On formal universals in phonology (original) (raw)
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Two case studies in phonological universals: A view from artificial grammars
2010
This article summarizes the results of two experiments that use artificial grammar learning in order to test proposed phonological universals. The first universal involves limits on precedence-modification in phonological representations, drawn from a typology of ludlings (language games). It is found that certain unattested precedence-modifying operations in ludlings are also dispreferred in learning in experimental studies, suggesting that the typological gap reflects a principled and universal aspect of language structure.
Frontiers in Psychology, 2016
Everett (2016b) criticizes The Phonological Mind thesis (Berent, 2013a,b) on logical, methodological and empirical grounds. Most of Everett's concerns are directed toward the hypothesis that the phonological grammar is constrained by universal grammatical (UG) principles. Contrary to Everett's logical challenges, here I show that the UG hypothesis is readily falsifiable, that universality is not inconsistent with innateness (Everett's arguments to the contrary are rooted in a basic confusion of the UG phenotype and the genotype), and that its empirical evaluation does not require a full evolutionary account of language. A detailed analysis of one case study, the syllable hierarchy, presents a specific demonstration that people have knowledge of putatively universal principles that are unattested in their language and these principles are most likely linguistic in nature. Whether Universal Grammar exists remains unknown, but Everett's arguments hardly undermine the viability of this hypothesis.
This article is an analysis of the claim that a universal ban on certain (‘anti-markedness’) gram- mars is necessary in order to explain their nonoccurrence in the languages of the world. Such a claim is based on the following assumptions: that phonological typology shows a highly asym- metric distribution, and that such a distribution cannot possibly arise ‘naturally’—that is, without a universal grammar-based restriction of the learner’s hypothesis space. Attempting to test this claim reveals a number of open issues in linguistic theory. In the first place, there exist critical as- pects of synchronic theory that are not specified explicitly enough to implement computationally. Second, there remain many aspects of linguistic competence, language acquisition, sound change, and even typology that are still unknown. It is not currently possible, therefore, to reach a definitive conclusion about the necessity, or lack thereof, of an innate substantive grammar module. This article thus serves two main functions: acting both as a pointer to the areas of phonological theory that require further development, especially at the overlap between traditionally separate subdomains, and as a template for the type of argumentation required to defend or attack claims about phonological universals.
Phonology in Universal Grammar
The Oxford Handbooks of Universal Grammar, 2017
In order to investigate the phonological component of Universal Grammar (UG), we must first clarify what exactly the concept of UG involves. 1 The terms 'Universal Grammar' and 'Language Acquisition Device' (LAD) are often treated as synonymous, 2 but we believe that it is important to distinguish between the two. We take a grammar to be a computational system that transduces conceptual-intentional representations into linear (but multidimensional) strings of symbols to be interpreted by the various physical systems employed to externalize linguistic messages. It thus includes the traditional syntactic, morphological, and phonological components, but not phonetics, which converts the categorical symbols output by the grammar into gradient representations implementable by the body. Bearing the above definition of 'grammar' in mind, we take 'Universal Grammar' to refer specifically to the initial state of this computational system that all normal humans bring to the task of learning their first language (cf. Hale and Reiss 2008:2; and chapters 5, 10, and 12). The phonological component of this initial state may contain, inter alia, rules (the 'processes' of Natural Phonology Stampe 1979), violable constraints (as in Calabrese's 1988, 1995 marking statements or Optimality Theory (OT)'s markedness and
Phonology, Naturalness and Universals
2007
This paper briefly surveys several conceptions of naturalness in phonology, touching primarily on typological frequency and the notion of 'phonetic motivation'. It is argued that typological frequency is not a reliable indicator of what is 'phonetically motivated' as relative frequency patterns are the outcomes of more complex interactions including non-phonetic factors. Phonetic motivations are diverse and include random variations, n o t only deterministic results, as is often desired. Models that view phonological patterns as emerging from complex interactions of a variety of natural factors are the most satisfying.
Deletion or epenthesis? On the falsifiability of phonological universals
This paper presents a revised typology of consonant epenthesis and explores the theoretical implications of such a typology. Through careful re-analysis, the basis for a proposed universal of coronal preference and dorsal avoidance is shown to be lacking in evidential support. In fact, epenthesis as a verifiable phenomenon-and not just a theory-internal label-is called into question once careful attention is paid to the issue of choosing between epenthesis and deletion as competing analyses of the same data. The ambiguity between multiple possible analyses, and the lack of formal transformations (from 'data' to 'evidence') are shown to be general problems within phonological theory. Phonological 'universals' can be invoked to arbitrate between competing analyses, but when the typological evidence for those 'universals' is derived from the same data, a problem of circularity arises. In order to break this closed loop, a quantitative evaluation metric is proposed that is theory-independent with regards to substantive universals. This metric is essentially a statistical threshold for learnability (itself empirically testable) that allows for independent testing of certain theoretical claims.
Phonology without universal grammar
Frontiers in Psychology, 2015
The question of identifying the properties of language that are specific human linguistic abilities, i.e., Universal Grammar, lies at the center of linguistic research. This paper argues for a largely Emergent Grammar in phonology, taking as the starting point that memory, categorization, attention to frequency, and the creation of symbolic systems are all nonlinguistic characteristics of the human mind. The articulation patterns of American English rhotics illustrate categorization and systems; the distribution of vowels in Bantu vowel harmony uses frequencies of particular sequences to argue against Universal Grammar and in favor of Emergent Grammar; prefix allomorphy in Esimbi illustrates the Emergent symbolic system integrating phonological and morphological generalizations. The Esimbi case has been treated as an example of phonological opacity in a Universal Grammar account; the Emergent analysis resolves the pattern without opacity concerns.
Microvariation, Variation, and the Features of Universal Grammar
Accounting for the tremendous diversity of acoustic realizations of what linguists label as the ‘same’ sounds (featurally and/or implicitly through use of IPA symbols) cross-linguistically is a challenging task. Since a certain amount of this diversity is directly reflected in the input data presented to acquirers, and since determining its source is a key component of phonological learning, it is crucial for any account of early phonological acquisition that we develop an understanding of the sources of this diversity. This paper presents an explicit account of types and sources of such diversity, which we will term ‘microvariation,’ and makes a critical distinction between microvariation – a product of various extra-grammatical mechanisms and properties – and phonology. Differences in acoustic realizations due to differences in phonological feature representations, which we will call ‘variation’, should, we maintain, be treated as entirely separate phenomena (although they clearly produce cross-linguistic diversity, as well). A close examination reveals that variation (feature-based distinctions) can be obscured by microvariation and that microvariation can be mistakenly taken as representing variation. Teasing these apart provides us with a clearer understanding of the nature of the grammar and its acquisition, as well as of its interaction with other systems.
Frontiers in Psychology
Findings from the field of experimental linguistics have shown that a native speaker may judge a variant that is part of her grammar as unacceptable, but still use it productively in spontaneous speech. The process of eliciting acceptability judgments from speakers of non-standard languages is sometimes clouded by factors akin to prescriptive notions of grammatical correctness. It has been argued that standardization enhances the ability to make clear-cut judgments, while non-standardization may result to grammatical hybridity, often manifested in the form of functionally equivalent variants in the repertoire of a single speaker. Recognizing the importance of working with corpora of spontaneous speech, this work investigates patterns of variation in the spontaneous production of five neurotypical, adult speakers of a non-standard variety in terms of three variants, each targeting one level of linguistic analysis: syntax, morphology, and phonology. The results reveal the existence of functionally equivalent variants across speakers and levels of analysis. We first discuss these findings in relation to the notions of competing, mixed, and fused grammars, and then we flesh out the implications that different values of the same variant carry for parametric approaches to Universal Grammar. We observe that intraspeaker realizations of different values of the same variant within the same syntactic environment are incompatible with the 'triggering-a-single-value' approach of parametric models, but we argue that they are compatible with the concept of Universal Grammar itself. Since the analysis of these variants is ultimately a way of investigating the status of Universal Grammar primitives, we conclude that claims about the alleged unfalsifiability of (the contents of) Universal Grammar are unfounded.