Response to Brian R. Clack (original) (raw)

Answering Sraffa on Religion: Wittgenstein Walking the Tightrope (open access)

JoLMA - , 2024

The subject of religion, one might think, although discussed in the Tractatus, is conspicuously absent from or in Wittgenstein’s later works, particularly in the Philosophical Investigations. Using Sraffa’s comments as a starting point, I tentatively deal with the absence of the subject by considering the question whether Wittgenstein’s religious views are compatible with his philosophies in the Tractatus and in the Philosophical Investigations. Answering this question involves examining Wittgenstein’s own central concern about his convictions in his later years, namely, to what extent one can honestly be a religious thinker nowadays. Presumably, his philosophy might not allow a ‘philosophy of religion’, if his own views on religion are not compatible with his philosophy. I tackle these issues beginning with Wittgenstein’s conversations with Ludwig Hänsel, then move to his later views and relevant passages in the Philosophical Investigations. With this in place, I uncover a religious moment that is not completely apparent in his later book, namely, an admission of errors that is a sort of confession.

The Significance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Religious Belief

Philosophia, 2021

This article aims to show that Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one's own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language.

Religion as A Form of Life: Some Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Concept of “Religion”

2019

Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion and religious language has some bearings on the current discussions on place of the religion in the secular societies. Early Wittgenstein represents a restrictive concept of religion as the religious language remains beyond the limits of ordinary experience and senses. In the Investigations religious life regarded as one form of life among other life experiences and hence the religious expression may as well constitutes a particular language game in itself. Wittgenstenians are divided on implications of this new conception of religion later works of Wittgenstein indicates.In this article I will analyze the implications of Wittgenstein’s concept of religion and religious language in the context of his later works. The question about the religion as a form of life needs to be answered as follows: Is religious language, according to Wittgenstein, a closed discourse that only within particular religious language game becomes meaningful? Or does Wittgen...

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Religion

How do images, idols and pictorial representations of the supernatural define our ability to decipher God? How does language communicate what is seen into what is audible or written? This is a humble attempt to look at religion from a different perspective, this piece was inspired by reading the first work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Towards a Meaningful Talk About Religion

International journal of social sciences, 2020

Wittgenstein’s profound thought had rich implications regarding religious belief and religion. In his early philosophy, silence occupies a central place to articulate what is beyond the boundary of language. Silence overcomes the limits of human language. In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, religious language and different religious languages are legitimized by the multiple uses of language. An evaluation of his linguistic philosophy and its application in religious belief reveals that despite the limitations of his philosophy, Wittgenstein has enriched the contemporary philosophy of religion. This paper discusses the meaningful talk about religion, religious speech acts and religious rituals with Wittgenstein’s later understanding of the religious domain. Though Wittgenstein was not a religious man, he saw things from a religious point of view. His insight on religious belief can be seen from different perspectives. From a pragmatic perspective, religious language is very much tied...