CSS Analysis No. 104: Fukushima and the Limits of Risk Analysis (original) (raw)
Related papers
2012
The Fukushima catastrophe tragically epitomizes the limitations of dealing with natural and technical hazards. Remarkably yet, authorities’ review of the catastrophe continue to be limited to mistakes and responsibilities of practical risk management. Although state regulations are questioned, technical protection measures verified, and disaster management processes optimized, no deeper discussion about the actual analytical limits of risk analysis has been engaged thus far. What can risk analyses address and what remains beyond their scope? How trustworthy can risk analyses be, and what kind of statements about the future can they actually formulate? This article examines these broader analytical and epistemological boundaries of risk analysis. Drawing on cases of international nuclear risk management, it tests and problematises how the definition of risk, the methodology of their registration, and the interpretation of results are reaching their limitations in contemporary risk analysis. Following this critical discussion of risk analysis, the article draws conclusions concerning the usefulness and necessity of a differentiated and informed discourse on the potential and the limitations of the risk analysis method, an approach which today enjoys increasing popularity in a variety of policy sectors ranging from critical infrastructure protection to national and international security.
Probabilistic risk assessment practices in the USA for nuclear power plants
Safety Science, 2002
It is clear that probabilistic risk assessment or probabilistic safety assessment is embedded in the safety culture of the nuclear power industry, worldwide. Risk assessment applications are in transition in the sense that the regulatory apparatus is not yet in place, at least in the United States of America (USA), to fully support a risk-based licensing process. There is progress on the regulatory front, but it is tedious and not without its frustrations. Currently, the strategy in the USA is a “risk-informed” approach that tends to be “business as usual”, but while you're at it, “do a risk assessment”. The result is added burden (and costs) at a time of increased competition in the power field as a result of deregulation. There is hope in that some steps are finally being taken to modify the regulations to allow risk assessment to be more of a part of the licensing process. For example, the regulations having to do with maintenance, plant changes, and technical specifications have been modified to allow insights from risk assessment to be part of the basis for licensing amendments. On the matter of standards there is strong support that is scientifically based and addresses such issues as health effects and environmental impacts. There appears to be less support for standards on such matters as definition of terms, methodology, and data requirements.
Brazilian Journal of Radiation Sciences, 2021
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan in 2011 has raised public fears about the actual safety of nuclear power plants in several countries. The response to this concern by government agencies and private companies has been objective and pragmatic in order to guarantee best practices in the several phases of nuclear reactors. In countries where the nucleo-electric matrix is consolidated, such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom, the safety assessment is carried out considering deterministic and probabilistic criteria. In the licensing stages of new projects, it is necessary to analyze and simulate the behavior of the nuclear power plant, when subjected to conditions that can lead to sequences of accidents. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is fundamental in this process, as it studies in depth the sequences of events that can lead to damage to the reactor core. Such sequences should be quantified in terms of probability of occurrence and your possible co...