On bounds for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament (original) (raw)
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This quantitative analysis deals with the issue of the apportionment of seats in the European Parliament amongst the 28 Member States and its goal is to quantify the existing principle for allocating the EP seats, the so-called principle of degressive proportionality provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 14 (2) of the Treaty on European Union. The analysis employs quantitative tools commonly used in electoral analysis for measuring disproportionality of electoral rules (the discrepancy between seats and votes). At the individual (Member State) level, the paper finds both the value of a vote (the average size of population per seat) and how much each of the Member States overrepresented or underrepresented (by the advantage ratio measure). At the aggregate level for the whole European Parliament representation, the value of malapportionment is measured by the distortion index created by Loosemore and Hanby (1971), as it was earlier suggested as a suitable strategy for measuring malapportionment by Samuels and Snyder (1991).
Microcosms and macrocosms: Seat allocation in proportional representation systems
Theory and Decision, 1988
Three alternative methods are proposed to determine a normative standard concerning the fair proportion of seats a party ought to receive in a representative assembly as a function of the voters' preference orderings. The methods differ from one another in their treatment of indifference relations and the assumptions they make about the type of scale underlying voters' preferences. Common to all three methods is the basic idea that the ratio between the number of voters preferring party i over j to the number of voters preferring party j over i can be tested for consistency, in a precisely defined sense, and if sufficiently consistent, can be appropriately scaled to determine the proportion of seats each party ought to receive. The proposed solutions are shown to satisfy several desiderata when the matrix of preference ratios is consistent. When there are cyclical majorities of equal size, the matrix of preference ratios is inconsistent. The main application of the proposed scheme is as a normative benchmark against which actual or proposed voting procedures can be evaluated in proportional representation systems. The theoretical implications of these solutions are briefly discussed.
European Studies
Summary Modern democratic political systems are hardly conceivable without political representation. This also applies to the political system of the EU, and namely the European Parliament. The EP has undergone several changes over time, including changes in its composition. The case study addresses the composition of the EP from the historical perspective. It investigates the origins of the EP’s composition, reapportionment strategies chosen and their effects on malapportionment of the EP seats. When changing the EP’s composition, the accommodation, expansionary and redistributive modes can be distinguished. While the accommodation mode is closely linked to the processes of enlargement, the expansionary and redistributive modes follow both enlargements and institutional reforms. The redistribution mode may be the strategy for the maintenance of malapportionment while the expansionary mode is a way to reduce the disproportionality of seat allocation among Member States in the contex...
A 700-seat no-loss composition for the 2019 European Parliament
arXiv (Cornell University), 2017
The following paper is part of the authors' response to an invitation from the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) of the European Parliament to advise on mathematical methods for the allocation of Parliamentary seats between the 27 Member States following the planned departure of the United Kingdom in 2019. The authors were requested to propose a method that respects the usual conditions of EU law, and with the additional property that no Member State (other than the UK) receives fewer that its 2014 allocation. This paper was delivered to the AFCO on
Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective
European Journal of Political Research, 1997
The paper offers a macroscopic view of the legislative electoral formulas in force in 166 sovereign countries, whether democratic or not. The purpose is to determine which formulas are the most widespread, and whether the prevalence of a formula is correlated with geographical, historical, economic, and political factors. While plurality and PR systems are equally frequent, the former tend to be found in more populated countries. PR prevails in Europe and South America, and among the most democratic countries, while the plurality rule is more typical of Asia, Africa, and North America, and is especially popular among former British colonies. Large countries are more likely to opt for single-member districts. No significant correlation emerges between the level of economic development or French colonial background and any electoral formula. The study suggests that the selection of an electoral system is not merely the outcome of party interest, but is also strongly influenced by ideas about what is good, just, or efficient.
US vs. European Apportionment Practices: The Conflict between Monotonicity and Proportionality
2017
To ensure equal representation, the voting districts of a country must be more or less of the same size. Designing such voting districts, however, is not an easy task due to the fact that voting districts are encompassed in administrative regions. Since the respective share of an administrative region, i.e.\ the number of seats its entitled to based on its population, is not necessarily an integer number, it is hard to distribute the seats in a fair way. The arising fair distribution problem is called the apportionment problem. Proportionality of the allocation is the most important, but not the only factor of a fair solution. Monotonicity related difficulties, administrative and demographic issues make the problem more complex. We provide an overview of the classical apportionment methods as well as the Leximin Method – a new apportionment technique designed to comply with the recommendation made by the Venice Commission. We discuss the properties of apportionments and test the mos...
Electoral Studies, 2009
Analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament ''fragmentation'' and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens' freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens' freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district magnitude and electoral formulas. Using data from 26 countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters' freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.