The morning after: Australia, Japan, and the submarine deal that wasn’t (original) (raw)

Strategy under the surface of the Australia–Japan sub deal

East Asia Forum, 2016

The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the country’s future submarines looms as a potential tipping point for the Japan–Australia strategic partnership. If the two countries were to enter into a long term relationship to build these submarines, a closer strategic partnership across the board becomes more likely. But if Australia opts for a German or French partnership, the momentum in Australia–Japan security relations could be seriously eroded.

The quiet achiever: Australia-Japan security relations

· the mutual strategic concerns that have motivated these quiet achievements are intensifying not moderating · US defence policy is increasingly reliant and demanding of support from its regional allies · both Australia and Japan are committed to increasing their force projection capabilities in similar manners.

Beyond the Quasi-Alliance? An Analysis of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership

the rest: journal of politics and development, 2024

This article examines a pathway of the Japan-Australia “special strategic partnership” in recent years. Both countries have developed a special strategic partnership, referred to as a “quasi-alliance”. Hence, the purpose of this research is to contextualise the development of the Australia-Japan quasi-alliance from global, regional, and bilateral perspectives. Globally, the quasi-alliance has been influenced by power transition and hegemonic competition in global politics. Regionally, the quasi-alliance has been embedded into the trilateral and multilateral strategic frameworks in the Indo-Pacific. Bilaterally, the quasi-alliance has been shaped by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC). Nonetheless, close security ties were temporarily adrift over Australia’s submarine deal and realigned by tangible milestones, such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the new JDSC signed off in 2022. While investigating these footsteps of the quasi-alliance formation, this article considers whether both countries have moved beyond the quasi-alliance toward a full military alliance in the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

the special japan-australia strategic partnership within the ambit of

This paper examines Japan’s and Australia’s efforts to enhance the maritime capabilities of the Philippines in the face of China’s maritime expansion in East Asia. It observes that both Japan and Australia are members of a loose association of maritime democracies called “Democratic Security Diamond (DSD).” A brain child of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the DSD was formed by four naval powers—Australia, India, the United States, and Japan--to safeguard safe guard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific. As members of the DSD, Japan and Australia have emphasized the relevance of the regional security architecture through the creation of multilateral organizations as a means of upholding a stable and rules based order in East Asia. Both are also actively involved in joint assistance to the development and maritime capacity building of third countries that might be threatened by the rise of China such as the Philippines. Since the formation of their special strategic partnership in 2012, Japan and Australia have assisted the Philippines in building up its navy, coast guard, and air force. In conclusion, this paper argues that in building up the country’s maritime security capabilities, the Philippines should look at the prospect of signing a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with Australia and the Japan and forming a trilateral security partnership made up of Tokyo, Canberra, and Manila.

Australia-Japan: Towards a New Security Partnership?

This paper assesses the impact of recent upgrades in security ties between Australia and Japan and their implications for the bilateral relationship. In particular, the development and future of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) is assessed. It is argued that former Prime Ministers Abe and Howard encouraged the enhancement of security ties to unprecedented new highs, but that the rise of China and leadership change in Japan and Australia in 2007 will make the prospects of a full security treaty unlikely.

The French-Australian Submarine Affair: Can It Sink the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy?

2021

Australia's decision to terminate a A$90 billion defence contract with France to forge a new defence alliance with the US and UK was a shock for Europe. Ironically, the announcement came just hours before the EU debuted its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Only weeks before being "stabbed in the back," Australia reassured the French of the "importance of the future submarine program" at the high-level 2+2 bilateral mee ng of defence and foreign ministers. However, Australian poli cians claim that France should not be surprised about the termina on of the contract, given major concerns about delays, cost, and suitability of the program for Australia's na onal interests. The crisis might have been compounded by a clash between the Australian low-context culture priori sing strict interpreta on of contractual obliga ons over long-term trust, the la er being more prominent for the French high-context culture. Nevertheless, shouldn't diplomacy serve to avoid such clashes? French resentment cannot merely be explained by the loss of a significant economic deal, although defence exports stand at the core of the French economy. In symbolic terms, France is becoming the de facto leader of the EU in light of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's departure. Moreover, France is taking over the rota ng presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2022. The termina on of the contract can thus be seen as a kick at the heart of Europe. Its severity is demonstrated by the Quai d'Orsay's decision to recall French ambassadors in Washington and Canberra, an unprecedented move in the diploma c rela ons between these tradi onal allies.