Substantivalism, relationism, and structural spacetime realism (original) (raw)

On the ontology of spacetime: Substantivalism, relationism, eternalism, and emergence

I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities (timeless and spaceless ‘events’). Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views.

In search of (spacetime) structuralism

Philosophical Perspectives, 2011

The debate between substantivalists and relationists about spacetime was given a new lease of life twenty years ago, when John Earman and John Norton published an argument for the conclusion that, in the light of general relativity, substantivalism is untenable. Responses to Earman and Norton's argument generated a proliferation of 'substantivalisms', and a debate between them that was, to the ears of at least some, distinctively metaphysical in character.

The Substantivalist View of Spacetime Proposed by Minkowski and Its Educational Implications

The geometrical interpretation of general relativity provides the formalism with intuitive imagery (Chandler 1994). Such an interpretation often presupposes a substantival space: a space taken to be a real entity whose existence is independent of the matter contained. Nowadays an image of space-container seems to have wide acceptance among physicists. Special relativity is, however, usually still taught as the theory which overthrew Newton’s absolute concepts (among which is the idea of a space-container). This inconsistency is considered here. Special relativity can also be interpreted substantivally, as Minkowski did in 1908. His substantivalism is the key to laying out an internally coherent substantivalist line running from Newtonian mechanics to general relativity. Another plausible interpretative line, namely the ‘relationist line’, will be mentioned. It will allow us to conclude with remarks concerning the cultural and educational implications of a consistent interpretative apparatus organised in several interpretative lines.

Radical Structural Essentialism for the Spacetime Substantivalist

The Foundation of Reality: Fundamentality, Space, Time, 2020

Spacetime substantivalists insist that spatiotemporal points are fundamental entities and thus are ontologically independent from the physical objects occupying these points. In this essay I argue that the best metaphysical option for the substantivalist is to adopt a radical version of structural essentialism, according to which participation in a certain relational structure is both a necessary and sufficient condition of identity for the elements characterized by this structure. I compare my proposed variant of essentialism with some alternative conceptions, such as Tim Maudlin’s metric essentialism and David Glick’s Minimal Structural Essentialism. I discuss how my Radical Structural Essentialism deals with the challenge of the hole argument as well as some less well-known challenges, such as the problem of contingent counterfactuals regarding the material contents of spacetime, and the ‘mole’ argument. Later I explain why the structure consisting of the metric tensor is a genuinely relational structure, and I defend the claim that in order to preserve the identity of its elements the actual structure may be merely embeddable in (and not necessarily isomorphic with) an alternative structure.

Should we be Substantivalists or Relationalists about Spacetime in light of Contemporary Physics?

As a first pass, substantivalism about spacetime is the view that that space and time exist as fundamental entities, independently from and in addition to the matterorfields that populate them. Relationalism about spacetime states that space and time are (ultimately) emergent from or dependent upon other physical entities; such that facts about space and time are exhausted or fixed by the arrangement of matter. I very briefly elaborate on these competing views by situating them in their historical context. I then, in very sketchy terms, try to show that no clear distinction between the two views survives in modern physics. I suggest the dispute becomes a matter of linguistic convention.

Space and Time as Relations: The Theoretical Approach of Leibniz

Philosophies, 2018

The epistemological rupture of Copernicus, the laws of planetary motions of Kepler, the comprehensive physical observations of Galileo and Huygens, the conception of relativity, and the physical theory of Newton were components of an extremely fertile and influential cognitive environment that prompted the restless Leibniz to shape an innovative theory of space and time. This theory expressed some of the concerns and intuitions of the scientific community of the seventeenth century, in particular the scientific group of the Academy of Sciences of Paris, but remained relatively unknown until the twentieth century. After Einstein, however, the relational theory of Leibniz gained wider respect and fame. The aim of this article is to explain how Leibniz foresaw relativity, through his critique of contemporary mechanistic philosophy.

Newton and Leibniz on Non-Substantival Space (2005)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton's conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. I shall offer a definite characterization of Leibniz and Newton's conceptions of space. I will show that, according to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantival. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations.

Newton and Leibniz on Non-substantival Space

Theoria an International Journal For Theory History and Foundations of Science, 2005

The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton's conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. I shall offer a definite characterization of Leibniz and Newton's conceptions of space. I will show that, according to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantival. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations.