Still Foes. Benovsky on Relationism and Substantivalism (original) (raw)
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Relationism about Time and Temporal Vacua
Philosophy, 2016
This paper examines the discussion concerning temporal vacua, originated by Shoemaker's famous 1969 paper, in connection to relationism about time – roughly, the view that time is nothing over and above a network of relations between things. A novel solution to the problem allegedly constituted by temporal vacua is presented, which turns out to call for, and support, a formulation of relationism that differs from the usual ones. In particular, it is argued that relationism requires neither actual nor merely possible modifications in the qualities or positions of things, and can be made entirely independent of the notion of change.
Substantivalism, relationism, and structural spacetime realism
Foundations of Physics, 2000
A historian of 20 th century philosophy of science that were to consider the recent renaissance of studies on the ontological status of spacetime would certainly notice a significant shift of interest toward metaphysical issues previously scorned by neopositivists philosophers. 2 Some philosophers more inclined toward historical analysis have complained about the audacious tendency of some contemporary philosophers of space and time to portray Newton and Leibniz (see Alexander 1956) as defenders of views that, like substantivalism and relationism, do not always represent in an accurate way the positions really taken by these historical figures (see . However, worse than such moderate forms of "interpretive violence" perpetrated on 17 th century natural philosophers -which in any case are not motivated by unfair attempts to add significance to one's pet philosophical problem by ennobling its historical pedigree -is the fact that the current participants to the debate don't even seem to agree about how to formulate "spacetime substantivalism" 3 within the fundamental spacetime theory of contemporary physics, the general theory of relativity. For example, it is not clear whether one should identify spacetime with the bare manifold or with the metric field. As is often the case when there is no agreement even about the nature of the problem, there is a natural tendency to affirm that 1 I want to thank Robert Rynasiewicz and Robert DiSalle for having read a previous version of this paper and having helped to remove some of my misinterpretations of their views. I am the only responsible for the remaining mistakes. 2 Such foundational studies were revived in the late eighties by the so-called "hole argument" due to John for discussions of the philosophical and metaphysical issues. The tendency to misrepresent Leibniz and Newton as defenders of relationism and substantivalism respectively was decisively more present in the philosophy of space and time of the first part of the century, and especially in Reichenbach.
Kriterion, 2016
Tenseless theorists assert that the relational structure of earlier/ later is the essential structure of time. Using B-notions, so they think, we speak about time `as it is' in a metaphysical sense and hence from the outside of our subjective perspective on it. I suggest on the contrary that the relational structure of earlier/later is part of our own intellectual structuring within the access to temporal phenomena. Furthermore it is essentially characterized by the structure of juxtaposition which originates in spatial experience rather than in temporal. In order to show this I consult Henri Bergson's analysis of our temporal experience on the one hand and of our intellectual practice on the other hand. I will conclude that it is not unplausible to take the relational account of time to be more closely connected to the nature of our intellect than to the nature of time itself.
Time, Relations and Dependence
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1983
s theory of time, though somewhat obscure, purports to establish the unreality of time by pointing to various contradictions inherent in our ordinaryconceptions. Our thinking of time, for Bradley, remains among the lowest of appearances as we abstract from our immediacy and fracture reality into a plurality of moments. This, of course, involves relations of the moments of experience which lies at the heart of Bradley's attack on metaphysical pluralism.
Relational Primitivism about the Direction of Time
2022
Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one's ontology. In the literature, primitivism has in general come along with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time-relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which is metaphysically equivalent to the direction of time. Relational primitivism is an attractive view for those that want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology.
Three Flawed Distinctions in the Philosophy of Time
Metaphysica, 2007
The distinctions between A-series and B-series, between synchronic and diachronic identity and between perdurance and endurance are basic in the philosophy of time; yet they are flawed. McTaggart’s claim that the B-series is static and that a series has to be changing to be really temporal arises from a misunderstanding of temporal relations and of the task of ontological analysis. The dynamic appearance of the A-series results from the incompleteness of the analysis. “Synchronic identity” is synonymous with “strict identity”, which has nothing to do with simultaneity. “Diachronic Identity” is another designation for persistence of an ordinary thing through time and change. Now, strict self-identity holds independently of whether a thing has a short or a long duration. Hence, diachronic identity is synchronic identity. Lewis’ distinguishes two kinds of ontological analyses of persistence, the perdurance and the endurance analysis. This dichotomy is in several respects not exhaustive. Above all, his definition of “persist” is inadequate being based on the notion of multiple temporal localisation which is apt with interrupted but misplaced with persistent, i.e., temporally continuous objects.
On the ontology of spacetime: Substantivalism, relationism, eternalism, and emergence
I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities (timeless and spaceless ‘events’). Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views.
Beyond Spacetime, 2020
Because of the non-locality of quantum entanglement, realist approaches to completing quantum mechanics have implications for our conception of space. Quantum gravity also is expected to predict phenomena in which the locality of classical spacetime is modified or disordered. It is then possible that the right quantum theory of gravity will also be a completion of quantum mechanics in which the foundational puzzles in both are addressed together. I review here the results of a program, developed with Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Marina Cortes and other collaborators, which aims to do just that. The results so far include energetic causal set models, time asymmetric extensions of general relativity and relational hidden variables theories, including real ensemble approaches to quantum mechanics. These models share two assumptions: that physics is relational and that time and causality are fundamental. Invited contribution to a collection of essays on Beyond spacetime, edited by Nick Huggett, Keizo Matsubara and Christian Wuthrich.