Fukushima: Probing the analytical and epistemological limits of risk analysis (original) (raw)
Related papers
CSS Analysis No. 104: Fukushima and the Limits of Risk Analysis
Risk analyses serve to identify future opportunities and risks systematically and thus make them calculable and manageable. Today, risk analysis is applied in an increasing number of policy fields, including in security policy. Catastrophes such as the Fukushima disaster raise questions about the limits of this approach, however. In view of difficulties regarding integration of the probability aspect, regarding risk compilation, and regarding its explanatory power, a differentiated application of the risk analysis methodology is advisable. For French and German versions of this analysis, please go to: http://www.css.ethz.ch/policy\_consultancy/topics\_INT/DetailansichtPubDB\_EN?rec\_id=1529
In this study, the question of whether or not the occurrence of the Fukushima nuclear disaster is ascribable to the accumulation of manufactured risk factors was addressed. In order to construct a plausible argument, this study considers the potential applications of Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis and green criminology theory as a theoretical foundation. This study paid explicit attention to three key issues surrounding the nuclear accident; namely, whether or not the scale of the tsunami that hit the facility was predictable from a scientific standpoint, whether or not Tokyo Electric Power Company was actively and intentionally engaged in the cover-up or the manipulation of the information regarding the extent of the damage in the facility and whether or not the relevant external regulatory bodies had appropriately monitored the company’s operations. Based on the evidence presented in the post-accident investigation reports and other relevant scholarly articles, it was determined that the fundamental cause of the accident is attributable to the plant operator’s reckless accumulation of manufactured risk factors. Contrary to the conclusion presented in TEPCO’s interim report, the evidence suggests that its imprudent corporate governance and exiguous risk mitigation planning were indeed the root causes of the accident, along with a number of vestiges of gross misconduct, negligence, organisational corruption and the systematic cover-up operations undertaken with its regulatory agencies. Based on the findings presented in the post-accident investigation reports, this study also considered the necessity of introducing a new criminological theory entitled ‘nuclear risk criminology’. Identical to an environmental justice-based approach, nuclear risk criminology can be utilised in defining a manufactured risk produced by the nuclear power industry as a new form of environmental harm and establishing a causal connection between nuclear operators’ conduct and nuclear hazards based on scientific risk calculation methods.
Fukushima, Tsunamis and Earthquakes: The Meanings of Risk in the 21st Century
2014
On 11 March 2011, an earthquake of a 9.0 magnitude and the consequent tsunami destroyed Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant. Known as 3/11 in Japan, the effects of this triple disaster will continue for decades. How did the media covering the catastrophe articulate issues of risk to the general public? This article is a textual analysis of accounts about the Fukushima disaster published between 11 March 2011 and 11 March 2013 in four of the most prominent media outlets in the United States. In particular, the analysis explores the practices through which these US media constructed the presence and meaning of public health risks resulting from the nuclear meltdown. The article illustrates how systematic media practices minimized the presence of health risks, contributed to misinformation, and exacerbated uncertainties. In the process, the study demonstrates how the media created vernacular epistemologies for understanding and evaluating the health risks posed by nuclear radiation. The article concludes by weighing the implications of the vernacular epistemologies deployed by media.
Regulation & Governance, 2013
This paper reflects on the credibility of nuclear risk assessment in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima meltdowns. In democratic states, policymaking around nuclear energy has long been premised on an understanding that experts can objectively and accurately calculate the probability of cata- strophic accidents. Yet the Fukushima disaster lends credence to the substantial body of social science research that suggests such calculations are fundamentally unworkable. Nevertheless, the credibility of these assessments appears to have survived the disaster, just as it has resisted the evidence of previous nuclear accidents. This paper looks at why. It argues that public narratives of the Fukushima disaster invariably frame it in ways that allow risk-assessment experts to “disown” it. It concludes that although these narratives are both rhetorically compelling and highly conse- quential to the governance of nuclear power, they are not entirely credible.