Functional Analysis and Schopenhauer's Theory of the Will (original) (raw)
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Schopenhauer's Metaphysics of Will
2017
This thesis is a detailed examination on Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of will. I first present the inconsistencies in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and point to the problems related to his metaphysical claims. I then demonstrate an alternative reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, focusing on its two characteristics: its contraction of reason and its phenomenological emphasis. I concede that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is burdened with the tension between his adaptation of Kant’s epistemology and his ambitious metaphysical goal to break away from the Kantian tradition. However, these inconsistencies and problems do not render Schopenhauer’s philosophy valueless. In contrary, they open up possibilities for Schopenhauer to address another arena of philosophy that Kant does not pay attention to, that is, human embodiment and human agency. Understanding Schopenhauer’s theories on this topic sheds great light upon his metaphysical project as a whole.
In Schopenhauer's account of the Will as discussed in "The World as Will and Representation", two potential problems arise. The first potential problem involves the irrational structure of the Will and how it can account for an ordered world. The second potential problem involves originating a desire to escape the Will, when the Will is supposed to be the only thing that drives living beings. I will first explain what the Will is, then follow with a discussion of the problem of structure. Then I will discuss Schopenhauer's remedies for alleviating the sufferings of the Will, which brings about the problem of origin. Though it seems that these concerns would cause serious problems for Schopenhauer, I argue that it is possible they may only be arising from misunderstandings of his writings. 1
Problems and Interpretations of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation
Voluntas - International Journal of Philosophy, 2019
In this paper we present an overview of the current interpretations of the first volume of Arthur Schopenhauer's main work The World as Will and Representation (W I) and discuss their problems. We discuss four issues, which in our opinion must clarify a current interpretation implicitly or explicitly, if it claims to be an interpretation of the whole book: (1) What does Schopenhauer mean by the fact that his work shares only one (single) thought? (2) How are the individual books of W I related? (3) Do we have to read Schopenhauer's W I as a normative guide to the denial of will-to-live or as a neutral description of the world? (4) Do the often discussed contradictions and aporias within the book follow a plan or are they errors of thought? Resumo: Neste artigo, apresentamos uma visão geral das interpretações atuais do Tomo I da obra principal de Arthur Schopenhauer, O mundo como vontade e representação (W I), e analisamos seus problemas. Discutimos quatro questões, que em nossa opinião podem lançar luz a uma interpretação atual, implícita ou explicitamente, no caso de se pretender uma interpretação do livro como um todo: (1) O que Schopenhauer quer dizer com o fato de que seu trabalho exibe apenas um (único) pensamento? (2) Como os livros individuais de WI estão relacionados? (3) Precisamos ler a obra de Schopenhauer como um guia normativo para a negação da vontade de vida, ou como uma descrição neutra do mundo? (4) As contradições e aporias frequentemente discutidas no interior do livro seguem um plano ou são equívocos de pensamento? Preface Not only the content and argumentation of the first volume of Schopenhauer's main work The World as Will and Representation (W I) are decisive for its understanding, but also its structure, organisation, form of argumentation and systematization. However, there is no consensus in research regarding the interpretation of its structure and content. In essence, the discussions revolve around four questions or areas of conflict: (1) What does Schopenhauer mean by the fact that his work shares only one (single) thought? What role I Privatdozent (Adjunct Professor) at
The discovery of the identity of the will and the thing in itself in Schopenhauer is a path that begins with Kant's distinction between appearance (Erscheinung) and the thing in itself (Ding an sich), and leads to moral conclusions about the world and its essence as a continuous form of suffering. Although Schopenhauer's path starts from Kant, he departs from him at an important point and separates his way. By distinguishing between two types of access to our body (external and internal), he attempts to discover the thing in itself, which he calls the will. However, regarding the foundation of the world as the will and equating it with the thing in itself leads to problems in Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this article, I investigate and analyze how Schopenhauer intends to solve Kant's thing in itself problem, and then I demonstrate how his answer to this puzzle creates problems for his philosophy. I also point out two interpretive currents of Schopenhauer's philosophy that attempt to address these problems, and I present a Spinozian reading of Schopenhauer's philosophy, including my own understanding of the thing in itself and the will. Finally, I attempt to solve the problems that arise from Schopenhauer's consideration of the thing in itself as identical with the will.
In: Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism, 15 (2017) [2019], 105-124 .
In this article, I discuss what role the concept of feeling has in Fichte’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophy and how it reveals a newly arising interest in psychological topics within the period of Classical German Philosophy. I expand on this concept first by analysing Fichte’s system of drives and feelings as a part of his moral psychology developed in The System of Ethics (1798). In the next step, I compare Fichte’s view of the concept of feeling with that of Schopenhauer and argue that Fichte’s conception had a strong impact on Schopenhauer’s first volume of The World as Will and Representation (1818/19).
Arthur Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation, Volume 2 (CUP 2018)
The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2, 2018
The World as Will and Representation is the major achievement of Schopenhauer’s life, and the backbone of his intellectual career. In 1844 he published a revised and extended edition of it, and now added a whole second volume of ‘supplementary’ essays. It is this second volume, even longer than the first, that we have here in translation. In 1859, the year before he died, Schopenhauer revised both volumes for a final time, making many further additions.
Schopenhauer's World: The System of The World as Will and Presentation I
Schopenhaueriana. Revista española de estudios sobre Schopenhauer, 2017
In recent years, the research on Schopenhauer has shown a change in the interpretation of his main work, The World as Will and Presentation, from (1) a normative and linear instruction which guides the reader from idealism to mysticism, pessimism and nothingness to (2) value-free and independent descriptions of the world with all phenomena (like idealism, mysticism, nothingness etc.) in it. Thus Schopenhauer’s main work has become an empirical or baconian approach—something like a «philosophical cosmography»—. this fundamentalchange of interpretation radically puts into question what Schopenhauer means by characterizing his main work as an «organic system». The present paper attempts to give an answer to this question, reviewing the self-reflexive, methodological and metaphilosophical hints which Schopenhauer gives in the first volume of his «World» («as Will and Presentation»).