Ontological Scope and Linguistic Diversity: Are There Ontological Categories? (original) (raw)
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"This essay explores the relationship holding between language, cognition and space by examining the notion of “ontological commitments” and focusing on Basque as the exemplar. In recent years discussions of linguistic relativity have brought to the fore the question of language-specific ontology. This topic has been addressed by Lucy (1996; 2000), and Levinson (1996), and even earlier by Whorf in the 1940s (Whorf 1995) as well as more indirectly by language typologists such as Senft (2000) and other researchers (Barton and Frank 2001; Nisbett 2003; Nisbett et al. 2001; Watson 1990). The chapter begins by introducing the key role played by “ontological commitments” in language, using Basque as the data source and, more concretely, by means of a fine-grained analysis of two Basque morphemes -en and -ki along with the schemas associated with them. Once the morphological complexity of each of the Basque examples is established, I attempt to describe the conceptual structure inherent to each classifier, following the lead of Tuggy (2003), Inglis (2003) and Palmer (2003). Methodologically, I draw on Langacker’s (2004) remarks on type, instance and nominal grounding, as well as those of Hudson (2004) and Dryer (2004) in reference to the cross-linguistic applicability of the terms “nominal grounding” and “noun phrases”. Overall, I argue for the following position: there is an aspect of spatial representation that relates directly to the differences in these ontological commitments and is conditioned by them. Finally, I propose that cognitive linguistics can profit by broadening its focus and becoming more aware of the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural research being conducted on the ontological commitments. Key words: linguistic relativity, ontological commitments, Basque, pre-dative marker, monologic, dialogic, schemas, spatiotemporal particulars, type, instance, nominal grounding. "
The place of linguistic concepts within a general ontology of everyday life
Proceedings of the EMELD Language Digitization …, 2005
Investigations into the foundations of a cross-linguistic database and the comparability of languages have led to the assumption that languages are comparable to the extent their functions are comparable. Assuming furthermore that the prime function of language is mind-sharing (shared activation of corresponding mental contents) and that this presupposes shared ontologies or conceptualizations of the world, it seems natural to adopt an ontology-driven or ontolinguistic approach to research on and especially across languages.
… Coding of Concepts. Berlin/New York …, 2007
Current progress in linguistic theorizing is more and more informed by crosslinguistic investigation. Comparison of languages relies crucially on those concepts which are essentially the same across human minds, cultures, and languages, and which therefore can be activated through the use of any human language. These instances of mental universals join other less common concepts to constitute a complex structure in our minds, a network of crossconnected conceptualizations of the phenomena that make up our world. Following more and more widespread usage we call such a system of conceptualizations an ontology, and we submit that the most reliable basis for any cross-linguistic research lies in the common core of the different individual human ontologies. This is the basic tenet of all approaches that can properly be called ontology-based linguistics or ontolinguistics for short.
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Helmbrecht et al. (eds.), Form and function in language research. Papers in honour of Christian Lehmann. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin / New York, 2009: 151-157., 2009
Journal of Memory and Language, 1999
What do differences across languages reflect about underlying category structure? This article focuses on how ontological divisions-the major divisions of entities in the world-are reflected in two languages. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the contrast between objects and events among English and Spanish speakers by examining patterns of linguistic predicability-allowable combinations of nouns and predicates that constitute much of the evidence for ontological knowledge. Results from Experiment 1 replicated the previously documented ontological contrast between objects and events on the basis of temporal and physical predicates among adult speakers of both languages. However, Spanish speakers, unlike English speakers, distinguished objects from events on the basis of spatial predicates. In Experiment 2, the spatial distinction was found to develop according to the same trajectory in Spanish-speaking children as the temporal distinction develops in both English-and Spanish-speaking children, further suggesting an ontological contrast between objects and events based on spatial properties. Experiment 3 investigated the role of spatial and temporal properties in objects and events using a measure that did not rely on linguistic predicability. In this experiment, both speakers of English and Spanish judged variations in temporal and spatial properties as more likely to change the identity of events than of objects, indicating that the spatial linguistic contrast made by speakers of Spanish in Experiments 1 and 2 reflects an underlying conceptual contrast between objects and events that is made by both English and Spanish speakers-a contrast not previously documented in experimental psychology. This work offers new experimental evidence on the psychological distinction between objects and events and leads to a better understanding of the relation between language and ontological knowledge.
The Ontological Commitments of Natural Language are Indeterminate
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Realist linguistics and dynamic ontology
The aim of this essay is to explore an appropriate characterisation of human language within the framework of general ontology. In order to make this exploration as concrete as possible, we will investigate rather directly the possibilities suggested by the now rapidly developing area of ontological engineering. Ontological engineering is concerned with constructing formally specified ontologies that may be computationally instantiated in order to support intelligent reasoning by information-based systems. This employs several notions of ontology, only some of which are directly related to traditional philosophical 'Ontology' construed as the study of the 'real', of what is or what exists. Ontological engineering is of interest particularly because of its explicit proposals for well specified foundational ontologies. The formalization of these ontologies allows us to follow the consequences of particular modelling decisions more closely. We can accordingly try to place complex entities, such as 'language', against the background of categories that they provide. We will ask to what extent this approach can perhaps take us further than more traditional discussions within the history of the philosophy of language or semiotics.