Emotions,'Phantasia'and Feeling in Aristotle's Rhetoric (original) (raw)
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Phronesis (1982)
Since the object of rhetoric is judgment (Rhetoric 1377b2l) and since what appears does vary with the emotions (ibid. 1378al), a concern for rhetoric provided Aristotle with the opportunity to develop his most sustained thoughts on emotions; not only does he define, explicate, compare and contrast various emotions, but also he characterizes emotions themselves. 1 His observation is quite striking.
2013
Robert Prus is a sociologist at the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. A symbolic interactionist, ethnographer, and social theorist, Robert Prus has been examining the conceptual and methodological connections of American pragmatist philosophy and its sociological offshoot, symbolic interactionism, with classical Greek and Latin scholarship. As part of this larger project, he also has been analyzing some of Emile Durkheim’s lesser known texts (on morality, education, religion, and philosophy) mindfully of their pragmatist affinities with symbolic interactionist scholarship and Aristotle’s foundational emphasis on the nature of human knowing and acting.
CONCEPTUALIZING EMOTIONS : FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE
Chora.REAM, 2022
Cet article vise à faire ressortir les fils hétérogènes de la pensée sur les émotions qui traversent la littérature philosophique et médicale grecque des cinquième et quatrième siècles avant J.-C., contribuant à l'émergence de la sphère des passions en tant que territoire autonome pour l'exploration des faits mentaux. Nous examinons d'abord le modèle psychologique homérique dans le but de mettre en évidence son influence sur la littérature philosophique et non philosophique grecque des siècles suivants. Les auteurs hippocratiques, en particulier, se révèlent redevables du monisme «matérialiste» d'Homère, mais on retrouve également des traces du modèle épique chez les penseurs qui, par la suite, se sont intéressés à la relation entre le corps et l'entité-âme. Nous reconstituons ensuite l'évolution au cours de laquelle, d'Héraclite à Démocrite, de Platon à aristote et au Péripatos, une notion du pathos en tant qu'émotion finit par émerger, prête à être acceptée et bien sûr précisée autant que retravaillée par les philosophies des âges hellénistique et romain 1 .
n: M. Boeri - Y. Kanayama - J. Mittelmann (Eds.), Soul and Mind in Greek Thought, Springer. 2018.
Recently, a strong hylemorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of the causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and guiding thread, but relying also on the discussion of in Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included in the picture, then a causal interaction of mind and body remains within Aristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylemorphism is understood. Beyond the discussion regarding this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfold causal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for a comprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. Through the different causes Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon of emotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intensional object.
The phenomenology of emotions-above and beyond 'What it is Like to Feel'
The Routledge handbook of phenomenology of emotion, 2020
Second, talking of a 'rediscovery' of emotions in philosophy is, in fact, highly misleading. After all, emotions have never been completely ignored in the history of philosophy. Quite the contrary, the nature of affectivity and the role of emotions in human existence and social reality as well as the notorious relation of emotions and rationality always been at issue in philosophy-even where explicit discussion of the emotions is missing or is deliberately relegated to the conceptual background. Moreover, the relation of philosophical reasoning to emotions, and the role that emotions (ought to) play therein, has never been philosophically neutral. 'What's your take on emotion' seems, then, to be the 64,000-dollar question for philosophers, ever since emotions entered philosophical thinking (see Landweer and Renz 2012). 2 Affects and emotions have played a central role in Western 3 philosophy ever since they were introduced by Plato, Aristotle, and the Greek and Roman (Neo-)Stoics (cf. Nussbaum 2001). They were extensively discussed as key factors in rhetoric, political life, moral psychology, and social interaction. Most classical authors, such as Aquinas, Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes, Malebranche, or Spinoza, up until the Scottish moralists, explored a panoply of particular affects, sentiments, and emotions, taxonomizing the so-called 'passions of the soul' (Descartes); many of these authors also offered general theories of emotions. It is, however, also true that after Kant and Rousseau, starting roughly with the dominance of German Idealism, emotions ceased to play any systematic role in philosophy. 4 In this period of relative marginalization, we find only a few isolated discussions of specific emotions, such as compassion in Schopenhauer 5 or anxiety and fear in Kierkegaard.
From Plato to Ellis. A Short Investigation of the Concept of Emotions
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2013
Ever since ancient times, emotions have been studied and intrigued the scientists. In this article, we set out to see how perspectives upon the concept of emotions have changed over time and according to each approach. We briefly discuss about two major Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotles, move on to more recent times with Descartes and Darwin, change the pace again with Sartre as the representative of phenomenology and end up with the cognitivists' approach presented by Johson and Laird, Lazarus, Frijda and Ellis, with the main focus on Ellis' ABC model based on the Rational Emotive Behavior Theory.
Perceiving Emotions (from Proc. of Aristotelian Society)
I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout’s challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivabilityof- emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout’s suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement of my own proposal that incorporates some of his insights.