Chapter Two. The Gods Divine Justice Or Divine Arbitrariness? (original) (raw)
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The Quarrel of Philosophy and Poetry
A discussion of the quarrel of philosophy and poetry in its various stages in the history of western ideas: from the early poets (e.g., Homer), to the first philosophic attack on poetry (e.g., Xenophanes), to the poetic counter-attack against philosophy (e.g., Aristophanes), to the classical synthesis (e.g., Plato), to the modern solution (Machiavelli to Nietzsche).
The Old Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry
The quarrel between philosophy and poetry has implications for our lives as both citizens and ordinary human beings. By closely reading and interpreting Book X of Plato’s Republic, which judges poetry by the standard of truth, and Aristophanes’ Clouds, which provides a comic critique of philosophy, we may see that the philosopher and the poet seem to engage in conversation, addressing similar points from opposing views and outlining the terms of their disagreement. This thesis aims to point to questions raised and answered by the poet and the philosopher about the status of reason in governing the soul and the city, the best life for human beings according to their nature, and the role of laws and convention in our lives and relationships. It also applies the discussion of these topics to issues of free expression today, and explores moral authority as both the philosopher and the poet see it.
The Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy. Introduction
2015
The article introduces to the volume on the quarrel between poetry and philosophy, by focusing on Leo Strauss's interpretation of this issue in Plato, who is widely recognized as the originator of the quarrel. Furthermore, the article describes how the quarrel is developed in the philosophical and poetic perspectives of some key thinkers such as Leopardi, Benjamin and Proust
2019
Although writing nearly 700 years apart, both Plato and Saint Augustine of Hippo addressed the relationship between the intelligible and sensible world. Specifically, both philosophers sought to uncover how we know what we know: can we trust and derive truth from what we see and sense, or must we look past the sensible world, and derive truth from the immaterial, incorporeal world? And, on top of that, by what means and through what processes can we uncover truth? In Plato's Republic and Augustine's Confessions, both philosophers address and explain their positions on these foundational epistemological questions. The following will (1) explicate Plato and Augustine's positions, (2) compare and contrast the two positions and (3) address which position I find more compelling and tenable.
Poetry and Philosophy: A New Look at an Old Quarrel APSR 109.2 (May 2015)
The subordination of poetry to rational guidance has been denounced as a symptom of a specifically Western sickness, with its origin in Plato’s Republic. But Plato’s disposition to the poets is more complex than is often supposed. Although Book Three’s education in civic virtue includes a call for an austere, civic poetry, in Book Ten Socrates finds the wisdom of this provision to need a serious reconsideration, one made necessary because philosophy has emerged as the true answer to the search for a genuinely fulfilling, happy life. Book Ten’s reconsideration quietly shows that great poets likeHomer are wiser than the earlier examination had suggested, especially about death, and are even indistinguishable from Socratic philosophers in their understanding of and disposition toward death and so in the related matter of the best human life.
Drawing on Plato as paradigmatic philosopher and, to a large extent, the intellectual architect of subsequent Western philosophy, the essay examines the definite limits of philosophical discourse and explores the conditions of its legitimacy. Taking Plato's treatment of the poets in the Republic as an example, the essay argues that poetry and philosophy are autonomous discourses, "separate magisteria"; that rational foundations are the conditions of meaningful philosophical discourse; and that poetic discourse is a form of dramatic wisdom which becomes meaningful precisely at the point at which philosophical discourse breaks down.
The Agon between Philosophy and Poetry
Athletics, Gymnastics, and Agon in Plato, 2020
In Republic 607b, in the context of justifying the exclusion of a certain kind of poetry from the city, Socrates refers to an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. In this agonistic dispute, which involved harsh words from both parties, Plato himself played a major role and the extensive restrictions Socrates imposes on poetry in the Republic would denounce his view that philosophy, and not poetry, should have the final word when it comes to molding Greek education. When one analyses Socrates’ arguments against traditional poetry, one serious accusation he seems to be open to is that of selectively choosing his quotations from the poets and intentionally distorting their meaning, sometimes by presenting them out of context and supposing that a regular reader/hearer would also do the same. However, in the Republic, before Socrates imposes his restrictions on poetry, Plato introduces Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ initial speeches, which play a key role in understanding why Socrates distorts the poets. A thorough reading of the brother’s speeches intended to present the “majority’s” views on justice will reveal that they also distort and interpret the poets in a way that fits their own purposes. This seems to be Plato’s strategy to make the reader understand that a distorted reading and appropriation of the contents of poetry is not a far cry from what can actually happen if poetry is not purified of its ambiguities, precisely the sort of ambiguities some of Socrates’ restrictions aim to prevent.
“Justice and the Banning of the Poets: The Way of Hermeneutics in Plato’s Republic”
Interpretations of Plato’s consideration of poetry often see his position either as a rejection or an admittance of only a certain kind. This article offers a more complex analysis: questions concerning the nature of justice and poetry should be taken as mutually illuminating inquiries. This constitutes Plato’s hermeneutics which shows how understanding poetry ideally effects a metanoia (new understanding) that requires the harmony between ethical deliberation and narrative self-understanding. The dialogue is a mimesis of this process, and the conclusion in Book X does not represent Plato’s final position but the trajectory of the dialogue when such a metanoia is incomplete. If you are a student researching this topic, please see my Phil Bits videos on Plato and Poetry on YouTube: https://youtu.be/UKk-\_-7nYIQ
It is first argued that dialectic was a form of regimented debate, which grew out of public debates in Ancient Greece. A set of rules for dialectical bouts is then given and their meaning explained. The transition from oral to written arguments is briefly examined, leading to the formulation of a delimitation problem in Plato's dialogues, as he inserted dialectical arguments within ordinary dialogue contexts, turning them into discussions where one of the participants reasons hypothetically to make the other realize that they are not entitled to their view. Doing so, Plato adjusted dialectic to a variety of dialogue purposes and in order to explore this variety, a study of the early tradition of classifying Plato's dialogues in terms of their 'character' is suggested, the results of which are then compared with types of dialogues in contemporary Argumentation Theory. 4.1 Public Debates and Dialectic as Regimented Debate Ut nihil affirmet ipse, refellat alios G. E. R. Lloyd argued in Magic, Reason and Experience that beliefs about nature were subjected within Ancient Greek culture to the same "radical examination" as political views: they were openly challenged in public debates, where every assumption was liable to be scrutinized. 1 In the opening section of On the Nature of Man, the author describes public debates between contending speakers concerning such beliefs: He who is accustomed to hear speakers discuss the nature of man beyond its relations to medicine will not find the present account of any interest. For I do not say at all that a man is air, or fire, or water, or earth, or anything else that is not an obvious constituent of man; such accounts I leave to those that care to give them. Those, however, who give them have 1 [42, p. 248].