Disease Management Programs In Germany's Statutory Health Insurance System (original) (raw)
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Health affairs
The introduction in 1996 of free choice among sickness funds in Germany was accompanied by a "risk structure compensation" (RSC) mechanism based on average spending by age and sex. Because chronically ill people were not adequately taken into account, competition for newly insured consumers concentrated on the healthy. The introduction in 2002 of disease management programs addresses this problem: Insured people in such programs are treated as a separate RSC category, making them a more "attractive" group that no longer generates a deficit. The degree of sickness fund activities and the fierce dispute with physicians are valid indicators that the incentives work.
Risk structure compensation in Germany's statutory health insurance
The European Journal of Public Health, 2001
In 1996 insurees in Germany's statutory health insurance system were given a right to choose their sickness fund. To ensure that all funds had an equal starting position, a risk structure compensation scheme based on income and average expenditure by age and sex was introduced. From an analysis of expenditure and transfers, data on sickness fund membership and a published survey, the following effects can be identified: sickness funds merged, with a reduction in number from 1,221 to 420 between 1993 and 2000; the risk compensation scheme narrowed differences in contribution rates; insurees left the more expensive funds for cheaper ones; and increasing transfer sums indicate further risk segregation. Thus, the compensation mechanism will have to be retained permanently, although modifications are likely.
Health Policy, 2006
As a result of recent health care reforms sickness funds and health care providers in German social health insurance face increased financial incentives for implementing disease management and integrated care. Sickness funds receive higher payments form the risk adjustment system if they set up certified disease management programmes and induce patients to enrol. If health care providers establish integrated care projects they are able to receive extra-budgetary funding. As a consequence, the number of certified disease management programmes and the number of integrated care contracts is increasing rapidly. However, contracts about disease management programmes between sickness funds and health care providers are highly standardized. The overall share of health care expenses spent on integrated care still is very low. Existing integrated care is mostly initiated by hospitals, is based on only one indication and is not fully integrated. However, opportunity to invest in integrated care may open up innovative processes, which generate considerable productivity gains. What is more, integrated care may serve as gateway for the introduction of more widespread selective contracting.
Financial incentives in the German Statutory Health Insurance: New findings, new questions
Health Policy, 2010
Objectives: This paper presents findings of a mandatory three-year evaluation of a prevention bonus scheme offered in the German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI). Its objective is to describe the rationale behind the programs, analyze their financial impact and discuss their implications on potentially conflicting goals on solidarity and competition. Methods: The analysis included 70,429 insured enrolled in a prevention bonus program in a cohort study. The intervention group and their matched controls were followed for a three-year period. Matching was performed as nearest neighbor matching. The economic analysis comprised all costs relevant for Sickness Funds (SF) in the SHI and was carried out from a SHI perspective. Differences in cost trends between the intervention and the control group were examined applying the paired t-test. Results: Regarding mean costs there was a significant difference between the two groups of D 177.48 (90% CI [D 149.73; D 205.24]) in favor of the intervention group. If program costs were considered cost reductions of D 100.88 (90% CI [D 73.12; D 128.63]) were obtained. Conclusions: The uptake of a prevention bonus program led to cost reductions in the intervention group compared to the control group even when program costs were considered. However, the results must be interpreted with caution as in addition to financial aspects, socio-economic and health-status, selection bias and the function and use of bonus programs as marketing tools, as well as their long-term sustainability should be considered in future assessments.
Incomplete risk adjustment and adverse selection in the German public health insurance system
2002
The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996. To avoid adverse selection, a prospective risk compensation scheme was introduced in 1994. Due to their low contribution rates, company-based sickness funds were able to attract a lot of new members. We analyze -using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel -the determinants of these transitions from 1995 to 2000. By estimating a simultaneous two equation system, we find that health status positively, and significantly, affects the probability of changing to a company-based sickness fund, especially after controlling for age. Thus the risk compensation scheme does not fully control for the health status of the changers. Consequently, the comparative advantages of company-based funds will increase over time. This observation provides evidence for the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium.
Health Policy, 2007
Up to the 1990s German health care legislation was dominated by measures regulating the supply side. Measures, such as budgets, aimed at volume control and sought to confine the increase of health care spending to the growth of the national income. To curb costs more effectively, competitive elements were introduced in the 1990s with free choice of sickness funds (open enrollment). To balance competition and solidarity, a risk compensation scheme (RCS) was implemented two years prior to open enrollment. Since then, balancing competition and solidarity has been a key feature of all consecutive health care reforms. The implementation of disease management programs in the statutory health insurance (SHI) served the dual purpose to promote quality of care and to foster competition. Preliminary experiences suggest, that the aligning of disease management programs with a RCS can greatly aid its implementation and benefit solidarity and competition.
Health Economics, 2003
In many countries, social health insurance systems are being reformed in favor of more competition among insurers, while premiums are community rated by regulation. The implicit incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection can only be curtailed using appropriate systems of risk-adjusted equalization payments among insurers. To develop these systems, predictors of individual utilization patterns have to be identified, e.g. via regression analysis using previous utilization data. In some countries such as Germany, such data are hardly ever available. In the early nineties, a number of sickness funds participated in an experiment in which individual utilization data were collected. Our data set covers more than 70 000 members of company sickness funds over a 5-year period. We analyze sociodemographic determinants of utilization which could be used as risk adjusters in a risk equalization scheme. Our results suggest that besides age and sex, the set of risk adjusters should include income, family status and a dummy for the last year of life.
The new risk adjustment formula in Germany: Implementation and first experiences
Health Policy, 2013
In Germany risk adjustment is a core element of the regulatory framework of competition between sickness funds. It shall create a level playing field between funds with very heterogeneous risk structures. Prior to 2009 risk adjustment was mainly by a demographic model. In 2009 morbidity based risk adjustment was introduced, embedded in a broader reform of the statutory health insurance system. The new formula covers 80 "severe" or "costly and chronic" diseases structured in a system of hierarchical groups.