Introduction: The Hiddenness of God (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Problem of Divine Hiddenness
Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2013
“The Problem of Divine Hiddenness” is an infelicitous phrase for two reasons. First, while it suggests that God both exists and hides, this phrase actually refers to a strategy of arguing that various forms of nonbelief in God constitute evidence for God’s nonexistence. Second, it suggests that there is only one problem for theistic belief here, while in fact this phrase refers to a family of arguments for atheism. This entry focuses on contemporary arguments from nonbelief to atheism. The most important of these is defended by J. L. Schellenberg. Schellenberg claims that a loving God would ensure that there is no reasonable or inculpable nonbelief in his existence, since this belief is required for human beings to enter into a relationship with God, and since (according to theism) having such a relationship with creatures is a great good, and indeed is one of God’s most important goals. But, Schellenberg argues, since such nonbelief occurs among those capable of belief in God, theism should be rejected. The citations collected under General Overviews, external link all concern Schellenberg’s argument. Other authors have independently constructed different arguments from nonbelief to atheism, and these are surveyed under Other Arguments from Nonbelief, external link. The final five sections of this bibliography survey responses to arguments from hiddenness to atheism. Most of this literature explicitly concerns Schellenberg’s argument, but many of these replies could also be directed against the other arguments surveyed here. There are important connections between the problem of divine hiddenness and the problem of evil, and the relevant literature is discussed in a preliminary section entitled Divine Hiddenness in the Context of the Problem of Evil.
Divine Hiddenness and Christian Theism: A Biblical Theodicy
Perichoresis
This article offers a Christian response to J.L. Schellenberg's argument for atheism from divine hiddenness. Utilizing the unique theological features of the Christian tradition, I aim to show that Schellenberg's argument does not undermine belief in Christian theism. The first half of the article focuses on differences between the theological presuppositions of classical theism and those assumed in Schellenberg's use of perfect being theology. In the remainder of the article, I present a biblical theodicy that pulls from the Old Testament and current trends in religious belief to argue that the experience of divine hiddenness should not be unexpected if Christianity it true.
REVIEW - The Hiddenness of God
Journal of Biblical and Theological Studies, 2020
Michael C. Rea is Rev. John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Philosophy of Religion. In this book, Rea deals with two problems induced by divine hiddenness. They are [1] the argument against the existence of God, most notably by J. L. Schellenberg; and [2] the challenge of the idea of God’s love. Rea’s approach to the issues involves two steps to respond to these two problems respectively. The first step involves two arguments to show that the hiddenness problems are based on an unfounded assumption about divine love. The first argument, in Chapter 2, is that Schellenberg’s problem is based on a concept of God which is different from and fails to target specifically Christian belief in God. For Rea, the problem of divine hiddenness is fundamentally “a problem of violated expectations” (p. 25).
Hiddenness of God, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016)
2016
“Divine hiddenness,” as the phrase suggests, refers, most fundamentally, to the hiddenness of God, i.e. the alleged fact that God is hidden, absent, silent. In religious literature, there is a long history of expressions of annoyance, anxiety, and despair over divine hiddenness, so understood. Understood in this way, divine hiddenness poses an existential problem for those who have such experiences. However, “divine hiddenness” refers to something else in recent philosophical literature, especially since the publication of J.L. Schellenberg’s landmark book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993). In this context, it refers to alleged facts about the absence of belief of God, on the basis of which one might think there is no God. For example, Schellenberg argues that, since there are nonbelievers who are capable of a personal relationship with God and who do not resist it, there is no perfectly loving God, while Stephen Maitzen argues that naturalism better explains the “demographics” of nonbelief than theism and Jason Marsh argues that naturalism better explains “natural nonbelief” than theism. Understood in this way, divine hiddenness constitutes putative evidence for atheism. We leave divine hiddenness understood in the first way to those fit to address it—rabbis, imams, priests, pastors, ministers, therapists, spiritual directors and the like—although some of the recent philosophical literature addresses it (e.g. DeWeese-Boyd 2016; Garcia 2002). This entry focuses on divine hiddenness understood in the second way.
In philosophical circles such as ours, we have become accustomed to expressing our religious ideas, and offering our analyses and arguments regarding these ideas, in terms that are associated with what we call "theism." I take this usage to be a convenient abbreviation. 1 Perhaps we should better characterize the terms that we like to use and the concepts with which we operate as belonging to "monotheistic" discourse, rather than as simply being "theistic." Moreover it should be noted that our discussions almost invariably relate to monotheism of a very specific type, such as the type that has become foundational in all the current religious traditions which are the successors of the Hebrew scriptures, namely, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Because this is so, there are two things that we shall do well to take into consideration. First of all, we must note that the theological discussions within these three great historical traditions have sometimes been more inclusive and of wider range than what is just contained in these simple monotheistic terms, no matter how foundational these terms may be. Each of the traditions has included philosophical currents and mystical movements that have modified, in different ways, the basic concepts behind the skeletal monotheistic terms with which they have operated. Of this we shall speak more later on. Second, we must recognize that when, in the course of our philosophic discussions, we do formulate our ideas in the simple monotheistic terms, as these are understood by the ordinary believers within those religious traditions, we do so at a cost. That cost is the puzzlement and frustration attendant upon the realization that this shared concept of the monotheistic personal God is irredeemably anthropomorphic, since our model of God is based upon the primacy of human agency and human personality. 2 This model is also largely anthropocentric as well, because our interest in God's activity comes to explain all sorts of things that concern us as human beings. Moreover, the measure of the good and evil that we attribute to the world that we believe to have been created by God is our measure, the measure of human beings. The puzzlement of which I talk reflects the fact that we can easily come to recognize that we want to say so much more about the divine than this model can possibly bear. We may want to move beyond the most simple and direct religious messages that this concept of God,
2006
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2 nd edition, MacMillan 2006 Many people are perplexed that God (if such there be) does not make His existence more evident. For many of them, the hiddenness of God puts their faith in God to the test. Others, however, claim that God's hiddeness is the basis of an argument against God's existence. While this claim is no newcomer to religious reflection, it has been the focus of renewed debate since the 1990's. Two preliminary observations are in order. First, the God in question is the God of traditional theism, a personal God who is unsurpassably good. Second, the "hiddenness of God" is an inapt term to use in an argument for the conclusion that there is no God since God is hidden only if there is a God; the term "inculpable nonbelief" is better. At a first approximation, the argument is that there are people who, through no fault of their own, lack belief that God exists; thus, since there is a God only if there is no inculpable nonbelief, there is no God.
The Argument from Evil, the Argument from Hiddenness, and Supernaturalistic Alternatives to Theism
Religions
In this brief article, I consider James Sterba’s logical argument from evil, finding it to be ultimately unsuccessful. Not for the various issues Sterba raises, which do seem to be problematic if God exists, but for the logical approach itself. I encourage Sterba to shift tack, to embrace the evidential argument from evil, which is not at all concessionary, as he seems to think, and is an extremely powerful argument against the probability of theism, especially when we open the debate to the supernaturalistic alternatives to theism. I also encourage Sterba to reconsider his dismissive attitude towards the argument from hiddenness, which, in its evidential form, is also a very powerful argument against God’s existence, either employed independently or incorporated into the argument from evil.
Divine Hiddenness and the Concept of God
International Philosophical Quarterly, 2019
John Schellenberg’s version of the divine hiddenness argument is based on a concept of God as an omnipotent, morally perfect, and ontologically perfect being. I show that Schellenberg develops his argument in a way that is inconsistent with each of these aspects, from which it follows that the argument in question proves to be unsustainable.
The Problem of Divine Hiddenness: A Wojtylian Response
Philosophia: An International Journal of Philosophy, 2020
Alongside the problem of evil, a new problem for theism has emerged: the problem of divine hiddenness. The structure of the problem is straightforward: it hinges on the idea that God’s existence is not obvious to many people, believers, and nonbelievers alike. But if God is loving, God would make sure that everybody would have an immediate knowledge of His existence. However, there are people to whom God’s existence is not immediate; in fact, there are nonbelievers who can rationally doubt God’s existence. Thus, if there are indeed such people, then God does not exist. While Karol Wojtyla, also known as Saint John Paul II, has no sustained work that delves deeply into addressing the problem, some of his ideas may be developed to respond to it. In this paper, I formulate a Wojtylian response to the problem, as can be gleaned in Wojtyla’s view about the nature and extent of faith and its relationship to reason. I also advance two challenges, inspired by Wojtyla, to a core assumption of Schellenberg’s argument that I argue are impossible to be met without the need for religious faith. Then, I conclude by noting the implications of God’s self-testimony in Jesus to the problem of divine hiddenness.
Divine Hiddenness in the Christian Tradition
A critique of J. L. Schellenberg's argument from Divine Hiddenness: Schellenberg's conclusion that since apparently there are 'capable inculpable non-believers in God' the cognitive problem of divine hiddenness is actually an argument for the non-existence of God. Schellenberg's conclusion seems at least partly based on his misunderstanding or disregard of significant aspects of the Judeo-Christian tradition and certain assumptions, especially regarding nature of religious belief as well as primacy and instrumentality of reason. I suggest that given the kind of God proposed by the Judeo-Christian tradition it is not necessary that reasonable non-belief in His existence be impossible; moreover it may even be the case that possibility of reasonable non-belief is necessary given the nature and purposes of God as proposed by the Judeo-Christian tradition