The Substantivalist View of Spacetime Proposed by Minkowski and Its Educational Implications (original) (raw)
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Substantivalism, relationism, and structural spacetime realism
Foundations of Physics, 2000
A historian of 20 th century philosophy of science that were to consider the recent renaissance of studies on the ontological status of spacetime would certainly notice a significant shift of interest toward metaphysical issues previously scorned by neopositivists philosophers. 2 Some philosophers more inclined toward historical analysis have complained about the audacious tendency of some contemporary philosophers of space and time to portray Newton and Leibniz (see Alexander 1956) as defenders of views that, like substantivalism and relationism, do not always represent in an accurate way the positions really taken by these historical figures (see . However, worse than such moderate forms of "interpretive violence" perpetrated on 17 th century natural philosophers -which in any case are not motivated by unfair attempts to add significance to one's pet philosophical problem by ennobling its historical pedigree -is the fact that the current participants to the debate don't even seem to agree about how to formulate "spacetime substantivalism" 3 within the fundamental spacetime theory of contemporary physics, the general theory of relativity. For example, it is not clear whether one should identify spacetime with the bare manifold or with the metric field. As is often the case when there is no agreement even about the nature of the problem, there is a natural tendency to affirm that 1 I want to thank Robert Rynasiewicz and Robert DiSalle for having read a previous version of this paper and having helped to remove some of my misinterpretations of their views. I am the only responsible for the remaining mistakes. 2 Such foundational studies were revived in the late eighties by the so-called "hole argument" due to John for discussions of the philosophical and metaphysical issues. The tendency to misrepresent Leibniz and Newton as defenders of relationism and substantivalism respectively was decisively more present in the philosophy of space and time of the first part of the century, and especially in Reichenbach.
The Adolescence of Relativity: Einstein, Minkowski, and the Philosophy of Space and Time
Springer eBooks, 2009
An often repeated account of the genesis of special relativity tells us that relativity theory was to a considerable extent the fruit of an operationalist philosophy of science. Indeed, Einstein's 1905 paper stresses the importance of rods and clocks for giving concrete physical content to spatial and temporal notions. I argue, however, that it would be a mistake to read too much into this. Einstein's operationalist remarks should be seen as serving rhetoric purposes rather than as attempts to promulgate a particular philosophical position-in fact, Einstein never came close to operationalism in any of his philosophical writings. By focussing on what could actually be measured with rods and clocks Einstein shed doubt on the empirical status of a number of pre-relativistic concepts, with the intention to persuade his readers that the applicability of these concepts was not obvious. This rhetoric manoeuvre has not always been rightly appreciated in the philosophy of physics. Thus, the influence of operationalist misinterpretations, according to which associated operations strictly define what a concept means, can still be felt in present-day discussions about the conventionality of simultaneity. The standard story continues by pointing out that Minkowski in 1908 supplanted Einstein's approach with a realist spacetime account that has no room for a foundational role of rods and clocks: relativity theory became a description of a four-dimensional "absolute world." As it turns out, however, it is not at all clear that Minkowski was proposing a substantivalist position with respect to spacetime. On the contrary, it seems that from a philosophical point of view Minkowski's general position was not very unlike the one in the back of Einstein's mind. However, in Minkowski's formulation of special relativity it becomes more explicit that the content of spatiotemporal concepts relates to considerations about the form of physical laws. If accepted, this position has important consequences for the discussion about the conventionality of simultaneity.
Spacetime weltanschauung: a reconstruction of Minkowski’s and Einstein's worldviews
The goal of the present paper is to reconstruct the history of Minkowski spacetime, focusing on the specific understanding that Minkowski had of his own model in the context of his worldview. To achieve it, we will first take a look at Minkowski’s personal academic history. By exploring his scientific development, certain key elements in his approach to mathematics and physics will be highlighted, so that his worldview is put into perspective and supported by evidence. Afterwards, a brief summary of Einstein’s work on special relativity is presented, with the aim to speculate on Einstein’s own way of interpreting spacetime. This will also set up the foundation for a comparison with Minkowski. Then, we will analyze the main lectures through which Minkowski presented his geometric model of spacetime to the German scientific community, focusing especially on Raum und Zeit. Here, Minkowski’s worldview is further articulated. Last but not least, we will endorse that, despite Minkowski’s work becoming crucial for Einstein and Einstein's interpretation of spacetime most likely growing closer to Minkowski's, the two scientists ultimately shared crucial differences in weltanschauung.
On the ontology of spacetime: Substantivalism, relationism, eternalism, and emergence
I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities (timeless and spaceless ‘events’). Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views.
General relativity and the epistemology of space and time: a relational approach
2017
The text proposes some directions of research, as based on previous works made by the author. Our purpose is to discuss the contribution of general relativity to the epistemology of space and time, in the context of a relational, and not substantial, rationality. General relativity brings us the important idea (of a relational nature) that space and time do not constitute a scene external to phenomena, but that, on the contrary, the phenomena themselves, in the first place the phenomenon of gravitation, are responsible for assessing the corresponding variables. However, this contribution does not make us progress on the "mystery" of time, that remains conceptually separated from space, even though, since the relativity theory, the values of space and time variables are related. Encouraged by general relativity, we must go further and express more strongly the link between the concepts of space and time, and their identity of substance. The relational approach must extend t...
Routledge eBooks, 2022
The questions of what represents space-time in GR, the status of gravitational energy, the substantivalist-relationalist issue, and the (non-)exceptional status of gravity are interrelated. If space-time has energy-momentum, then space-time is substantival. Two extant ways to avoid the substantivalist conclusion deny that the energybearing metric is part of space-time or deny that gravitational energy exists. Feynman linked doubts about gravitational energy to GRexceptionalism, as do Curiel and Duerr; particle physics egalitarianism encourages realism about gravitational energy.
Should we be Substantivalists or Relationalists about Spacetime in light of Contemporary Physics?
As a first pass, substantivalism about spacetime is the view that that space and time exist as fundamental entities, independently from and in addition to the matterorfields that populate them. Relationalism about spacetime states that space and time are (ultimately) emergent from or dependent upon other physical entities; such that facts about space and time are exhausted or fixed by the arrangement of matter. I very briefly elaborate on these competing views by situating them in their historical context. I then, in very sketchy terms, try to show that no clear distinction between the two views survives in modern physics. I suggest the dispute becomes a matter of linguistic convention.
In search of (spacetime) structuralism
Philosophical Perspectives, 2011
The debate between substantivalists and relationists about spacetime was given a new lease of life twenty years ago, when John Earman and John Norton published an argument for the conclusion that, in the light of general relativity, substantivalism is untenable. Responses to Earman and Norton's argument generated a proliferation of 'substantivalisms', and a debate between them that was, to the ears of at least some, distinctively metaphysical in character.