The mind-body problem and “mental illness” (original) (raw)
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Given that psychiatry is the area of medicine devoted to mental disorders, it is crucial for psychiatry to have a viable understanding of the nature of mental states. However, the nature of mental states has been a persistent source of controversy throughout history to the present day, with no clear agreement in sight among the contemporary philosophers and scientists engaged in the topic. This puts psychiatry in a difficult position. If psychiatrists are to diagnose and treat mental disorders, the lack of agreement concerning our basic understanding of mental states appears to be a significant barrier to effective procedures and results. Fortunately, there is a way to situate psychiatry in a functional position here despite the lack of agreement across viewpoints concerning its basic domain. Rather than enlisting in the battle over the nature of mental states, seeking to nail down a single theory or explanation for itself, psychiatry can instead take advantage of the plurality of available viewpoints and apply them as best fits its aims. The goal of this article is to establish a philosophical basis for this approach in psychiatry, utilizing what is known as the biopsychosocial model of medicine. As its name suggests, the biopsychosocial model is a pluralistic approach to disease and health that integrates multiple modes of explanation, diagnosis, and treatment, rather than solely privileging any one perspective over others. To be clear, this does not mean that " anything goes, " such that any perspective or theory of mental states is as good as another. Rather, it is the recognition that mental states and their various properties are exceedingly complex and thus should be approached from multiple angles rather than just one, with those various angles still being held to reasonable expectations of accuracy and demonstrable success. To make a case for the biopsychosocial model in psychiatry, I will first survey the main philosophical views of the mind, taking a look at what is known as the mind-body problem in philosophy. This will enable us to see the main contending options for understanding the nature of mental states, as things stand today in both philosophy and the sciences of the mind. As we will see, much of the debate comes down to whether or not mental states are brain states. I will then argue that even if mental states are brain states, this does not privilege one single mode of explanation over others. Instead, following the biopsychosocial model, brain states exist within an overlapping matrix of underlying mechanisms, cognitive functions, and social behaviors, such that these factors must be integrated together to effectively understand and address mental disorders in psychiatry.
The Mind-Body Problem: A Critical Discussion
The Mind-Body Problem: A Critical Discussion, 2020
The mind-body problem is a philosophical dilemma that concerns the relationship between the mind and body of humans (Garcia-Albea, 2018). This question arises when the mind is viewed as a metaphysical construct, separate from the body in its entirety (Descartes, 1953). Theories ranging from the early Greeks philosophers to modern day neuroscientists aim to show how the mind works in tandem with the physical body and if they are indeed separate entities. This mind-body problem was first defined by Descartes (1953), as the relationship between the immaterial, thinking mind and the material, non-thinking and reactionary body. However, this concept was debated long before Descartes’s (1953) theory, with the likes of Aristotle and Plato both proposing that the mind and body are comprised of two entirely separate entities. This thesis will discuss the development of the mind-body problem as well as its comparison to other theories and disciplines, such as the neuroscientific approach and functionalism (Brysbaert & Rastle, 2013).
How do our mental states relate to the physical states of our body? Do our mental states arise from the physical processes of our body? Is it really the case that some of our actions are caused by our mental states such as our intentions and desires? Is there a significant difference between a physical state causing another physical state say the cutting of our skin causing the bleeding of our skin, and a mental state causing a physical state say desiring to raise our arm causing the rising of our arm? If we believe that there are such things as mental states that are over and above the physical states of our body then it is important to know how they relate to the physical states of our body. The investigation of the various philosophical issues connected to the relation between mind and body, or between our mental states (and processes) and bodily states (and processes), is the primary concern of what has been called in philosophy as the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem, as can be gleaned from the discussions of philosophers on this problem, has the following two types. The first concerns the ontological (or existential) relation between mind and body, where the inquiry focuses on how the existence of the mental states relates to the existence of bodily states-or the physical states of the body. I shall call this type of mind-body problem as the ontological mind-body problem. The second one, on the other hand, concerns the causal relation between mental states and bodily states, where the inquiry focuses on whether there is a causal relation between these two types of states, and if there is, on what type of causal relation is at work therein. I shall call this type of mind-body problem as the causal mind-body problem. In this essay, I examine the various solutions proposed by philosophers to the mind-body problem both in its ontological and causal form.
Psychiatry and Questions about Minds
In this paper I examine Thomas Szasz’s claim that mental illness is only metaphorically an illness, not literally one. In doing so I consider the crucial distinction between the literal and metaphorical uses of language. I pay special attention to the various uses of the word ‘mental’ and how each affects our conception of what we mean by ‘mental illness.’ Finally, I offer a defence of Szasz’s position by way of arguments which differ from those offered by Szasz himself.
Whose Illness? Man, Mind, and Mental Illness
Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Convention of the AISB, 2014
This paper argues that the conceptions of man and of mental illness are inter-linked, and that it is not possible to reconceptualize one without the other. In order to understand the understanding of man underlying biological psychiatry, this paper traces two inter-linked historical developments: first, that of the gradual disappearance of the patient from the production of medical knowledge, and second, that of how reductionist approaches in biological psychiatry have further neglected to place personhood in medical cosmologies. To illustrate this, first-person reports of the subjective experience of depression are given due consideration, as well as examples from applications of DBS. It is our conclusion that the personhood of the patient has to be reinstated, in a form of personal realism, thereby altering the modern modes of production of medical knowledge.
Organon F
Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one-viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory-is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical status of the mind.
A dialogue concerning the mind-body problem
2019
Three monist views on the mind-body problem are presented. Triple-aspect monism considers that there are three main phases of actualization of the potentialities in Nature: the physical, the informational, and the conscious. The double-face view assumes that conscious mind and brain are irreducible to each other, stressing not only that the conscious mind is dependent on the brain, but that changes in the brain are also dependent on the conscious mind. Qualitative physicalism adopts the mindbrain identity thesis, and defends the view that subjective qualia are actual physical attributes of some region of the brain.