What proof of an External World? (original) (raw)

Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External World

2012

Abstract: In this essay I attempt to refute radical solipsism by means of a series of empirical experiments. In the first experiment, I prove to be a poor judge of four-digit prime numbers, in contrast to a seeming Excel program. In the second experiment, I prove to have an imperfect memory for arbitrary-seeming three-digit number and letter combinations, in contrast to my seeming collaborator with seemingly hidden notes. In the third experiment, I seem to suffer repeated defeats at chess.

The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2008

Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in the existence of an external world itself. I show how Wright's and Pryor's positions are of interest when taken in connection with Humean scepticism, but that it is only linking it with Cartesian scepticism which can explain why the proof strikes us as an obvious failure.

On G. E. Moore's "Proof of an External World"

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

A new reading of G. E. Moore’s “Proof of an External World” is offered, on which the Proof is understood as a unique and essential part of an anti-sceptical strategy that Moore worked out early in his career and developed in various forms, from 1909 until his death in 1958. I begin by ignoring the Proof and by developing a reading of Moore’s broader response to scepticism. The bulk of the paper is then devoted to understanding what role the Proof plays in Moore’s strategy, and how it plays it.

Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World”

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2021

This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume that Moore’s response to “external world skepticism” deals exclusively with the former, not the latter. But this is a mistake. I shall argue that Moore’s anti-skeptical argument targets an ontological form of skepticism. Thus, the conclusion is an ontological claim about fundamental reality, while the premises are epistemic claims. If this is correct, then the conclusion outstrips the scope of its premises and proves too much.

Why Proof? What is a Proof?

In R. Lupacchini & G. Corsi (Eds.), Deduction, Computation, Experiment. Exploring the Effectiveness of Proof, Springer, Berlin 2008, pp. 1-27, 2008

This paper is concerned with real proofs as opposed to formal proofs, and specifically with the ultimate reason of real proofs (‘Why Proof?’) and with the notion of real proof (‘What is a Proof?’). Several people believed and still believe that real proofs can be represented by formal proofs. But this view is by now obsolete. This paper shows its limitation and and puts forward an alternative approach to proof.

THE PROOFS TO BELIEVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In the history of philosophy, proofs for ‘the existence of God’ occupies a remarkable position. Beginning with the Ancient Western era to the contemporary, many philosophers have contributed a lot to the field of philosophy. But in this research I have discussed only up to the modern philosophy. Here it is clear that though their aim was one they have taken different ways to reach those ends in different angle.

On an Unsound Proof of the Existence of Possible Worlds

1989

In this paper, an argument of Alvin Plantinga's for the existence of abstract possible worlds is shown to be unsound. The argument is based on a principle Plantinga calls "Quasicompactness", due to its structural similarity to the notion of compactness in first-order logic. The principle is shown to be false.