Ignacio L . Moya Arriagada | Western University Canada (original) (raw)

Books by Ignacio L . Moya Arriagada

Esta es la introducción, los primeros aforismos (son 103 en total) y dos páginas del ensayo <<Pes... more Esta es la introducción, los primeros aforismos (son 103 en total) y dos páginas del ensayo <<Pesimismo Teleológico>> de mi libro <>. El libro salió en Abril, 2021, editado por RIL editores, Santiago de Chile. Está disponible en librerías y a través del sitio de la editorial, aquí:
https://rileditores.com/tienda/entre-infinitos/
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This is the introduction, the first aphorisms (there are 103 in total) and two pages of the essay "Teleological Pessimism" of my book "Between infinites". The book came out in April, 2021, edited by RIL editores, Santiago de Chile. It is available in bookstores and through the publisher's site, here:
https://rileditores.com/tienda/entre-infinitos/

Este es el prólogo (escrito por Maximiliano Figueroa) y el capítulo I de mi libro <<Pesimismo Pro... more Este es el prólogo (escrito por Maximiliano Figueroa) y el capítulo I de mi libro <>.
El libro salió en Julio, 2018, editado por Librosdementira, Santiago de Chile. Está disponible en librerías y a través del sitio de la editorial, aquí:
http://librosdementira.cl/producto/pesimismo-profundo/

Book Chapters by Ignacio L . Moya Arriagada

La Confianza (im)posible, 2018

Este ensayo está incluido en el libro "La confianza (im)posible" editado por Maximiliano Figueroa... more Este ensayo está incluido en el libro "La confianza (im)posible" editado por Maximiliano Figueroa y Nicole Darat. Yo argumento que la confianza es una condición existencial, no opcional, que revela la interdependencia y la fragilidad de nuestras vidas.

Papers by Ignacio L . Moya Arriagada

The Philosopher, 2024

Pessimism is a highly contested concept. In this paper I present an overview of the ways in which... more Pessimism is a highly contested concept. In this paper I present an overview of the ways in which pessimism is viewed. Then I argue that the original pessimists were the 19th century German philosophers that followed the work of Arthur Schopenhauer. I argue that this pessimism is better conceived of as "Transcendental Pessimism".

Prometeica, 2022

Este artículo es mi reseña del libro que la profesora Sandra Baquedano (Universidad de Chile) ha ... more Este artículo es mi reseña del libro que la profesora Sandra Baquedano (Universidad de Chile) ha publicado recientemente. Este es la primera traducción completa de la <<Filosofía de la redención>> de Philipp Mainländer (Fondo de cultura económica, 2021, 516 PP.) al castellano.

Isegoría. Revista de filosofía moral y política, 2021

Este artículo presenta la hipótesis de que el aburrimiento pudo ser un factor decisivo en el esta... more Este artículo presenta la hipótesis de que el aburrimiento pudo ser un factor decisivo en el estallido social que tuvo lugar en Chile en 2019. La misma se sustenta en otra hipótesis que postula que el aburrimiento puede convertirse en una emoción política capaz de desatar la revolución, cuando afecta a todo un pueblo. El objetivo principal del trabajo es explicar el marco teórico filosófico en el que se inscribe la segunda hipótesis y dar razones de por qué, de ser esta cierta, podría aplicarse al caso concreto de Chile. Primero se esboza una definición inédita del concepto de aburrimiento y se examina la literatura que describe el aburrimiento como una emoción reactiva y política. Después, se desarrolla el contexto sociopolítico chileno de los últimos cuarenta años en busca de factores aislables que puedan ser relacionados con la experiencia del aburrimiento. Finalmente, se presenta una línea de investigación original para testar ambas hipótesis en un proyecto más amplio que pretende poder predecir cuándo un sistema social está al borde del colapso por aburrimiento.

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This paper introduces the hypothesis that boredom may be a decisive factor in the social outbreak that took place in Chile in 2019. It is based on another hypothesis that postulates that boredom can become a political emotion capable of unleashing a revolution when it affects an entire community. The main objective of the work is to explain the theoretical, philosophical framework in which the second hypothesis is inscribed and to give reasons why, if this is true, it could be applied to the specific case of Chile. In this sense, an unpublished definition of the concept of boredom is first outlined and the literature that describes boredom as a reactive and political emotion is examined. Then, the Chilean socio-political context of the last forty years is analyzed in search of isolatable factors that may be related to the experience of boredom. Lastly, an original line of research is proposed on which to work to test both hypotheses in a broader project that aims to be able to predict when a social system is on the verge of collapse because of boredom.

Hénadas - Revista Internacional de Pesimismo Filosófico, 2020

Este ensayo va a aparecer en mi libro "Entre infinitos" que será editado en Chile por RIL editore... more Este ensayo va a aparecer en mi libro "Entre infinitos" que será editado en Chile por RIL editores y en España por editorial Mirahadas.

This essay will appear in my book "Between infinities" that will be published in Chile by RIL editores and in Spain by editorial Mirahadas.
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En este artículo yo divido el pesimismo el filosófico en tres grandes corrientes. El pesimismo metafísico, el pesimismo hedónico y luego introduzco lo que llamo pesimismo teleológico. Este pesimismo sostiene que la vida no tiene un fin (telos) y que esta falta de propósito es una fuente de sufrimiento existencial.

In this essay I divide philosophical pessimism into three main streams. Metaphysical pessimism, hedonic pessimism and what I call teleological pessimism. This latter pessimism that life has no end (telos) and that this is a source of existential suffering.

Intus-Legere Filosofía, Dec 2013

En este trabajo propongo un concepto del Yo que nos permite abordar y solucionar algunos de los p... more En este trabajo propongo un concepto del Yo que nos permite abordar y solucionar algunos de los problemas asociados con la identidad personal diacrónica. Esto es, en virtud de qué podemos considerar que hoy yo soy la misma persona que fui ayer. Este problema de la continuidad en el tiempo de la identidad personal tiene una larga historia en la filosofía analítica. Yo sostengo que la continuidad de la identidad personal en el tiempo se puede garantizar acudiendo al concepto del “yo extendido como centro de gravedad” que aquí presento. Mi argumento central es que una persona individual no conoce ni está en control de su identidad ya que las identidades no dependen de los individuos particulares, sino que siempre se extienden hacia fuera, hacia los otros. Es decir, la continuidad de mi identidad está garantizada por los otros.

In this paper I propose a concept of the self that allows us to address and solve some of the issues associated with problem of diachronic personal identity. That is, by virtue of what can we consider that I am today the same person I was yesterday? The problem of continuity in time of identity has a long history in analytic philosophy. I argue that the continuity of personal identity over time can be ensured by resorting to the concept of "extended self as the center of gravity" presented here. My central argument is that a person does not know and is in control of her personal identity. Identities are not dependent on particular individuals, but always extend outward toward others. Therefore, the continuity of my identity is guaranteed by the others.

Appraisal: The Journal of the Society for Post-Critical and Personalist Studies, Oct 2009

My aim is to explore how the question of personhood is tied to the notion of space--both physical... more My aim is to explore how the question of personhood is tied to the notion of space--both physical and moral space. In particular, I argue against the Cartesian view of the disengaged/disembodied self and in favour of Charles Taylor's and Martin Heidegger's view of the engaged and embedded self. I contend that space, as the transcendental condition for the possibility of human agency, is the place where questions of identity are possible and where answers, if any, are to be found. Thus, personal identity and space are inexorably tied and dependent on one another.

Talks by Ignacio L . Moya Arriagada

This is the document I only used to guide my presentation at the APA, central division conference... more This is the document I only used to guide my presentation at the APA, central division conference - the entire presentation went beyond this. Still, the main point of my presentation was to raise questions in regards to Schopenhauer's views on happiness and happy people in general. Specifically, I brought attention to his claim that happy people had to be left by the will as "decoy-birds".

Schopenhauer claims that all life is wretched and that we are all destined to suffer. Faced with ... more Schopenhauer claims that all life is wretched and that we are all destined to suffer. Faced with such a grim view of life, some scholars hold that Schopenhauer's philosophy should allow for suicide. However, he does not think that suicide is a solution and he does not think that suicide has a place in his overall philosophy. Specifically, he holds that suicide is always a mistake. Given everything Schopenhauer says about life, some scholars think his opposition to suicide is not warranted, that there appears to be some inconsistency between on hand sustaining that life is a torment and, on the other hand, claiming that suicide is no solution. In this paper I defend Schopenhauer's view of suicide against these criticisms and explain why his position is coherent and follows from his overall view of existence.

In this paper I aim to answer the question of what makes us moral? by establishing a necessary co... more In this paper I aim to answer the question of what makes us moral? by establishing a necessary connection between morality and our concept of the self.
Specifically, I propose that morality is dependent on a concept of the self that I call the “Extended self as a centre of gravity”. In essence, my argument is that morality is rooted in the transcendental realization that what we do to others, we also do to ourselves.
I start my argument by elaborating on the concept of the “Extended self as a centre of gravity”. I argue that the self is, to borrow a term from Charles Taylor, dialogical—that is, identity is constructed on the basis of a necessary dialogue with others. The idea of an extended self comes from Andy Clarke’s and David Chalmers paper “The extended mind”. From them I borrow the idea that a person’s skin and skull do not represent a person’s boundaries. In this way, the others are not just separate or estranged others. Rather, the others are constituent parts of the self.
The idea of a self as a centre of gravity was first developed by Daniel Dennett in his essay “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity” and in this paper I borrow the concept of a centre of gravity in order to argue that selves require the presence of physical bodies.
Based on the above thesis, I proceed to elaborate the idea that empathy is not just a connection or an identification that one self has with a distinct and separate other self. I consider emotions. They constitute fundamental parts of our identities and, because my extended self thesis stipulates that our identities are always out there in the world, it follows that our emotions are also out there. Thus, when someone close to us feels painor feels happiness, that pain or happiness is actually happening to us. In other words, we are not simply identifying with an other pain. That other pain is our pain. Recent advances in neuroscience lend credence to the thesis that what happens to others actually happens to us. According to the mirror neuron theory, when a self sees an other self act, certain neurons in the first self (located in the premotor cortex) activate as if the one was not merely watching the actions of that other but was actually carrying them out (a form of covert imitation). When we see another person cry, our mirror neurons activate as if we were crying. This is, the story goes, the origin of empathy. Yet, the claim I make is stronger than this. Because I argue that as selves we are extended, it follows that our feelings of empathy, our moral intuitions and principles are all rooted in the realization that what we do to others, we also do to ourselves—insofar as the others constitute a part of our own selves. This is why we wish to avoid inflicting pain and we seek to act morally.

In this paper I propose a concept of personal identity that offers possible answers to some of th... more In this paper I propose a concept of personal identity that offers possible answers to some of the more pressing questions that arise in the philosophy of personal identity. Where does the self go when a person has Alzheimer’s? When a person has amnesia? While in each of these cases, the person is unable to claim an identity for herself, she continues to be individualized and identified by those around her. What does this tell us about ‘our’ identities? By resorting primarily to David Chalmers, I contend that it is possible to construe a concept of the ‘extended self as a centre of gravity’ that makes it possible to answer the above puzzles. I do this by arguing that a person cannot ‘lose’ her identity because identities are not ‘ours’ to possess or lose.

Interviews/entrevistas by Ignacio L . Moya Arriagada