On blind deference in Open Democracy (original) (raw)
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This short piece discusses Hélène Landemore's proposal of an 'open democracy', as outlined in her recent book Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century. Acknowledging the value of Landemore's radical and ambitious proposals, I draw attention to a number of shortcomings and blind spots that have to do with how the case for an 'open democracy' is made: through an unduly brief and dismissive treatment of political parties; a methodological insensitivity to empirical variations of democratic performance and citizens' evaluations of the latter; a failure to distinguish between higher and ordinary law-making in the discussion of the central Icelandic case; and, finally, a surprising concession that realising an open democracy is all but infeasible in established constitutional democracies. If open democracy is to be an attractive ideal, these issues must arguably be addressed.
Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the 21st Century
On Method 19 2 The Crisis of Representative Democracy 25 The Crisis of Representative Democracy: Empirical 26 The Crisis of Representative Democracy: Conceptual 33 The Road Not Taken 40 The Realists' Objections 44 Con temporary Solutions and Their Limits 47 3 The Myth of Direct Democracy 53 Rousseau's Mistake 56 Repre sen ta tion, Modernity, and the Prob lem of Size 61 The Myth of Classical Athens as a Direct Democracy 66 Direct versus Open 74 4 Legitimacy and Repre sen ta tion beyond Elections (Part One) 79 The Prob lem with Consent Theory 83 Definitions 85 Lottocratic Repre sen ta tion 89 Self-Selected Repre sen ta tion 93 On the Accountability of Non-Elected Demo cratic Representatives 98 Conclusion 104
Deliberative Democracy as Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy
Deliberative democracy is at risk of becoming collateral damage of the current crisis of representative democracy. If deliberative democracy is necessarily representative and if representation betrays the true meaning of democracy as rule of, by, and for the people, then how can deliberative democracy retain any validity as a theory of political legitimacy? Any tight connection between deliberative democracy and representative democracy thus risks making deliberative democracy obsolete: a dated paradigm fit for a precrisis order, but maladjusted to the world of Occupy, the Pirate Party, the Zapatistas, and other anti-representative movements. This essay argues that the problem comes from a particular and historically situated understanding of representative democracy as rule by elected elites. I argue that in order to retain its normative appeal and political relevance, deliberative democracy should dissociate itself from representative democracy thus understood and reinvent itself as the core of a more truly democratic paradigm, which I call " open democracy. " In open democracy, popular rule means the mediated but real exercise of power by ordinary citizens. This new paradigm privileges nonelectoral forms of representation and in it, power is meant to remain constantly inclusive of and accessible–in other words open–to ordinary citizens. The motivating concern for this essay is the impact that the crisis of representative democracy, widely diagnosed by political commentators and democratic theorists alike, has or should have on deliberative democracy as a mainstream theory of democratic legitimacy. To the extent that the fate of deliberative democracy has become intimately intertwined with representative democracy as both a normative paradigm and a set of particular historical institutions, and to the extent that representative democracy is under attack precisely for being representative and keeping ordinary citizens at arm's length of the real site of decision and power, deliberative democrats should be worried about the status of their theory. Deliberative democracy risks becoming collateral damage of the problems currently facing representative democracy.
Social Science Computer Review, 2014
The concept of open government, having been promoted widely in the past 5 years, has promised a broader notion than e-government, as supposed to fundamentally transform governments to become more open and participative and collaborative. Unfortunately, this has not significantly enhanced a set of fundamental problems regarding e-government. One of the problems is that the underlying democratic ideology is rarely clearly expressed. In this paper, we have therefore constructed a framework for the analysis of open government from a democratic perspective, to explore the research foundation of open government and the types of research missing. We have looked closely at the notion of democracy in peer-reviewed journals on open government from 2009 to 2013, focusing on discussions of some fundamental issues regarding democracy and the type of solutions suggested. We have found that despite seemingly good intentions and an extensive rhetoric, there is still an apparent lack of adequate tools in which public deliberation and representation are addressed in any meaningful sense. There are two main important observations herein: (i) the rhetoric in the dominant discourse supports the concept of open government formulated by the Obama administration as transparency, participation, and collaboration, but in practice, the focus is predominantly on transparency and information exchange, while ignoring fundamental democratic issues regarding participation and collaboration, and (ii) the concept of the public is inadequately considered as a homogenous entity rather than a diversified group with different interests, preferences, and abilities.
A militant defence of democracy: A few replies to my critics
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2020
In this essay, I address some questions and challenges brought about by the contributors to this special issue on my book 'Democracy without Shortcuts'. First, I clarify different aspects of my critique of deep pluralist conceptions of democracy to highlight the core incompatibilities with the par-ticipatory conception of deliberative democracy that I defend in the book. Second, I distinguish different senses of the concept of 'blind deference' that I use in the book to clarify several aspects and consequences of my critique of epistocratic conceptions of democracy and their search for 'expertocratic shortcuts'. This in turn helps me briefly address the difficult question of the proper role of experts in a democracy. Third, I address potential uses of empowered minipublics that I did not discuss in the book and highlight some reasons to worry about their lack of accountability. This discussion in turn leads me to address the difficult question of which institutions are best suited to represent the transgenerational collective people who are supposed to own a constitutional project. Finally, I address some interesting suggestions for how to move the book's project forward.
Maeckelbergh, M. 2013. “What Comes After Democracy?” Open Citizenship 3(1): 74-79.
Open Citizenship 4(1): 74-79, 2013
The current financial crisis highlights two trends that offer some indication of what post-democracy might look like. The first trend – authoritarian repression – is characterised by increased acceptability of far-right ideologies and pre-emptive, militarised policing, both of which make protest more dangerous. The second trend, by contrast, involves the refusal of many social movements to express their demands through traditional democratic channels, such as elected representatives and referenda. These movements have designed elaborate decision-making procedures that promote a form of radical equality dubbed horizontality, which is viewed by many participants as a potential replacement for political systems based on representation and electoral politics.
‘The Democratic Paradigm: A Vanishing Act?’
Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation, 2016
The premise of this issue of the journal is that in western secular democracies the principles underlying the democratic paradigm at the national level are not in any serious doubt. It is this presumption that I wish to address. This paper will assert that the citizen is no longer at the heart of the democratic process. Using the example of the UK, I will argue that this is a consequence of the representative nature of liberal democracy which conceptualises citizenship as a legal status, giving citizens protection of the law rather than participating in its formulation or execution as in the civic republican model. Liberal democracy not only eschews greater political participation, it does not prepare citizens for it. There currently exists a democratic deficit at local and national level which is leading to a decline in active citizenship. Therefore any attempt to democratise globalisation without addressing the weakening of national democracies will simply lead to the current poli...
Mind the Gap: Three Models of Democracy, One Missing; Two Political Paradigms, One Dwindling
Contemp Polit Theory, 2007
The article revisits two basic questions of political theory posed by Jon Elster. First, should the political process be defined as private or public, and second, should its purpose be understood instrumentally or intrinsically? Having posed these questions, Elster arrives at three views of politics: social choice (private, instrumental), republican (public, intrinsic) and discourse theory (public, instrumental). I argue for a fourth view (private, intrinsic), and explain Elster's omission of this model by referring to his underlying paradigm of politics, that is, as will formation. The main thesis in Elster's article is about whether the process of will formation should be relegated to the market mechanism or dealt with via deliberative forums. I reject this paradigm and argue instead for politics as jurisdiction. This notion of politics is concerned with the question of how both market and forum processes of will formation should be institutionalized. Defining politics as jurisdiction strongly improves the plausibility of the missing fourth model of democratic will formation, as a depiction of democratic will formation as private in its process and intrinsic in its purpose illustrates the importance of distinguishing between two levels of democracy: namely, the civil level of will formation and the political level of jurisdiction.
2016
Acknowledgements v Contents vii List of Tables xi List of Diagrams xv 1. Democratic theory and internationalisation in Europe 1 2. A dogma of political inclusiveness and autonomy 53 3. Political autonomy during internationalisation 73 4. Deliberation during internationalisation 5. Participation during internationalisation 6. A dogma of delegation and alienation of authority 7. Comparing national and international democracy 8. Adapting democratic theory to internationalisation References Appendices Dissertation series v Acknowledgements Some time ago, in a hot and airless archive of despairingly little interest to my research, I remember planning to use this page not mainly for acknowledging the contributions of those who helped me to start and bring this project to an end, but rather to give the full details of those institutions and persons who had succeeded in substantially delaying the progression of my work. Now, at a secure distance from fruitless archive sessions, I cannot remember any of those sarcastic formulations that I prepared and meditated on for quite some time-and instead I find myself with nothing but a strong wish to express my most sincere gratitude to all those other persons who have generously shared their knowledge with me. If this sudden feeling of reconciliation has anything to do with a thesis being finished, the following persons, among others, helped me to do so and, more importantly, to get a moment's peace of mind. It has been a great pleasure, and a great intellectual asset, to be supervised by Kjell Goldmann. The Seminars on Internationalisation and European Politics at the Stockholm Department of Political Science that he chaired for some years together with Ulrika Mörth-who inspired an early formulation of what was to become my research problem-provided a venue in which I benefited from thoughtful comments by