Financial incentives for disease management programmes and integrated care in German social health insurance (original) (raw)
Related papers
Disease Management Programs In Germany's Statutory Health Insurance System
Health Affairs, 2004
The introduction in 1996 of free choice among sickness funds in Germany was accompanied by a "risk structure compensation" (RSC) mechanism based on average spending by age and sex. Because chronically ill people were not adequately taken into account, competition for newly insured consumers concentrated on the healthy. The introduction in 2002 of disease management programs addresses this problem: Insured people in such programs are treated as a separate RSC category, making them a more "attractive" group that no longer generates a deficit. The degree of sickness fund activities and the fierce dispute with physicians are valid indicators that the incentives work.
Health affairs
The introduction in 1996 of free choice among sickness funds in Germany was accompanied by a "risk structure compensation" (RSC) mechanism based on average spending by age and sex. Because chronically ill people were not adequately taken into account, competition for newly insured consumers concentrated on the healthy. The introduction in 2002 of disease management programs addresses this problem: Insured people in such programs are treated as a separate RSC category, making them a more "attractive" group that no longer generates a deficit. The degree of sickness fund activities and the fierce dispute with physicians are valid indicators that the incentives work.
Financial incentives in the German Statutory Health Insurance: New findings, new questions
Health Policy, 2010
Objectives: This paper presents findings of a mandatory three-year evaluation of a prevention bonus scheme offered in the German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI). Its objective is to describe the rationale behind the programs, analyze their financial impact and discuss their implications on potentially conflicting goals on solidarity and competition. Methods: The analysis included 70,429 insured enrolled in a prevention bonus program in a cohort study. The intervention group and their matched controls were followed for a three-year period. Matching was performed as nearest neighbor matching. The economic analysis comprised all costs relevant for Sickness Funds (SF) in the SHI and was carried out from a SHI perspective. Differences in cost trends between the intervention and the control group were examined applying the paired t-test. Results: Regarding mean costs there was a significant difference between the two groups of D 177.48 (90% CI [D 149.73; D 205.24]) in favor of the intervention group. If program costs were considered cost reductions of D 100.88 (90% CI [D 73.12; D 128.63]) were obtained. Conclusions: The uptake of a prevention bonus program led to cost reductions in the intervention group compared to the control group even when program costs were considered. However, the results must be interpreted with caution as in addition to financial aspects, socio-economic and health-status, selection bias and the function and use of bonus programs as marketing tools, as well as their long-term sustainability should be considered in future assessments.
Disease management and health care reforms in Germany—Does more competition lead to less solidarity?
Health Policy, 2007
Up to the 1990s German health care legislation was dominated by measures regulating the supply side. Measures, such as budgets, aimed at volume control and sought to confine the increase of health care spending to the growth of the national income. To curb costs more effectively, competitive elements were introduced in the 1990s with free choice of sickness funds (open enrollment). To balance competition and solidarity, a risk compensation scheme (RCS) was implemented two years prior to open enrollment. Since then, balancing competition and solidarity has been a key feature of all consecutive health care reforms. The implementation of disease management programs in the statutory health insurance (SHI) served the dual purpose to promote quality of care and to foster competition. Preliminary experiences suggest, that the aligning of disease management programs with a RCS can greatly aid its implementation and benefit solidarity and competition.
Integrated care in Germany-a stony but necessary road!
International journal of integrated care
German healthcare provides a very comprehensive benefits catalogue, high quality standards, low access barriers and in particular healthcare which is independent from one's income. But at the same time it is one of the most expensive systems in the world. Reasons for the high costs of care are mainly due to the separation of the outpatient, inpatient and rehabilitation sectors, the poor information flow between the service providers and insufficient competition in healthcare provision. In the last 15 years the German government has introduced various reform acts and in doing so has followed a continual path of development: more competition for care concepts between health insurances, more options for the insured and more leeway for players in the various sectors of healthcare. The following article gives an overview of new forms of contracting that have been introduced and provides recommendations for the further development of integrated care in the German healthcare system.
International journal of integrated care, 2010
Integrated care solutions need supportive financial incentives. In this paper, we describe the financial architecture and operative details of the integrated pilot Gesundes Kinzigtal. Located in Southwest Germany, Gesundes Kinzigtal is one of the few population-based integrated care approaches in Germany, organising care across all health service sectors and indications. The system serving around half of the population of the region is run by a regional health management company (Gesundes Kinzigtal GmbH) in cooperation with the physicians' network in the region (MQNK), a German health care management company with a background in medical sociology and health economics (OptiMedis AG) and with two statutory health insurers (among them is the biggest health insurer in Southwest Germany: AOK Baden-Württemberg). The shared savings contract between Gesundes Kinzigtal GmbH and the two health insurers, providing financial incentives for managers and health care providers to realize a sub...
Intereconomics, 2008
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