The Asia-Pacific Scramble and a 'Larger Australia' (original) (raw)
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A ustralia's geostrategic advantage is increasingly compromised by its need to catch the fast-sailing Asian economic ships. Comprehensive ties with nations in the Asia-Pacific are also reshaping its national identity , as well as its perceptions of what constitutes the national interest. How to handle the military rise of China that will inevitably alter the security order of the region, while its economy is so tied up with the rising giant, poses a serious and inescapable challenge. This chapter examines Australia's current defence posture and strategic traditions in the context of China's growing power projection, the Asian pivot of the US, and the role of Japan and the rise of multiple Asian middle powers, in order to shed light on some 'middle-of-the-road' options for Australia. The first section examines how Australia approaches its national interest; special attention is paid to the role of national identity in shaping the perception of the national interest and the resulting strategic tradition. The second section outlines the changing strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific and examines how well Australia's strategic tradition serves its changing national interest. It also diagnoses the resulting 'bipolar dis-order' from which Australia is suffering as its political (security) interests and economic interests are pulling the nation in different directions. The final section weighs up the options available to Australia and recommends a new role and a new identity for Australia in the Asia-Pacific region.
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