On an Inconsistency in Constructive Empiricism (original) (raw)

Theory-Laden Observations and Empirical Equivalence of Theories

2013

The paper examines Dickson’s (1999) question how it is possible to hold the theoryladen observation thesis and, at the same time, to uphold the thesis of the empirical equivalence of theories. After the elucidation of several semantic distinctions we propose the definitions of empirical equivalence of expressions and theories, respectively. In the next step, we scrutinize the theory-ladenness thesis more closely and propose three distinct, but related, specifications of it. Finally, we reconsider the two theses in question order to show that they could be interpreted as fully compatible.

Another Look at Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination of Theory Choice 1

In 1991 Larry Laudan and Jarret Leplin proposed a solution for the problem of predictive equivalence and empirical underdetermination. In this paper we argue that, even though Laudan and Leplin's reasoning is essentially correct, their solution should be accurately assessed in order to appreciate its nature and scope. Indeed, Lau-dan and Leplin's analysis does not succeed in completely removing the problem or, as they say, in refuting the thesis of underdetermination as a consequence of empirical equivalence. Instead, what they show is merely that science possesses tools that may eventually lead out of an underdetermination impasse. We apply their argument to a real case of two empirically equivalent theories: Lorentz's ether theory and Einstein's special relativity. This example illustrates the validity of Laudan and Leplin's reasoning , but it also shows the importance of the reassessment we argue for.

The logic of empirical theories revisited

Synthese, 2012

Logic and philosophy of science share a long history, though contacts have gone through ups and downs. This paper is a brief survey of some major themes in logical studies of empirical theories, including links to computer science and current studies of rational agency. The survey has no new results: we just try to make some things into common knowledge.

Another look at empirical equivalence and underdetermination of theory choice

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2014

In 1991 Larry Laudan and Jarret Leplin proposed a solution for the problem of predictive equivalence and empirical underdetermination. In this paper we claim that, even though Laudan and Leplin's reasoning is essentially correct, their solution of the underdetermination problem must be accurately assessed in order to appreciate its nature and scope. We argue that Laudan and Leplin's analysis does not refute the problem (as they claim). Instead, what they show is merely that science possesses tools that may eventually lead out of an underdetermination impasse. We apply their argument to a real case of two empirically equivalent theories: Lorentz's ether theory and Einstein's special relativity. We argue that this example shows that the core of Laudan and Leplin's proposal works, but also that the reassessment we argue for is correct and necessary. We conclude that empirical equivalence and underdetermination are ordinary scientific problems rather than problems that should be solved by epistemology.

Empirical Adequacy and Scientific Discovery

Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2008

This paper aims to show that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, such as it is expounded in The Scientific Image, ends up in considerable difficulties in the philosophy of science. The main problem would be the exclusion of mathematics from the conception of science, given its clear absence of empirical adequacy, which is the most important requirement of his formulation. In this sense, it is suggested a more inclusive formulation of scientific theory, aroused from the notion of Da Costa's (1999) simple structure, considering the notion of scientific discovery in a strict sense, and the validity limit of a theory and the formalism used in a temporal context. Le physicien qui vient de renoncer à une de ses hypothèses devrait être (.. .) plein de joie car il vient de trouver une occasion inespérée de découverte. Son hypothèse, j'imagine, n'avait pas été adoptée à la légère ; elle tenait compte de tous les facteurs connus qui semblaient pouvoir intervenir dans le phénomène. Si la vérification ne se fait pas, c'est qu'il y a quelque chose d'inattendu, d'extraordinaire ; c'est qu'on va trouver de l'inconnu et du nouveau. Henri Poincaré, La science et l'hypothèse.

Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence

Synthese, 2011

Are theories 'underdetermined by the evidence' in a ny way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalen ce and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a riv al as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empiri cally equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised - two such 'rival' theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in natu re. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is alw ays an empirically equivalent 'rival' to any accepted theory would have - even if such a demonstration co...

Empirical equivalence, explanatory force, and the inference to the best theory

2005

In this paper I discuss the rule of inference proposed by Kuipers under the name of Inference to the Best Theory. In particular, I argue that the rule needs to be strengthened if it is to serve realist purposes. I further describe a method for testing, and perhaps eventually justifying, a suitably strengthened version of it. * I am greatly indebted to Roberto Festa, Theo Kuipers, and Jan-Willem Romeyn for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Theory-Laden Observation and Incommensurability

Organon F, 2008

In this paper, I investigate the logical relation between two claims: (1) observations are theory-laden 1 and (2) there is no empirical common ground upon which to evaluate successive scientific theories that belong to different paradigms. I, first, construct an argument where (1) is the main premise and (2) is the conclusion. I argue that the term "theory-laden" has three distinct senses: semantic, psychological and epistemic. If 'theory-laden' is understood in either epistemic or psychological senses, then the conclusion becomes a claim about people. If incommensurability is to be a claim about theories, then 'theory-laden' in the main premise should be understood in the semantic sense. I, then, argue that there is a further distinction to be drawn between the absolute and relative senses of theory-laden. The relative sense of theory-laden allows observations that are relatively neutral between the theories under examination. I then conclude that the argument from theory-ladenness only shows that foundational empiricism is not a tenable philosophical position, but it fails to show that no empirical test can decide between successive theories that belong to different paradigms.