The Stoics on Fate and Freedom (original) (raw)

Free Will, Determinism and Stoic Counsel

Ars Disputandi

Stoic philosophy has been charged with an inconsistency insofar as its deterministic worldview appears to conflict with its advocacy of various methods of self-discipline aiming at self-improvement. It is, some claim, self-contradictory to hold persons responsible for adhering to counsel regarding their behavior and attitude if forces beyond their control ultimately determine that their behavior and attitude will not conform to counsel. In this paper, I argue that this complaint is misguided. Though several Stoic philosophers attempted to reconcile their determinism with some conception of free will, I contend that the Stoics should have (or at least could have) rejected the doctrine of free will while defending Stoic counsel and its efficacy for producing a well-ordered mind, virtuous character, and a life of harmony with Nature.

Early Stoic Determinism= Le Déterminisme Dans L'Ancien Stoïcisme

Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 2005

ABSTRACT: Although from the 2nd century BC to the 3rd AD the problems of determinism were discussed almost exclusively under the heading of fate, early Stoic determinism, as introduced by Zeno and elaborated by Chrysippus, was developed largely in Stoic writings on physics, independently of any specific "theory of fate ". Stoic determinism was firmly grounded in Stoic cosmology, and the Stoic notions of causes, as corporeal and responsible for both sustenance and change, and of effects as incorporeal and as predicates, are indispensable for a full understanding of the theory. Stoic determinism was originally not presented as causal determinism, but with a strong teleological element, in the context of a theory of natural motions, which makes use of a distinction between a global and an inner-worldly perspective on events. However, Chrysippus also employed his conception of causality in order to explicate his determinism, and can be shown to have maintained a universal causal determinism in the modern sense of the erm. The teleological and mechanical elements of early Stoic determinism were brought together in Chrysippus' conception of fate, which places elements of rationality in every cause.

The Piety of the Determined Will: A Critique of Stoic Freedom

The Stoic's were aware of the problem of reconciling a deterministic view of the universe with a preservation of the responsibility and freedom of an individual's will. Stoic philosophy does not adopt a traditional conception of libertarian freedom, where individuals can act freely with respect to multiple different actions in the world1. Instead, the individual is fated to act in a specific way, but is free to assent, or not assent, to the validity of impressions which are presented to the mind2. The Stoic doctrine of determinism states that the universe as a whole is God, and that the will of God determines the entirety of this universe. Reconciling the doctrine of a determined universe with the idea of free assent is imperative to the Stoic philosophy, but brings about significant problems. In this paper, I examine the concept of assent in Stoic philosophy. Assent is intended to help the Stoic reconcile determinism with individual freedom and responsibility. Specifically, I aim to critique Chrysippus' distinction between principal and auxiliary causes, and its implications on the relationship between the individual and God. I conclude that Chrysippus' notion of assent as an auxiliary cause does not avoid the problem of reconciling determinism and individual responsibility. Furthermore, the conception of the individual as free places the individual's volition outside of the will of God. Any attempt to reserve a space for individual freedom from fate, as is the case with the freedom to assent or dissent to given presentations, comes at the cost of the Stoic claim that the universe as a whole is 1 Also known as the principle of alternate possibilities, or PAP for short (O'Keefe, 11). 2 Different Stoics differ on the degree of freedom attributed to the mind. Chrysippus did not think the mind was as free to alter its own beliefs and desires as did the earlier Stoics. Instead, he aimed to reconcile the concepts of assent and causation with the deterministic nature of the world, including the mind (Hellenistic Philosophy, II-90.39).

A Neglected Stoic Argument for Human Responsibility

2016

On two separate occasions Origen attempted to defend the proposition that human beings are personally responsible for their actions. In his comprehensive exposition of Christian theology, On Principles, written about A.D. 220-25, he devoted an entire chapter to the subject of free will, in the first half of which he attempted to demonstrate on philosophical grounds that human beings are responsible for their behavior and that it is within their power (to e<p' tijivv) to do right and avoid sin, as God in his justice demands (De Princ. 3. 1. 1-5 = SVF 2. 988).1 A decade or so later in his treatise On Prayer Origen again defended human responsibility, this time in order to show that God does not foreordain everything that happens, thereby rendering prayer useless, but rather that human beings remain in control of and responsible for their own decisions and actions (De Orat. 6. 1-2 = SVF 2. 989).2 Origen's two arguments have long been regarded as influenced by the Stoic liter...

Stoic Providence: Cosmology and Ethics United

This paper investigates Providence as it was conceived by the Stoics, beginning from the earliest of their school, Zeno, up until the writings of Seneca. What is Providence for the Stoics and how does it differ from fate? The findings of this study will be that the Stoics held Providence to be due to God’s rational ordering of the cosmos, that God in some sense is the cosmos, and thus the perfection of God is indistinct from the perfection of the cosmos. A difference can also be seen between the early and later Stoics. For the early Stoics, Providence is more of a cosmological speculation, whereas for the later it is a term of great ethical significance. In the end, Stoic cosmology and ethics are united in Providence.

Necessity, Possibility, and Determinism in Stoic Thought

Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap, 2016

At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a posteriori, a world order according to certain metaphysical principles and natures that god crafts within the constraints of matter. Finally, what is providentially necessary is what occurs according to the chain of fate, but only once it is in process or past. The method of the paper is a close reading of Diogenes Laertius 7.75, adducing broad textual evidence along the way, to show that the Stoic theory of modality embraces Philonian possibility, both that which is capable of being true as a matter of logical consistency, and that which is possible according to the bare fitness of the entity. What differentiates the Stoics from Philo is their additional commitment to possibility as opportunity, resisting the collapse of determinism into necessity.