Rachel Barney | University of Toronto (original) (raw)

Address: Toronto, Ontario, Canada

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In a number of dialogues, Plato affirms in various ways that human desire is for the good. In the... more In a number of dialogues, Plato affirms in various ways that human desire is for the good. In the Protagoras, Socrates proposes that "no one who knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better" (358b7-c1). 1 Likewise, "No one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good" (358c6-d2). In the Meno, Socrates argues that no one really desires or wants [epithumein, boulesthai] what is bad (77a-78c). In the Gorgias, he claims that when we act, what we want [boulesthai] is some beneficial outcome; if it does not ensue, then the agent does what seems good to him, or as he sees fit [dokei autô], but not what he wants [bouletai] (466a-468e). Diotima and Socrates agree in the Symposium that the desire [epithumia] for happiness or good things is the supreme love or longing [erôs] in everyone (205d); in fact, "What everyone loves [erôsin] is really nothing other than the good" (205e7-206a1).

How the fine (kalon) is related to the good (agathon) in Plato's thought is a puzzle: we might su... more How the fine (kalon) is related to the good (agathon) in Plato's thought is a puzzle: we might suspect it was a puzzle to Plato himself. 1 In the Meno and Symposium the phrase 'good things' (ta agatha) is substituted for 'fine things' (ta kala) as if the two were equivalent (Men. 77b, Symp. 204d-e, cf. 202c-d); Socrates also gets Agathon to agree that all good things are fine (Symp. 201c). That what is good or beneficial (ôphelimon) is fine is also flatly affirmed in the Lysis, Republic and Timaeus (216d, 457b and 87c respectively). 2 But the converse, that all fine things are good, is argued for only in the First Alcibiades (115a-6a). Within the uncontroversially authentic corpus, it is asserted only in the Protagoras (359e-60b, cf. 358b), and the context here is heavily dialectical and ad hominem --likewise in the Gorgias, when Socrates proposes to Polus that the fine is so by being either good or pleasant (474d-e). In the Hippias Major, the fine is at one point defined as the beneficial (296e-7a); but that definition is refuted. On the other hand, it is refuted by reductio, and the implication which is assumed to be absurd is that the fine is not good, nor the good fine (297c).

In a number of dialogues, Plato affirms in various ways that human desire is for the good. In the... more In a number of dialogues, Plato affirms in various ways that human desire is for the good. In the Protagoras, Socrates proposes that "no one who knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better" (358b7-c1). 1 Likewise, "No one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good" (358c6-d2). In the Meno, Socrates argues that no one really desires or wants [epithumein, boulesthai] what is bad (77a-78c). In the Gorgias, he claims that when we act, what we want [boulesthai] is some beneficial outcome; if it does not ensue, then the agent does what seems good to him, or as he sees fit [dokei autô], but not what he wants [bouletai] (466a-468e). Diotima and Socrates agree in the Symposium that the desire [epithumia] for happiness or good things is the supreme love or longing [erôs] in everyone (205d); in fact, "What everyone loves [erôsin] is really nothing other than the good" (205e7-206a1).

How the fine (kalon) is related to the good (agathon) in Plato's thought is a puzzle: we might su... more How the fine (kalon) is related to the good (agathon) in Plato's thought is a puzzle: we might suspect it was a puzzle to Plato himself. 1 In the Meno and Symposium the phrase 'good things' (ta agatha) is substituted for 'fine things' (ta kala) as if the two were equivalent (Men. 77b, Symp. 204d-e, cf. 202c-d); Socrates also gets Agathon to agree that all good things are fine (Symp. 201c). That what is good or beneficial (ôphelimon) is fine is also flatly affirmed in the Lysis, Republic and Timaeus (216d, 457b and 87c respectively). 2 But the converse, that all fine things are good, is argued for only in the First Alcibiades (115a-6a). Within the uncontroversially authentic corpus, it is asserted only in the Protagoras (359e-60b, cf. 358b), and the context here is heavily dialectical and ad hominem --likewise in the Gorgias, when Socrates proposes to Polus that the fine is so by being either good or pleasant (474d-e). In the Hippias Major, the fine is at one point defined as the beneficial (296e-7a); but that definition is refuted. On the other hand, it is refuted by reductio, and the implication which is assumed to be absurd is that the fine is not good, nor the good fine (297c).

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