Allocation of security system for terrorist events using binomial distribution (original) (raw)
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We model the struggle between terrorist and conventional forces as a Colonel Blotto game, replacing Powers and Shen’s (2006) mathematical expression for the probability of target destruction by a more rigorously derived approximation from a diffusion-based Lanchester analysis. We then use the resulting equilibrium solutions for force allocations and attack probabilities to make inferences about terrorist attackers and government defenders that are roughly consistent with empirical findings. Our analysis reveals that the loss function of a government/society plays a central role in determining the types of targets likely to be attacked by terrorists in “peacetime” and “wartime”, leading to a much more frequent selection of “trophy” targets in peacetime
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Risk …, 2010
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), considerable efforts have been made to esti mate the risks of terrorism and the cost effectiveness of security policies to reduce these risks. DHS, industry, and the academic risk analysis communities have all invested heavily in the development of tools and approaches that can assist decisionmakers in effectively allocating limited resources across the vast array of potential investments that could mitigate risks from terrorism and other threats to the homeland. Decisionmakers demand models, analyses, and decision support that are useful for this task and based on the state of the art. Since terrorism risk analysis is new, no single method is likely to meet this challenge. In this article we explore a number of existing and potential approaches for terrorism risk analysis, focusing particu larly on recent discussions regarding the applicability of probabilistic and decision analytic approaches to bioterrorism risks and the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment methodology used by the DHS and criticized by the National Academies and others.
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Polis Dergisi, 2004
These first years of our twenty-first century will probably be considered as a period in which terrorism has changed dimension and turned out to be an issue that threats the globalized world rather than a problem of some specific countries. Only a small period of the human history of five millenniums has passed without a war since the invention of writing. All the sides and the fronts in these wars are always known. With the twentieth century, first the definition of the war and front changed, the battlefield became any place in the world and the war hit every person in every second without mentioning the differences between soldiers and civilians or morning and evening. Besides, the twentieth century turned out to be a century when the age of the wars of triumph and honor closed and each member of the both sides of a war suffered harm in any case. With the beginning of the twenty-first century, while the world is away from the threat of a global war, the danger of terror and terrorism as the most serious thereat to the humanity and the governmental system became more terrible than any war and a catastrophe for which it is impossible to be completely alert and ready. As a consequence of this, it seems that the age of wars and triumphs closed and the age of strugle between terrorism and anti-terrorism has started. As there is no real victory in this battle, a hindered terrorist intention or operation doesn't give honor or a model to a person like a victory attained after a war does. The battle field of terrorism may be anywhere, the attack time may be any time, the weapons to be used may be anything and the soldiers may be potentially anybody. As a result, in this battle of which the winner is not evident and the loser is everybody, the need to re-analyze the methods and understanding of struggling with terror has emerged. In the light of the ideas above, it would be helpful to divide the struggle with terror into three subsequent steps. The first one of these steps is 'Controlling the Risk' which has been used up to now. The second one is 'Managing the Risk' which is accepted as a more developed understanding and becoming more popular now. The last and the newly one is 'Analyzing the Risk' method. Now we can discuss and evaluate these steps. A) Risk Control: We can define it as preventing or disabling an operation or an action which has a criminal value against a state, a person or an institution beforehand by the help of utilizing different information and intelligence resources. This method, which has been being used, is the most common method in terms of public safety. A great number of highly qualified intelligence staff, expensive technical equipment and being alert all the time are vital issues in this method. It is probable to disturb the public peace for the public safety and
Statistical Methods in Counterterrorism
2006
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European Journal of Operational Research, 2009
Probabilistic uncertainty is caused by ''chance'', whereas strategic uncertainty is caused by an adverse interested party. Using linear impact functions, the problems of allocating a limited resource to defend sites that face either probabilistic risk or strategic risk are formulated as optimization problems that are solved explicitly. The resulting optimal policies differ-under probabilistic risk, the optimal policy is to focus the investment of resources on priority sites where they yield the highest impact, while under strategic risk, the best policy is to spread the resources so as to decrease the potential damage level of the most vulnerable site(s). Neither solution coincides with the commonly practiced proportionality allocation scheme.
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International Journal of Intelligent Defence Support Systems, 2012
Due to their improvised nature, the variability in the design, manufacture and operation of most improvised explosive devices (IEDs) defy the traditional paradigms used to assess the effectiveness of conventional munitions. Thus, IEDs are complex socio-technical systems to model. To compensate for inadequacies in model design or data deficiencies, expert judgement and subjective probability assignments are often employed. The paper aims to reduce this reliance by developing an IED probabilistic risk assessment model using a systems model for IED attacks based on IED device reliability and characterising the human aspects of IED attack operational effectiveness from existing terrorism databases. This model can then be used to develop an automated model for IED probabilistic risk assessment that can be used towards informing military applications such as operations planning and war-gaming, and civil applications such as security risk management (including event planning), protective construction requirements, and insurance assessments. It was found that the risk of loss (fatalities, property damage) is influenced more by operational aspects (such as target selection, IED placement and attack timing) than the technical aspects of the device design and manufacture.
Statistics and Probability in Military Decision-Making
Applications of Operations Research and Management Science for Military Decision Making
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Statistical Data Mining to security system allocation
Data mining is the process of posing queries and extracting patterns, often previously unknown from large quantities of data using pattern matching or other reasoning techniques. It has many applications in security including for national security as well as for cyber security. Security allocation is one of the possibilities of averting terrorist attacks. This paper examines the effect of framing on decision making in a homeland security across the highly terrorist attacking countries to propose a formal model to allocate the security forces. The allocation is mainly based on the probability of attacking countries to prevent the attack.
Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources
American Political Science Review, 2007
This paper develops a framework for analyzing a defender's allocation of scarce resources against a strategic adversary like a terrorist group in four settings: (1) a baseline case in which the sites the defender tries to guard are “independent” in that resources dedicated to protecting one site have no effect on any other site; (2) if the defender can also allocate resources to border defense, intelligence, or counterterrorist operations which, if successful, protect all of the sites; (3) if threats have strategic and nonstrategic components (e.g., the threat to public health from bioterror attacks and the natural outbreak of new diseases); and (4) if the defender is unsure of the terrorists' preferred targets. The analysis characterizes the defender's optimal (equilibrium) allocations in these settings, an algorithm or approach to finding the optimal allocations, and relevant comparative statics. These characterizations provide a general way of thinking about the resou...
Cost of Equity in Homeland Security Resource Allocation in the Face of A Strategic Attacker
2012
Abstract Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent in homeland security since September 11, 2001. Many mathematical models have been developed to study strategic interactions between governments (defenders) and terrorists (attackers). However, few studies have considered the tradeoff between equity and efficiency in homeland security resource allocation.