“Climbing the hierarchical ladders of rules”: A life-cycle theory of institutional evolution (original) (raw)

Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011

This paper surveys alternative approaches to the emergence and evolution of institutions. The challenge is to develop frameworks capable of capturing both stability and change. We follow a "descaling" approach to show how founding assumptions about economics-namely, alternative assumptions about individual rationality and the role of social efficiency-influence our understanding of the drivers of institutional evolution. We then contrast two families of institutional theory. In the first, institutions are viewed as rules imposed on individuals and the focus is on the strategic games among coalitions that aim to promote or block new rules. In the second, institutions are viewed as shared beliefs; here the idea is to analyze how equilibria that are self-enforcing (in terms of mutual expectations about others' behaviors) can collapse and so induce switching to another equilibrium. Finally, we discuss the political economy literature that examines institutional transitions to a market economy, and we identify long-term drivers as well as short-term political barriers to institutional reforms.

HOW DOES GOOD GOVERNANCE COME ABOUT? ON EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS

Economic welfare rests on entrepreneurs, competition, and good governance. All three have a positive effect if embedded in a set of good institutions. Major question here is: how do we get good institutions? The paper concentrates on the example of governance. Good institutions and good governance are not solely the result of discrete policy decisions; as far as beliefs and informal rules are concerned, they are also the result of an evolutionary process of longue durée. The core of the paper is a discussion of evolutionary institutional change. Three theoretical approaches are discussed: the Marx-Schumpeter approach and its neoclassical offsprings, a further extension by the Stanford economists Aoki and Greif, and Hayek's 'spontaneous' evolution. Change at the institutional frontier and imitation or catching up to the institutional frontier seem to be different processes. Why countries fail to catch up constitutes a challenging puzzle, for incumbent institutions show a remarkable persistence. Findings are illustrated by developments in post-socialist transformation.

To what extent do some fundamental concepts of New Institutional Economics help explain the governance phenomenon?

Zarządzanie Publiczne, 2015

ABSTRACT The paper is an attempt to describe synthetically the relationship between the New Institutional Economics theory and the problem of governance research. The undertaking requires, without doubt, an in-depth research and extensive analysis, taking into account the various concepts developed by New Institutional Economics, and above all used to analyze the phenomenon of governance. Of necessity, the present paper is a far incomplete analysis of the problem, but allows one to present the basic commonalities and differences between the logic of economic analysis and its subject – which in this case is governance. For the purpose of this text, we define governance in accordance with the model of network governance as put forward by Leach et al. (2007).

Taking Stock of Institutional Complexity: Anchoring a Pool of Institutional Logics into the Inter-institutional System with a Descendant Hierarchical Analysis

Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 2013

Institutional pluralism is an intriguing phenomenon for institutional scholars. How the balance among logics evolves within a field and what kind of trajectories a set of logics may experience over a long-term period remain unclear. In particular, extant literature tends too often to downplay institutional complexity by focusing on two dominant logics, and to ignore modes of interaction among logics other than competition. In order to address these issues, we offer a novel methodology for measuring institutional complexity—multiple institutional logics and their change. In particular, we highlight the utility of descendent hierarchical classification models, and demonstrate their relevance by analyzing articles published in a leading French trade journal over more than 100 years to study logics related to workplace in the construction industry. We identify a pool of six field-structuring logics over a period of one century; they reveal the composite nature of such logics, which we characterize as combining several higher institutional orders. Additionally, our results bring to light new mechanisms that can explain the composition of institutional logics.

How Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and Institutional Change

Polity, 2012

This article argues that questions of gradual institutional change can be understood as an evolutionary process that can be explained through the careful application of "generalized Darwinism." We argue that humans' advanced cognitive capacities contribute to an evolutionary understanding of institutional change. In constantly generating new variation upon which mechanisms of selection and replication operate, cognition, cognitive schemas, and ideas become central for understanding the building of human institutions, as well as the scope and pace of their evolution. Evolutionary theories thus provide a broad theoretical framework that integrates the study of cognition, ideas, and decision-making with other literatures that focus on institutional change and human evolution.

The Evolution of Institutions: An Agenda for Future

Constitutional Political Economy, 2002

This article reviews some theoretical questions concerning the processes of institutional evolution. The necessity of assuming the prior existence of some other institutions, such as language, is underlined. Arguably, the emergence and stability of some institutions may be enhanced by processes of ‘downward causation’ through which institutional constraints lead to the formation of concordant habits of thought and behaviour. Having

An introduction to the theories of institutional change

Journal of Economics Library, 2018

Institutional change explains the change of institutions considered as rules and expectations that govern human interactions and paths of development in society. This conceptual paper describes, with an historical perspective, the most important definitions of institution and of institutional change and shows some theories that analyze these critical topics in economics to assess similarities and differences. The future challenge of institutional scholars concludes this study.