony in plant-based meat advertisements, specifically when this irony involves the death of animals. Firstly, it presents an argument showing that, from the standpoint of veganism, ironising about animals’ death can be a moral wrong. Secondly, by relying on an interpretation of irony that leverages its potential for subverting and criticising hegemonic viewpoints, it is shown that this kind of irony can serve as a form of resistance aimed at dismantling the pervasive indifference towards the killing of animals for producing meat.

Bioetica - Rivista Interdisciplinare, 2023

The ongoing evolution of medical care impacts our lives in many ways. One is the continuous chang... more The ongoing evolution of medical care impacts our lives in many ways. One is the continuous change affecting how we cease to exist. Indeed, more and more people cease to exist after spending a long time in conditions that are intermediate between existence and non-existence, and the practical and legal issue of classifying these states is getting more and more pressing. If we want to make rational decisions about where drawing the lines in the grey zone of the continuum – the intermediate area in which survival is controversial – we should explore what are our metaphysical and moral intuitions and which intuitions appear more renounceable in case of conflict between them or their logical consequences. In particular, the ethical problem of organ donation from patients in a permanent vegetative state should be carefully taken apart, the relevant sub-question being: Should we leave people free to determine what happens to their organs after that they have ceased to exist? Should we leave them free to individually decide in which of the intermediate conditions they should be considered as ‘having ceased to exist’ rather than ‘continuing to exist’? Should people be entitled to receive medical aid to cease to exist if this is what they need to save the life of a son, a friend or a handful of strangers? Should an active medical intervention putting an end to the vital processes of the body – rather than merely the withdrawal of life support as provided by Italian law n. 219/2017 – be granted to patients in a permanent vegetative state who have asked for it in their advance directories?

Argumenta, 2024

In this paper I reconstruct Spencer (2014)'s argument supporting the conclusion that 'race', in i... more In this paper I reconstruct Spencer (2014)'s argument supporting the conclusion that 'race', in its current U.S. meaning, is a rigidly designating proper name for a biologically real entity, specifically for the partition at the K = 5 level of human population structure. Then, I object to the argument by contesting three distinct key assertions in it. First, I contest the assumption that if a term t has a logically inconsistent set of identifying conditions but a robust extension, then it is appropriate to identify the meaning of t as just its referent. Second, I contest the thesis that 'race', in its current U.S. meaning, is a rigidly designating proper name for a specific set of five race categories. Third, I contest the thesis that the partition at the K = 5 level of human population structure that Spencer identifies with the human population continental distribution, or 'the Blumenbach partition' as Spencer calls it, is biologically real in the sense Spencer needs. If even only one of my objections is convincing, Spencer's "radical solution to the race problem" is seriously undermined.

Food Ethics, 2023

The consumption of traditional meat is currently being challenged by the rise of meat alternative... more The consumption of traditional meat is currently being challenged by the rise of meat alternatives claimed to be more beneficial for the environment and non-human animals. One of the peculiarities of these products lies in their attempt to replace meat through the close imitation of its sensory qualities, which poses relevant philosophical questions: What are the purported reasons that motivate this imitation, instead of the promotion of different but sustainable foods that break with the imagery of meat eating? And, if eating meat is considered morally wrong, what is the moral status of the simulation of a wrong act? Our aim is to address these questions to shed new light on the ethical claims that constitute, in fact, one of the major advantages of these products. Firstly, we introduce the aims and functions of simulating meat sensory qualities. Subsequently, we investigate whether the imitation of meat can be found morally acceptable on consequentialist grounds. Lastly, we raise the question of whether there is room for claiming that imitating meat is morally wrong even if its consequences are overall better, from the point of view of non-consequentialist ethical frameworks. We conclude that there are not compelling reasons for considering meat imitation as morally undesirable.

Giornale di Filosofia, 2022

The paper proposes to examine the implications of the mimetic theory for urban studies, and more ... more The paper proposes to examine the implications of the mimetic theory for urban studies, and more precisely it explores the relevance of the Girardian perspective for some specific cases of “production of space”. Mimetic dynamics seems to explain how simple rules can give rise to complex, counter-intuitive results. Our primary objective is to develop, test and apply a general hypothesis concerning the role and function of mimetic relations in the production of different forms of space: territories, landscapes, urban space, tourist destinations, wasteland, places and non-places. Hence, fifty years after the publication of Violence and the Sacred, we explore if what Girard says is applicable in currently unexplored disciplinary fields. The challenge is to prove and offer the condition of possibilities for an application of the mimetic theory, as formulated in Violence and the Sacred and directly explored by Girard.

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2023

A movement asking to take race out of medicine is growing in the US. While we agree with the nece... more A movement asking to take race out of medicine is growing in the US. While we agree with the necessity to get rid of flawed assumptions about biological race that pervade automatic race correction in medical algorithms, we urge caution about insisting on a blank eliminativism about race in medicine. If we look at racism as a fundamental cause, in the sense that this notion has been introduced in epidemiological studies by Bruce Link and Jo Phelan, we must conclude that race is indispensable to consider, investigate, and denounce the health effects of multilevel racism, and cannot be eliminated by addressing more specific risk factors in socially responsible epidemiology and clinical medicine. This does not mean that realism about human races is vindicated. While maintaining that there are no human races, we show how it is that a non-referring concept can nonetheless turn out indispensable for explaining real phenomena.

Acta Analytica, 2022

Naïve realists traditionally reject the time lag argument by replying that we can be in a direct ... more Naïve realists traditionally reject the time lag argument by replying that we can be in a direct visual perceptual relation to temporally distant facts or objects.
I first show that this answer entails that some visual perceptions – i.e. those that are direct relation between us and an external material object that has visually changed, or ceased to exist, during the time lag – should also count as illusions and hallucinations, respectively.
I then examine the possible attempts by the naïve realist to tell such perceptions apart from illusions and hallucinations, and after showing the inadequacy of the answers relying on a mere counterfactual or causal criterion, I explain why the problem is solved by introducing a view of visual perception as temporally extended into the past of objects and, in particular, as consisting in the whole causal chain of events or states of affairs going from external material object x to subject S.
But this solution is not immune from defects for the naïve realist. I show that this view of perception raises a number of significant concerns, hence leaving the issue of the time lag problem still open for naïve realism.

Notizie di Politeia, 2022

This paper deals with the proposal, which has been recently advanced by the Finnish moral philoso... more This paper deals with the proposal, which has been recently advanced by the Finnish moral philosopher Joona Räsänen, that we should allow to change their legal age those people whose emotional and biological age does not match their chronological age, because legal age change would easily prevent, stop, or reduce severe forms of discrimination by age they would otherwise face. I first address Räsänen's argument as presupposing that chronological age is just a proxy in comparison to emotional and biological age, which are thought as variables making available more relevant and accurate information. I show how it is that this presupposition is deeply flawed. I then consider Räsänen's argument as purified from this presupposition. I argue that the purified version of the argument supports the position that we should concede whatever legal age change to anyone who asks for it. Such a position, however, is hardly tenable, if for no other reason than because it is a slippery slope leading to an unbearable version of the law of the strongest-that is, the law of the strongest at substituting real with unreal and lucrative facts. I conclude that Räsänen's argument is defective anyhow, and his proposal must be rejected until proven otherwise.

in Remapping Race in a Global Context, eds. L. Lorusso and R. G. Winther, Routledge, 2022

In this chapter we address the problem of whether we should adhere to indiscriminate radical elim... more In this chapter we address the problem of whether we should adhere to indiscriminate radical eliminativism about race and erase any reference to human race from scientific and medical discourse. Our answer is that total and indiscriminate eliminativism would be a mistake. Our position, however, is not based on the thesis that there are such things as human races. Quite the contrary, we show that the response coming from the sole field of study entitled to determine the ontological status of human races, i.e. population genetics, is that, loosely speaking, there are not such things as races. Still this conclusion should not put an end to the story. Also if race is on a par with witchcraft, we show not only that there are some phenomena that we cannot adequately explain without resorting to a nonreferring concept, but also that some of these phenomena are biological phenomena. In particular, race is a biologically significant and ineliminable variable from social epidemiology; the mere fact that races "do not exist" is simply not relevant enough to decree that the concept of race should be eliminated from epidemiology in the face of its epistemological indispensability as a variable tracking the effects of all of the causal pathways going from racism to disease.

Bioetica. Rivista Interdisciplinare, 2020

Negli USA sta prendendo piede un movimento di pensiero che si batte affinché sparisca dall’educaz... more Negli USA sta prendendo piede un movimento di pensiero che si batte affinché sparisca dall’educazione, dalla scienza e dalla pratica medica ogni riferimento alla razza, sulla base del fatto che è falso che i gruppi razziali socialmente riconosciuti abbiano una realtà biologica, e allo scopo di cessare di favorire la reificazione del concetto di razza. In questo paper mostriamo che è giusto opporsi a un certo tipo di correzione su base razziale implementata negli algoritmi diagnostico-terapeutici più utilizzati, ma anche che per combattere le disparità di salute prodotte dal razzismo abbiamo bisogno di una epidemiologia, di una ricerca biomedica e di conseguenza anche di una clinica medica che utilizzino in maniera consapevole il concetto di razza.

A growing number of medical professionals in the US are saying that race should not be used in patient care, biomedical research, and medical education, and are advocating for their institutions to ban race from medical thinking, starting with automatic race correction in guidelines and algorithms. While we agree that most automatic race correction is grounded on conceptions of race tainted with scientific racism and pseudoscience and should therefore be eliminated, we also argue that we need to employ the concept of race critically and intensely in biomedical research, epidemiology, and even clinical medicine if we want to actively fight racism, address health inequalities, and avoid penalising disadvantaged groups.

Paradigmi, 2021

In recent years there has been considerable debate over the metaphysics of human race, but little... more In recent years there has been considerable debate over the metaphysics of human race, but little attention has been given to its implications on the question of the causal relevance of race, arguably because such implications are considered self-evident. This paper shows that, on the contrary, they are far from being transparent. First, it argues that embracing biological realism about race is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for maintaining that race is causally relevant to the instantiation of some biological properties in an individual or in a group, and to consequent emergence of some biological differences between individuals or groups. Second, it argues that social realism alone – at least in societies which are not fully racism-free – can account for race to be causally relevant to the instantiation of biological traits that can even be biologically transmitted to offspring.

Humana.Mente, 2020

When investigating the nature of culinary works, it is easy to take for granted that they all sha... more When investigating the nature of culinary works, it is easy to take for granted that they all share the same ontology. This paper argues that, on the contrary, the ontology of culinary works is really threefold. Some culinary works are edible concrete particulars, or dishes, as many of us may first assume. But others are types, or multiply realisable abstract entities. And, while some of these types are determined by one recipe, others are rather chased after by their indefinitely many recipes. So, there are really three kinds of culinary works; only those belonging to one of the three are edible per se; and, each kind has a very different relationship to recipes. Indeed, it is very doubtful that culinary works consisting in edible concrete particulars are suitable to have one or more recipes: by exploring what are the requirements for being a recipe, the paper also examines under what necessary conditions there is a recipe for preparing a culinary work qua concrete particular.

Topoi, 2020

In this paper I attempt to show that a certain degree of hunger, intended as a material and psych... more In this paper I attempt to show that a certain degree of hunger, intended as a material and psychological condition of the diner, can become a constitutive property of a culinary work. One may believe that the best possible argument supporting this thesis is one relying on the general assertion that an author's stipulative authority over the features of his or her work, if adequately exercised, is absolute. Quite the contrary, I show that we should prefer a different and more specific argumentative strategy based on the twofold fact that the conventions ruling over culinary works are peculiarly less stringent than in many other art fields, and that hunger has a very special status with regard to culinary works, in the sense that fixing the degree of hunger of the diner may serve to fix the appropriate conditions for any minimally acceptable perceptual experience of a culinary work to take place.

Bioetica. Rivista Interdisciplinare, 2020

In Italy, movements designed to delay, block, or permanently disable large infrastructure project... more In Italy, movements designed to delay, block, or permanently disable large infrastructure projects get often put under the same category as anti-vaxxers, in that both rebel against impositions from above, and happen to be accused of being intolerably selfish. In this paper I show that that they are very differently vulnerable to the accusation of selfishness. It is contingently true that almost any specific case of opposition to large infrastructure projects is prima facie selfish, but when we take into consideration the arguments used to defend them, selfishness fades away most of the time. When it persist, however, – as in the Nimby case – it turns out to be a morally legitimate kind of selfishness. On the contrary, not every form of the anti-vax position is prima facie selfish. But the forms that are prima facie selfish are unamendably so; and those that are prima facie not selfish do become immorally selfish, or at least generically immoral, when one tries to concretely argue in favour of them.

Le posizioni No Tav e No Vax sono spesso equiparate perché entrambe accusabili di essere intollerabilmente egoistiche. Lo scopo di questo articolo è mostrare che, contrariamente alle apparenze, la loro vulnerabilità all’obiezione dell’egoismo è molto diversa. La posizione No Tav è prima facie sempre imputabile di egoismo, ma quando si va a supportare No Tav con argomentazioni specifiche, o l’accusa viene spazzata via, o (come nel sottocaso Nimby) si tratta di un egoismo moralmente legittimo. D’altra parte solo alcune forme che No Vax assume sono prima facie imputabili di egoismo, ma in questo caso non c’è redenzione morale che giunga dalla loro difesa argomentativa. Quanto alle forme di No Vax che non sono a priori accusabili di egoismo, esse diventano immorali, e in parte rilevante immorali perché egoistiche, proprio in virtù delle argomentazioni che vengono invocate per suffragarle.

Notizie di Politeia, 2020

The spread of tattooing in Western countries since the 1990s has been particularly impressive. In... more The spread of tattooing in Western countries since the 1990s has been particularly impressive. In many countries, amongst which Italy, it is not illegal for parents to tattoo their babies, toddlers, and preschoolers. Should we let them? Or should we instead advocate the adoption of a restrictive law to prohibit this conduct?
This paper shows that it is not easy to justify the ban. Indeed, we take it morally right to let parents decide for their children under many circumstances, also when their choices are more bizarre and possibly more harmful than getting them a tattoo. A ban on tattoos would then require a ban on a very large part of parental discretion, which would produce a much more morally disgusting scenario than that we intended to prevent. Nor can we isolate a special class of suboptimal parental choices (including getting a tattoo) we only want to prohibit – for example, those which are an alternative to best options that are also omissions, or, those which irrevocably affect the child’s future life.
A more promising argumentative path to justify the ban, however, can be developed by considering the semiotic properties of a tattoo. By inscribing writing, a design or a symbol on their child’s skin, parents claim the right to speak for her throughout her life, not just during her childhood. But when the child will be a grown woman, her parents’ illocutionary acts will be taken as hers, thus condemning her to be continuously and unpleasantly misread.

Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 2019

Purpose: This study aims to explore whether face recognition technology - as it is intensely empl... more Purpose: This study aims to explore whether face recognition technology - as it is intensely employed by state and local police departments and law enforcement agencies - is racism-free or, on the contrary, is affected by racial biases and/or racist prejudices, thus reinforcing overall racial discrimination.

Design/Methodology/Approach: The study investigates the causal pathways through which face recognition technology may reinforce the racial disproportion in enforcement; it also inquires whether it further discriminates black people by making them experience more racial discrimination, and self-identify more decisively as black - two conditions that are shown to be harmful in various respects.

Findings: This study shows that face recognition technology, as it is produced, implemented and used in Western societies, reinforces existing racial disparities in stop, investigation, arrest and incarceration rates due to racist prejudices, and even contributes to strengthen the unhealthy effects of racism on historically disadvantaged racial groups, like black people.

Practical implications: The findings hope to make law enforcement agencies and software companies aware that they must take adequate action against the racially discriminative effects of the use of face recognition technology.

Social implications: This paper highlights that no implementation of an allegedly racism-free biometric technology is safe from the risk of racially discriminating, simply because each implementation leans against our society, which is affected by racism in many persisting ways.

Originality/Value: While the ethical survey of biometric technologies is traditionally framed in the discourse of universal rights, this study explores an issue that has not been deeply scrutinised so far, that is, how face recognition technology differently affects distinct racial groups, and how it contributes to racial discrimination.

Argumenta, 2021

This paper explores the Persistence Question about cities, that is, what is necessary and suffici... more This paper explores the Persistence Question about cities, that is, what is necessary and sufficient for two cities existing at different times to be numerically identical. We first show that we can possibly put an end to the existence of a city in a number of ways other than by physically destroying it, which reveals the metaphysics of cities to be partly different from that of ordinary objects. Then we focus in particular on the commonly perceived vulnerability of cities to imaginary relocation; and we make the hypothesis that cities do have among their essential properties that of being surrounded by a specific geographical context. Finally we investigate the possibility that a city can survive relocation in virtue of the capacity of its geographical context to survive it in the first place. We suggest that city contexts may not be essentially context-dependent in turn, and outline a possible description of the criteria for their persistence over time.

City, Territory and Architecture, 2018

According to a standard view, architectural works are nothing but material buildings. This paper ... more According to a standard view, architectural works are nothing but material buildings. This paper argues that this is just one of many options, each of which may capture more incisively what architects really produce in different circumstances. Three fundamental splits are examined. First, architectural works can be regarded as either objects or events. Second, they can be understood as mere abstract entities, types, or concrete particulars. Third, they can be identified narrowly or broadly. The resulting combinations are explored and tested against concrete situations. The paper argues that, while adopting the type view in conjunction with the narrow view is simpler when we consider stereotypical, vernacular or modular architecture, when we have to do with more experimental and creative approaches it seems more appropriate to identify the architectural work with a broadly identified concrete particular or, at most, with a broadly identified abstract entity that can hardly coincide with the content of the architectural design. The paper highlights that the same goes—mutatis mutandis—for traditional and stereotypical cooking, on the one hand, and haute cuisine, on the other hand. So the paper is also an investigation of the closeness between architecture and cooking, and of the contingent character of some of their differences.

Southern Semiotic Review, 2024

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 2024

S&F_scienzaefilosofia.it, 2024

Bioetica - Rivista Interdisciplinare, 2023

Argumenta, 2024

Food Ethics, 2023

Giornale di Filosofia, 2022

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2023

Acta Analytica, 2022

Notizie di Politeia, 2022

in Remapping Race in a Global Context, eds. L. Lorusso and R. G. Winther, Routledge, 2022

Bioetica. Rivista Interdisciplinare, 2020

Paradigmi, 2021

Humana.Mente, 2020

Topoi, 2020

Bioetica. Rivista Interdisciplinare, 2020

Notizie di Politeia, 2020

Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 2019

Argumenta, 2021

City, Territory and Architecture, 2018

Mente-corpo: per tanti non è un problema, invece dovrebbe esserlo. Sostenerlo significa vedersela... more Mente-corpo: per tanti non è un problema, invece dovrebbe esserlo. Sostenerlo significa vedersela con le teorie riduzioniste dell'identità - uno stato mentale è identico a uno cerebrale, ovvero la mente altro non è che il corpo - e addirittura le teorie eliminativistiche - la mente non esiste. Significa anche colpire la cieca fede nella scienza, criticare e rifondare discipline: non solo la filosofia, ma anche la nostra medicina ufficiale e riduzionista, e la sociologia dell'emergenza del mentale. Finché il rapporto mente-corpo non ci apparirà più un mistero insoluto, ma un destino cui non si può sfuggire, perché le contraddizioni in cui cade chi vuole eliminare la mente sono davvero ineliminabili.

This volume brings together a number of previously unpublished essays that will advance the reade... more This volume brings together a number of previously unpublished essays that will advance the reader's philosophical understanding of specific aspects of causation, agency and moral responsibility. These are deeply intertwined notions, and a large proportion of the volume is taken up by papers that shed light on their mutual connections or defend certain claims concerning them. This volume investigates several important questions, including: Can causation be perceived? If it can, can it be perceived in any way other than visually? Can the interventionist theory developed by James Woodward offer an adequate account of causation? Is a causal relation a necessary condition for moral responsibility? Can there be a responsibility difference without a causal difference? Are causal ascriptions based on the more primitive language game of blame ascriptions? What can be learnt from the analogy between causal interference and unbreakable processes, on one side, and motivational interferences and "unbreakable" resolutions, on the other side? How can humans be routinely considered responsible for non-deliberated omissions? Should the connection between moral responsibility and the epistemic conditions usually required for moral responsibility to be obtained be weakened? What is the connection between awareness of one's doing and intentional action? These essays constitute a valid contribution towards the discovery of reasonable answers to such deep questions as the metaphysics of causal relations, the epistemology of causal explanations, the interventionist theory of causation, and the relationship among causality and moral responsibility, willpower, agency and intentional action.

Metaphysics and ontology feature among the traditional and fundamental concerns of philosophers. ... more Metaphysics and ontology feature among the traditional and fundamental concerns of philosophers. Gaining a picture of the world and the kind of objects that exist out there is for most philosophers (past and present) a preliminary aim upon which other theoretical activities depend. In fact, it seems that sound conclusions on topics relevant to ethics, aesthetics, psychology, and common and scientific knowledge can be achieved only after one has been given a picture of that sort. What is worth stressing, though, is that from time to time the tribunal of history has managed to put its finger on some flawed conclusions. To take a time-worn example, who would now accept Plato's claim that the spatiotemporal world is just an imperfect copy of a world of abstract objects conceived of as perfect unchanging models of concrete things? The picture Plato gave us is nothing but a myth - an account which is too far away from what common sense and science could accept, too detached from the usual ways of conducting a rational discussion. Therefore, pictures of this kind appear to be supported by nothing but dogmas, i.e. uncompromising principles taken as true without any previous critical analysis. And Plato has no shortage of company. Issues of this kind revolving around metaphysics and ontology are tackled in the essays in this volume, which approach a secular debate in fresh and original ways, providing the necessary tools for clearing the field of unpalatable metaphysical and ontological items.

Although philosophers have been concerned with truth at least since the age of Plato, the last th... more Although philosophers have been concerned with truth at least since the age of Plato, the last thirty years have seen an impressing explosion of the philosophical debate on this topic. The fuse whose burning is at the origin thereof is undoubtedly the Deflationist Renaissance (half a century after the seminal work of Ramsey) due, in the Seventies, to the development of the prosentential theory of truth by D. Groover, J. Kamp and N. Belnap and to the quinean disquotational interpretation of tarskian truth definitions, and, by the second half of the Eighties onwards, to the forceful defences of deflationary conceptions provided by H. Field and P. Horwich. The philosophical struggle on deflationism has been thought-provoking: starting in fact by arguing on the merits and shortcomings of such a conception philosophers have come to broaden and deepen the discussion on truth beyond the boundaries of deflationism. the varieties of problems tackled by the essays in this book and their enlightening insights witness how the land of Truth is still far from having been totally explored and how, in this intellectual endeavour, real progresses can be achieved.